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ABSTRACT 
 
Name of University: Durham University 
Name: Sarah Emily Morley  
Degree Title: PhD  
Thesis Title: Takeover Litigation: the US does it more than the UK, but why and does it 
matter? 
Submission Date: March 2017 
 
This thesis begins by describing the regulatory regimes of takeovers in the UK and US, and 
maps the litigation landscapes of both jurisdictions. In order to first map or describe the 
litigation landscapes, data was collected to reveal the extent of the UK’s propensity to litigate 
during takeovers. Although data ascertaining takeover litigation levels existed in the US no 
current study had yet established the levels in the UK. It is revealed that in the US 87 percent 
of takeovers are subject to litigation, whilst in the UK the figure is less than one percent. 
Current literature has not yet attempted to explain exactly why the US and UK differ so 
widely, considering their very similar market systems. The focus of this thesis is then to 
explain this difference and debunk some of the more obvious presumed explanations (i.e. 
“the US is just more aggressively litigious”) and identify some lesser known reasons. As the 
main instigators of US litigation are target shareholders alleging their directors have breached 
a fiduciary duty a number of explanations inevitably arise from this particular scenario. A 
simplistic uni-causal explanation is therefore rejected and instead this thesis offers four 
candidates for explaining the disparity. These are, firstly, that US shareholders benefit from 
more extensive “causes of action.” The second explanation encompasses the different “forms 
of action” that are available to shareholders in the UK and US to pursue these causes of 
action; in the US the class action is the favoured form whereas in the UK shareholders are 
limited to the derivative claim. The third explanation concerns the role played by the 
existence of the Code, and its administration by the Panel. It is argued that these UK 
institutions do much to suppress takeover litigation in general. The fourth and final 
explanation is the rather amorphous concept of “litigation culture.” Finally, the impacts of the 
diverging propensities to litigate on factors such as cost and speed on the takeover process are 
then evaluated. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 1.1 Introduction 
This project fits within the area of research which studies the regulation of takeovers. More 
specifically, it provides a comparative study of certain aspects of the regulatory regimes of 
the United Kingdom and the United States. There are many similarities between the corporate 
governance systems of the UK and the US. Indeed, they are often labelled, collectively as the 
“Anglo-American” system, and archetypal examples of “outsider” governance regimes, to 
contrast them with the “insider” systems that characterise many continental European or 
Asian states.  Yet, as Armour and Skeel have noted, when it comes to takeover regulation, the 
UK and US are remarkably divergent in both substance (the rules) and mode (who it is that 
does the regulating). They noted that the US ‘looks to formal law, whereas norms-based self-
regulation holds sway in the UK.’1 
 
In the UK, takeovers are regulated by the Takeover Code (the “Code”), a set of “soft law” 
rules that are written and overseen by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Panel”).  
The rules of the Code place great importance on protecting shareholders, and allowing them 
to control the takeover process. The directors of the “target” company (the company that is 
the subject of the takeover) have only limited means of influencing the outcome of the 
takeover bid. By contrast, the takeover process in the US is regulated to a much greater extent 
by hard law. Instead of the soft law of the Code, the most important rules are found in federal 
regulation and state law, and in place of the active oversight of the Panel, the enforcement of 
the rules falls to the courts. 
 
One striking difference in the takeover regimes of the UK and the US, alluded to already 
above, concerns the extent to which “defensive” or “frustrating” action by target directors is 
possible. In the UK, as has been noted, the central philosophy of takeover regulation is 
                                                          
1
 John Armour, David Skeel, ‘The Divergence of U.S. and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) University of 
Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economic Research Paper No. 08-24 
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“shareholder sovereignty;” shareholders determine the outcome of the bid, and target 
directors cannot deny them the opportunity to do so. In the US, it is argued, target directors 
enjoy rather greater power to influence bid outcomes. This question of the extent of 
directorial discretion is undoubtedly an important aspect of takeover regulation, and this is 
reflected in the voluminous literature that has emerged comparing and evaluating the 
difference between the UK and US approaches. This difference is not, however, the focus of 
this thesis. Instead, this thesis addresses a related, but surprisingly much less studied,
2
 aspect 
of the two regimes.  It concerns the role that litigation plays within the takeover process, as a 
means of resolving the complaints that takeover participants may have.   
 
Referring to the “role” of litigation is a little vague, and it will be helpful to describe briefly 
the three, separate, issues that this reference to the “role” of litigation encompasses (each will 
be expanded on somewhat in this introductory chapter below). The first issue is a descriptive 
one. To what extent do takeover participants in the UK, and in the US, resort to litigation?  
This work shall aim to provide both an “aggregate picture” of the overall propensity to 
litigate in the two jurisdictions, but also unpack the detail to some extent, asking who are the 
parties to such actions, and what complaints are the subject of litigation?  
 
Having, in this way, described the situation in the UK and US, and the extent of the 
differences between them, the second issue that shall be considered moves beyond 
description to explanation. How can the differences, which have been identified between the 
two jurisdictions, be explained? It might be thought, from what has been said so far, that the 
                                                          
2 Whilst Armour and Skeel’s work very briefly commented on how the different mode and substance of the 
regimes might impact on the levels of litigation it was limited in scope and specifically addressed hostile 
takeovers. Their work paid little specific attention to explaining litigation practices and the reason for the 
diverging levels, and the specific impact these practices might have in detail. Their work was also published in 
2007 before the publication of US empirical studies, which this project uses utilises. Literature responding to 
Armour and Skeel (e.g. Coffee John, Sale Hillary, ‘Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better 
Idea?’ (2009) 95 Virginia Law Review 707) has also not yet addressed these issues. In terms of impact of 
different propensities to litigate, much has been written about the general impacts of takeovers, but little has 
focused purely on the impact of litigation to the takeover process. Mukwiri (Mukwiri, Jonathan, ‘The Myth of 
Tactical Litigation in UK Takeovers’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 2), for example, has examined 
likely levels of future litigation in reaction to regulatory changes, yet nothing has been written, specifically, on 
the impact on shareholders propensity to litigate. Ogowewo (Tunde I Ogowewo, ‘Tactical Litigation in 
Takeover Contests’ (2007) Journal of Business Law 589) has evaluated the scope for tactical litigation after the 
implementation of the EU takeover directive, and the new statutory grounding of the Panel and the Code. 
However, this work does not address the current levels of litigation in the UK nor explain the lack of a 
propensity to litigate and its impacts.   
14 
 
answer is both easy and obvious. If the UK system is built on soft law, enforced by an extra 
judicial Panel, whilst the US relies upon hard law enforced by the courts, then those 
fundamental structural/institutional arrangements will cause, and explain, whatever litigation 
practices we discover in the UK and the US.  As is often the case, however, what may appear 
as obvious is merely partly true. A full explanation is more complex, and much more 
intriguing.  
 
The third issue that shall be addressed is to evaluate the different litigation landscapes that 
have been described and explained. It answers the question: so what?  Why is it important to 
understand whether the US and the UK experience remarkably different levels of litigation 
during takeovers, or care what the causes of these differences may be?  
 
To summarise, there are three principal research questions that this thesis seeks to answer:  
a) What takeover litigation is undertaken in the UK, and the US?  
b) How can we explain the divergence in the propensity to litigate between these two 
regimes? 
c) Why do the different propensities to litigate matter?   
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
Chapter two provides a context for the discussion that follows. It does so by explaining why 
takeovers themselves matter (and why therefore the reader might think a further contribution 
to the takeover literature is worthwhile).  Despite their technicality, takeovers have a 
significant impact upon the lives of “ordinary” citizens. Yet how they should be regulated 
remains hugely controversial. Chapter two explores this controversy. It discusses in particular 
the merits of the market for corporate control (“MCC”) by outlining its three main benefits. 
The first two benefits arise from the promotion of economic efficiency, through the 
reallocation of resources to their most productive use and through creating stronger 
disciplinary incentives. The third benefit is the protection that takeovers afford to minority 
shareholders. This chapter will then examine the main criticisms made against the MCC, 
15 
 
namely that the market is not efficient enough to allow the MCC to function correctly and 
that takeovers do not act as a disciplinary device. Finally, this chapter will investigate 
alternatives to the MCC, focusing specifically on shareholder activism, and finally 
concluding that the literature indicates that the MCC is a necessary tool in the Anglo-
American corporate governance system. Having established this, it is clear that takeovers 
play an important role in the system of governance and any limitations placed on it, such as 
frustrating litigation, may not be warranted. Whilst chapter two provides a context within 
which to understand the need for the MCC, it also provides a basis for the assessment of 
litigation practices, which will be drawn upon in the final, evaluatory chapter.  
 
In seeking to explain why there is more or less litigation within these jurisdictions the next 
chapters (chapters three to six) first describe the takeover practices and regulatory regimes 
within the UK and US, and then examine the types of litigation and the different propensities 
to litigate. The further chapters (chapters seven and eight) will then build upon this 
groundwork to explain the different levels of litigation and evaluate the impacts of those 
levels on the takeover process in both jurisdictions. 
 
Chapter three therefore offers a description of the regulation and process of takeovers in the 
UK, including discussing the key players within takeovers and their competing interests. The 
chapter will thus first describe the process by which a takeover is completed in the UK and 
the players that take part in this process, and then move on to describe the function and role 
of the Panel and the scope of the Code. This chapter will also identify the relevant company 
law provisions that impact upon the regulation of takeovers. The aim of the fourth chapter is 
to establish the level of takeover litigation in the UK. As data was not already available from 
current literature, an empirical study was undertaken to ascertain the exact levels of litigation 
within the UK. This chapter also identifies the causes of action that generate litigation in the 
UK, who instigates litigation, and who is the subject of these claims. 
 
As already established, the regulation and process of takeovers in the US is very different 
from those in the UK, and as such, the fifth chapter offers a description of the US system. 
Chapter six then establishes the levels of litigation that parties to a takeover in the US 
16 
 
undertake during the takeover process. The method for gathering the data ascertaining these 
levels differs from that in chapter four, which used hand collected data. This chapter will 
instead use empirical studies that have already been completed in the US, which give 
sufficient data for this assessment. This chapter unexpectedly reveals that target shareholders 
are the instigators of the large majority of litigation in the US. More surprising still, the 
targets of the litigation are their own directors. It is common for the shareholders to allege 
that their directors have breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure, and use the class action 
as a means to bring this claim to the courts.   
 
Chapter seven focuses on explaining the difference between the UK and US’s different 
propensities to litigate. The chapter offers four candidates for explaining this:  firstly, that 
greater statutory disclosure obligations are owed by directors in the US; secondly, the class 
action and the attorney fees that can be recovered in this type of litigation; thirdly the role 
played by both the Panel and the Code; and finally litigation culture. Finally, chapter eight 
turns to focus on evaluating the impacts that these differences have on the takeover process: 
i.e. what effect do the levels of litigation have on the takeover process? The chapter will 
however limit the impacts discussed to those which significantly affect what generally is 
sought from the takeover process: speed, not unduly costly, of benefit to target shareholders 
who bring the litigation and the impact on the MCC. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The first stage of the project involved desk-based research to obtain a thorough overview of 
the literature describing the impact of takeovers in general and the regulation of such 
takeovers in the UK and US. Relevant sources included academic monographs, journal 
articles, conference/working/policy papers and reports (see bibliography). These, together 
with necessary US materials, are available through Durham University’s library either 
physically or electronically (e.g. Westlaw International, Lexis, HeinOnline, LSN, Web of 
Knowledge, EBSCO). The second stage of the research focused on the three research 
questions described above, and mainly involved desk-based research. In order to answer the 
first question, (i.e. what takeover litigation is undertaken in these systems), an empirical 
study was carried out to ascertain the actual levels of litigation in the UK.  
17 
 
 
A search was therefore undertaken in order to find all instances of takeover litigation in the 
UK. The cases which were of interest involved a takeover by either a scheme of arrangement, 
takeover offer, or any case in which there was a change of control or threat of a change of 
control. Both friendly and hostile takeovers were counted, and also claims brought either 
during or after the takeover. This is to enable a good overview of the litigation which can be 
brought during the whole of the takeover process including the effects of a takeover. Using 
the LexisNexis Professional internet database, the search began by initially searching against 
each cause of action that had been identified as being one which parties to a takeover could 
use to progress a complaint; for example, s.171 of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA”). Once 
this search was completed, a case search was undertaken in order to seek out cases under the 
causes of action which did not have a relevant provision, such as the common law duty of 
care. Defunct legislation was also searched when there was an identical provision that existed 
during the time period looked at, for example s.459 of the Companies Act 1985 has now been 
replaced by s.994 CA. 
 
These case searches however brought up many cases that were not relevant. In order to find 
those cases which involved takeover litigation, each case was examined individually. In some 
instances this was not possible to do with the initial search term (which was the cause of 
action). Therefore some searches were refined by selecting the company law field, and then 
searching within the results using the term “takeover.” Once the whole search was complete, 
each case that had been found was then examined further using the case history function. This 
function allows the cases which had referred to the judgment of the relevant case to be 
shown, and also the cases which the relevant case had used in its judgment. Each relevant 
case was then checked to ensure that all the pertinent cases had been found. A more detailed 
outline of the study is given in chapter four along with the findings of the search. 
 
In explaining the divergence in litigation practices a detailed investigation of the development 
of case law, forms of action and practices within the two jurisdictions was undertaken, and 
the broader cultural attitudes towards litigation within the two were also examined. Next, the 
project explored the consequences of the different levels of litigation. The research drew on 
18 
 
the existing literature, from a number of disciplines, debating the impacts of takeovers in 
general, but seeking to isolate the specific effects of litigation within the takeover process.   
Relevant participants within these takeover disputes, including five M&A partners at top tier 
London law firms, were interviewed to ascertain their views as to their experience of 
takeover litigation and opinions as to why they believed there was a divergence in litigation 
practices during takeovers. Finally, the regulatory implications of the findings were analysed. 
For this final part, a relevant policy maker, the deputy director of the Panel, was interviewed. 
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Chapter Two 
The Theory of the Market for Corporate Control 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This first chapter will reveal why takeovers are important, by establishing that takeovers play 
an important role in the system of governance. They perform this governance role via the 
market for corporate control (“MCC”) whereby takeovers not only act as a tool to make 
companies more efficient but also discipline poor management. Any litigation that takes 
place during a takeover which frustrates the bid and prevents it from completing will impact 
upon the effectiveness of this governance mechanism. This is because the MCC relies upon 
takeovers occurring frequently and unhindered. Whilst this first chapter provides a context 
within which to understand the need for the MCC, it also provides a basis for the assessment 
of litigation practices, which will be drawn upon in the final, evaluatory chapter.  
 
The fundamental premise underlying the MCC is the existence of a high positive correlation 
between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that company.
3
 
The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the 
more attractive a takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company 
more efficiently.
4
 There is general agreement that the motives for a takeover determine its 
character, for instance it is said that hostile takeovers will take on a disciplinary nature whilst 
synergistic takeovers are more likely to be friendly.
5
  
 
                                                          
3
 Henry Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1965) 73 Journal of Political Economy 110, 
112 
4
 ibid 113 
5
 Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, ‘Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers’ in 
Alan J. Auerbach (ed), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Chicago) 
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The view that hostile takeovers function as a corporate governance mechanism is often used 
to explain the trend of de-conglomeration during the 1980s. Some academics subsequently 
argued that the hostile takeover emerged in the 1980s as a response to the wave of mergers 
and acquisitions in the 1960s, which produced a high number of inefficient conglomerates.
6
 
When companies ‘failed to recognise the flawed nature of their diversification strategies, or 
were not fast enough to refocus their operations, hostile raiders were ready to do the 
restructuring job for them.’7 It is consequently thought that the top executives are more likely 
to be removed from office in those targets which are performing worse than the average firm 
in their industry.
8
  
 
Takeovers are therefore an important method of correcting managerial failure, and as such, an 
effective external corporate governance mechanism.
9
 Rappaport, for example, believes that 
the wave of takeover activity in the late 1980’s has changed the attitudes and practices of US 
managers.
10
 He argues that ‘it represents the most effective check on management autonomy 
ever devised.’11 The critics of the MCC, however, see takeovers as a poor form of corporate 
governance and maintain that they are exceedingly bad for the economy.  
 
Taking these mixed attitudes into consideration, this chapter aims to do three things: firstly to 
illustrate the merits of the MCC; secondly to discuss the main criticisms of this mechanism; 
and thirdly to explain that there is no viable alternative currently available to replace the 
MCC, at least within the corporate governance regime of the UK. Section 2.2 will outline the 
three main benefits of the MCC: the first two arise from the promotion of economic 
efficiency, firstly through the reallocation of resources to their most productive use, and 
secondly through creating stronger disciplinary incentives. The third benefit is the protection 
                                                          
6
 See Amar Bhide, ‘Reversing corporate diversification’ (1990) 3 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 70, 
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, ‘Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: evidence and implications’ (1991) 12 
Strategic Management Journal 51 
7
 Marina Martynova, Luc Renneboog, ‘A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do 
we stand?’ (2008) 32 Journal of Banking & Finance 2148, 2173 
8 Kenneth Martin, John McConnell, ‘Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover’ 
(1991) 46 The Journal of Finance 671, 681 
9
 Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, ‘Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure’ (1996) 40 Journal of 
Financial Economics 163 
10
 Alfred Rappaport, ‘The staying power of the public corporation’ (1990) 68 Harvard Business Review 96 
11
 ibid 100 
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that takeovers afford to minority shareholders. Section 2.3 will then examine the main 
criticisms made against the MCC, namely that the market is not efficient enough to allow the 
MCC to function correctly and that takeovers do not act as a disciplinary device. Section 2.4 
will investigate alternatives to the MCC, focusing specifically on shareholder activism, and 
finally concluding that the literature indicates that the MCC is a necessary tool in the Anglo-
American corporate governance system. 
 
2.2 The Merits of the Market for Corporate Control 
A great deal of theory and evidence supports the idea that takeovers address governance 
problems,
12
 and that a well-functioning takeover market is essential to overall economic 
prosperity.
13
 An active market for corporate control is said to benefit the economy in three 
main ways: by creating greater economic efficiency; disciplining poor management; and 
protecting minority shareholders. These will now be discussed in turn. 
 
2.2.1 Economic Efficiency  
Economic efficiency is a broad term that implies an economic state in which every resource 
is optimally allocated while minimising waste and inefficiency.
14
 A well-functioning MCC 
creates economic efficiency by allowing outside parties to takeover poorly performing 
companies.
15
 Economic efficiency consequently occurs because of the change in control to  
more effective management, who can then improve the value of the company’s existing 
resources and create allocational efficiency through the reallocation of resources to their most 
productive and efficient use.  
 
Poor management, biases in managers' decisions or managerial rent-seeking behaviours can 
have a vast impact upon the productivity of a company. This is because managers are 
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important to corporate decision making due to their expertise and the information they 
acquire about the firm and its prospects.
16
 If a company is not productive, it will become 
inefficient. Bertrand and Mullainathan, found that poor managers avoided costly efforts 
associated with shutting down of old plants or starting new plants; and that they paid higher 
wages in order to buy peace with their workers.
17
 They maintain that poor management may 
prefer to avoid the difficult decisions in order to lead a “quiet life.”18 Jensen’s free cash flow 
theory also hypothesised that poor management were inclined to sacrifice a company’s 
profitability for size by investing in unprofitable projects.
19
 Takeovers can therefore help to 
remedy incumbent management’s over-investment of resources by bringing in new managers 
who can effectively eliminate excess capacities, reduce wasteful investments, superfluous 
wages or reverse previous unprofitable acquisitions.
20
  
 
New management can also improve the value of existing corporate resources by exploiting 
synergies from combining the target and bidder firms, resulting in improved performance and 
productivity.
21
 The Australian Takeover Panel reported that takeovers can additionally assist 
allocative efficiency by facilitating the reallocation of capital between industries.
22
 They 
argued that many managers are often reluctant to invest outside their own or closely-related 
industries, even though returns may be substantially higher elsewhere. This, they argued, is 
because managers’ skills and experience are often highly industry-specific.23 Takeover 
‘specialists often have less attachment to a particular industry and are more willing to invest 
in alternative, potentially higher-yielding activities.’24 In this context, they concluded, firms 
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with large cash flows operating in industries with poor to average prospects are particularly 
likely to be hostile takeover targets.
25
  
 
Efficiency gains from takeovers also hugely benefit target shareholders both pre and post 
takeover.
26
 Before and after the initial announcement of the tender offer target shareholders 
see a large, positive, abnormal return on their investment.
27
 This happens because the worth 
of the target company is estimated to increase post-takeover
28
 due to the expected efficiency 
gains. Loughran and Vijh,
29
 and Franks et al
30
 show that due to operational changes, targets 
of hostile takeovers in the UK significantly, outperform friendly takeover targets over a three 
year window following the bid announcement.
31
 Jensen, for instance, estimated that post 
takeover restructurings of Phillips, Unocal and Arco in the 1980’s created total gains for 
shareholders of $6.6 billion, due to a reduction in investment in negative net present value 
projects.
32
 The MCC thus subjects firms to a ‘continuous auction process which ensures that 
resources flow to their highest value use.’33  
 
2.2.2 Disciplinary Device 
The threat of a change in control acts as a disciplinary mechanism because inefficient or 
wasteful managers run a high risk of being dismissed. Armour and Skeel explain that a 
properly functioning takeover market can discipline management by keeping them on their 
toes: ‘[I]f managers have reason to suspect that a hostile bidder will swoop in and take 
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control.’34 The discipline of management does not therefore depend on takeovers actually 
occurring. ‘The mere threat of a takeover may galvanise the existing management of a target 
company into improving its performance and raising the returns obtained on assets’ to reduce 
the risk of a further takeover bid.’35  
 
When underperforming firms are likely targets of hostile offers, management are more 
motivated to achieve efficiency.
36
 Shleifer and Vishny, for example, demonstrated that the 
pressures of possible hostile takeovers affected how management behaved, inducing them to 
restructure and increase value creation.
37
 Nuttall also completed a study which confirmed that 
the threat of a hostile takeover had a disciplinary effect on management who were forced to 
rethink their current strategies.
38
 Moreover Bertrand and Mullainathan, who assessed the 
effects of different anti-takeover legislation used in the US, found that restrictions put in 
place within takeover markets had a real effect on firm behaviour and generated a rise in poor 
management.
39
  
 
An active hostile takeover market is thus arguably necessary to motivate management to be 
effective, and it’s not just those companies which are potential targets that are affected. 
Takeover related changes in the operating strategy of a target firm also often lead to similar 
changes in rival firms.
40
 Kerschbamer found that not only did the stock prices of targets, but 
also those of other firms in the same industry, increased strongly around the date of a 
takeover bid.
41
 He argued that if an industry settles into an “inefficient incentive 
equilibrium,” then a hostile takeover that provides new incentives for the management of a 
single company in the industry, induces the whole industry to move from an “inefficient 
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contracting equilibrium to an efficient one.”42 A single disciplinary takeover, or even the 
threat of one, can accordingly change the incentives and behaviour for all managers in the 
industry. 
 
2.2.3 Minority Shareholder Protection 
Takeovers, as well as acting as a mechanism for efficiency and discipline, have an emphasis 
on the protection of minority shareholders.
43
 This is particularly true in the UK as the Code 
aims to ‘ensure that shareholders in [a target] company are treated fairly and are not denied 
an opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover.’44 Takeover regulation in the UK 
therefore requires directors to seek shareholders’ approval in a general meeting before 
adopting measures or actions that may frustrate a takeover bid.
45
 
 
The UK concepts of “squeeze-out” and “sell-out,” for example, are also designed to address 
the problems of residual minority shareholders following a successful takeover bid.
46
 
Squeeze-out rights enable a successful bidder to compulsorily purchase the shares of the 
remaining minority shareholders who have not accepted the bid.
47
 Whilst sell-out rights 
enable minority shareholders, in the wake of such a bid, to require the majority shareholder to 
purchase their shares: the sell-out rules therefore give the rump shareholders the right not 
only to exit the company, rather than to remain as minority shareholders, but crucially to be 
able to be bought out at the offer price.
48
  
 
This minority protection plays an important role in preserving the integrity of capital markets 
by enhancing the willingness of small shareholders to invest in equity. Without minority 
protection there may be ‘insufficient interest in equity investment, resulting in depressed 
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share prices and a suboptimal allocation of resources.’49 The MCC consequently gives to 
shareholders both power and protection commensurate with their interest in corporate 
affairs
50
 and is a key mechanism for rendering managers accountable to shareholders.
51
 The 
MCC is arguably the most effective protection for shareholders to facilitate the exercise of 
their rights in a dispersed ownership market system.  
 
The MCC therefore plays an important role both within capital markets, and also as a 
corporate governance mechanism. The economic efficiency created from hostile takeovers 
means that companies are putting their assets to best use and as a result generates an efficient 
economy. An active takeover market also works as a corporate governance mechanism in 
which continual checks are placed on management, disciplining those who are poor decision 
makers and motivating others to keep maximising company value to avoid becoming a target. 
Minority shareholder protection afforded by their options to exit on fair terms means that they 
are encouraged to keep on investing, which is imperative in dispersed markets such as the UK 
and US. Critics however argue that the effectiveness of the MCC as an external control 
mechanism relies too heavily upon a number of assumptions which are not attainable.  
 
2.3 Criticisms of the Market for Corporate Control 
Despite the benefits that arise from the MCC, critics maintain that it is flawed. The main 
arguments put forward are firstly, that the MCC relies on an ideal market which is not 
attainable, and secondly that the MCC does not act as a disciplinary device. Section 2.3.1 of 
this chapter will focus on discussing these two main criticisms.  
 
2.3.1 The Ideal Market and Stock Market Efficiency 
The ideal market is one in which stock prices provide accurate signals for investors to buy or 
sell shares. Investors participating in the ideal market can choose amongst shares that 
represent the ownership of the company’s activities under the clear assumption that the 
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process at any time fully reflects all available information.
52
 When prices always fully reflect 
available information the market is “efficient.” In an efficient market, production-investment 
decisions can be made easily and accurately.
53
 This is known as the efficient market 
hypothesis and is the corner stone of modern financial theories.  
 
The MCC, and the benefits that arise from it, are therefore conditional upon an efficient 
market accurately pricing shares. This is because accurate pricing is necessary to identify bad 
management, rather than good managers who might make disagreeable decisions, and to 
identify those companies which are performing poorly and have the potential to improve. If 
the market is efficient it will be able to distinguish between those managers and companies 
who are continually poor performers and those who have, for example made one bad 
judgement or a company effected by the outside environment. It should do this by pricing the 
shares of those consistently poor companies much lower than the industry average. The 
market can also generally establish the difference between companies who are not performing 
well due to problems with efficiency and those who are not paying high dividends to 
shareholders due to long-term strategies, such as investing in research and development. 
Accurate share pricing is therefore imperative in determining the correct targets, which need 
to be improved.  
 
Accurate share pricing is also important in terms of identifying appropriate bidders. If a 
bidder’s shares have been overvalued for example, then the bidder will not be in a position to 
take over a target firm and increase efficiency. However, if shares are priced accurately it will 
be more likely that the bidders are well managed companies. This is because they will have a 
high share price relative to the market. This will enable them to either generate enough cash 
to pay for the targets shares outright or pay for the bid using their own shares. Bidders are 
therefore more highly valued relative to their targets. High quality bidders are necessary in 
order to be able to improve targets. Accurate share pricing is therefore imperative to assist in 
confirming a bidder’s position to take over another company, and in identifying the correct 
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targets for the takeover. If the share price of either a target or a bidder is miscalculated the 
benefits of the MCC cannot be acquired. 
 
Critics of MCC however argue that stock markets are far from ideal, and their efficiency 
relies on a number of assumptions that are not attainable. These assumptions are (1) that all 
information is fully available and is properly reflected in the share price, and (2) that 
investors are rational enough to assess this information correctly. Critics argue that these 
assumptions required for an efficient market are not realistic, that real markets are both 
volatile and uncontrollable. This section will therefore discuss and critique these two 
components that are said to make up an efficient market. 
 
2.3.1.1 Available Information 
The efficient market theory relies on an even flow of new and accurate information through 
to the market in order to accurately assess the price of shares.
54
 Economic empirical work in 
this area has focused on three main research themes in order to assess whether prices fully 
reflect available information. These themes focus on different subsets of information: firstly 
what is known as weak form tests in which studies focus on past price histories and other 
variables; semi-strong form tests which are concerned with the speed of price adjustments to 
other obviously publicly available information; and finally strong form tests which assess 
whether monopolistic access to any relevant information affects the accuracy of pricing.
55
 
These tests are undertaken in order to assess whether the market can be beaten, for example if 
there is information available that an investor can use to buy stocks which have been 
undervalued by the market. The research is however also particularly useful in assessing 
whether the market is efficient enough for the MCC to function as a corporate governance 
mechanism. This is because the more accurate the pricing the more efficient the market will 
be, and therefore the more effective the MCC will be. 
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The research in to weak form tests, or return predictability, is vast and growing, and therefore 
only a brief summary of the evidence will be discussed here. Return predictability studies 
have shown that daily and weekly returns can be predicted from past returns.
56
 Research has 
also demonstrated that returns for short and long horizons are predictable from dividend 
yields, E/P ratios, and default spreads of low-over high-grade bond yields.
57
 The 
predictability of stock returns is not in itself evidence for or against market efficiency, 
however there is some controversy surrounding the variation in expected returns discovered 
within these tests.
58
 The market may therefore be prone to variation due to current versus 
future consumption or by technology shocks. This could mean that the market is vulnerable 
to “bubbles” because shares prices are not correctly valued. If this is true then the MCC 
cannot properly function. The research in this area is however on-going and the reasons for 
the variations and their effects on the efficient market is a contentious issue.  There is also 
however no definitive evidence yet as to whether these “bubbles” mean that markets are or 
are not efficient.
59
  
 
Semi-strong form tests or event studies, on the other hand strongly indicate that the market is 
efficient.
60
 This is because event studies can give a clear picture of the speed of adjustment of 
prices to information. There is a large amount of literature that illustrates how average stock 
prices adjust quickly to information, such as information about investment decisions, 
dividend changes, changes in capital structure, and corporate-control transactions.
61
 Fama 
notes that:  
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‘The typical result in event studies on daily data is that, on average, stock prices seem 
to adjust within a day to event announcements. The result is so common that this work now 
devotes little space to market efficiency. The fact that quick adjustment is consistent with 
efficiency is noted, and then the studies move on to other issues.’62 
 
Strong form tests, or tests for private information, have demonstrated that some individuals 
do have private information which is not reflected in share prices. For example, the 
profitability of insider trading has been established in detail, and there is some evidence that 
security analysts do possess information not reflected in stock price.
63
 Some studies within 
this area also claim to have evidence to support professional investment managers having 
access to private information,
64
 but the evidence on balance suggests that they do not.
65
 The 
conclusion from this area of work subsequently seems to be that whilst there are some 
individuals that have private information, it is not on a large enough scale to affect the 
relative efficiency of the market.
66
  
 
Critics however maintain that there is clear evidence from the recent financial crisis of 
relevant information, for example in relation to risk management, not being made available 
either to boards or to the public.
67
 The high profile collapse of US corporate giant Enron, 
followed closely by WorldCom, also occurred because both companies had massively 
overstated their profits.
68
 Critics argue that the share price of banks undertaking high risk 
strategies during the financial crisis should have decreased to reflect managerial behaviour. It 
appears self-evident now, however that the management of banks before the crash did not 
perform effectively, and that bank CDS (credit default swap) prices did not provide 
forewarning of the scale of the problems ahead.
69
 The Turner Review revealed that bank 
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share prices failed to indicate that risks were increasing, but instead delivered strong market 
price reinforcement to management’s convictions that their aggressive growth strategies were 
value creative.
70
 It is thus argued that if the MCC functioned effectively share prices would 
have reflected these failures and the companies would have become the target of a takeover; 
after which the benefits of allocational efficiency, managerial discipline and minority 
shareholder protection would have kicked in.  
 
Critics contend that when relevant information is not made available to investors, they lose 
their powers of control to either voice their concern or sell their shares out of protest. The 
lack of information also means that the share price will not reflect how the company is ran, 
and thus impacts on the effectiveness of the MCC and its benefits. In reality, however there 
will always be anomalies in the market, but they are relatively infrequent and it does not 
mean that it is a reflective failure of available information delivering accurate share pricing 
on a day to day basis. The Turner review confirmed that whilst market overshoots may 
happen, a balance still needs to be struck to allow liquid markets to work. These overshoots 
in share pricing are however being combatted by the use of tighter regulation and 
improvements in technology. For instance, in the UK listed companies are required to comply 
with the Disclosure and Transparency Rules, which necessitates companies to have 
appropriate internal procedures in place regarding the timely and accurate disclosure of 
information to the market.
71
 It requires the disclosure of information that would have a 
significant effect on the price of the qualifying investments or on the price of related 
investments.
72
  
 
What is considered significant depends on an assessment of the company, who are required to 
take into consideration the anticipated impact of the information in light of the totality of 
their activities. If the disclosure rules are not complied with then the Financial Conduct 
Authority (“FCA”) can suspend trading.73 In the US the Sarbanes-Oxley Act74 also requires 
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real-time disclosures on material events,
75
 and the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
backed this requirement by mandating immediate online reporting of all material 
information.
76
 These transparency and disclosure requirements ensure that companies are 
aware of what information needs to be available and that non-compliance has serious 
consequences. These requirements safeguard market efficiency by creating accurate share 
pricing in which the market is able to rely upon. 
 
The efficiency of the market has also been improved through technology, for example by 
using online disclosures companies have increased the frequency of available information. 
Studies have established that timelier material disclosures are price informative,
77
 and that 
investors benefit from online disclosures as they reduce the cost of information processing 
and procurement.
78
 Prior theoretical and empirical disclosure studies also demonstrate that 
the frequency of online announcements of material information, as corporate events occur or 
unfold,
79
 speeds up the price formation process and enhances liquidity.
80
 Since material 
information becomes available on a timelier and more frequent basis, frequency also reduces 
market risk to stocks arising from information asymmetry and increases stock market 
activity.
81
 Corporate information on stock exchange websites is easily accessible, which 
lowers information search costs for investors. This helps investors conduct appropriate 
research on the companies in which they wish to invest. 
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It is consequently arguable that whilst the market is not ideal, the market does price shares 
accurately enough in practice. Changes to regulations since the crash have meant that 
companies are compelled to make relevant information available, and due to advancements in 
technology information is easier and quicker to supply and access. These changes do not 
create an ideal market, but a practically efficient market. Yet critics also argue that even in an 
efficient market independently acting market participants are in general not rational in their 
assessment of the available information, which could mean that the MCC still cannot function 
correctly. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Rational Investor 
There is an assumption that investors will sell shares when they become unhappy with the 
performance of the company; critics of MCC however argue that investors may not 
appreciate the inefficiencies involved and may therefore not attribute poor performance to 
their directors' inefficiencies.
82
 It is argued that shareholders simply cannot distinguish 
between low corporate value caused by mismanagement or by unfavourable environment.
83
 
For example during the financial crisis the MCC failed to intervene as an external control 
mechanism. This is because shareholders may have been unaware of the underperformance of 
the banks and consequently did not attribute this to their board’s inefficiencies. For Manne, 
sales by dissatisfied shareholders are necessary to trigger the MCC.
84
 As share prices 
increased, “shareholders were very satisfied indeed.”85 Whilst the risks management were 
taking in banks during the financial crisis amounted to, (as we now know in hindsight), poor 
decision making, it did not trigger the MCC to correct management’s behaviour. 
 
It is argued by Shiller, who specialises in behavioural finance, that human error has a great 
impact on the rationality of investors. As commented by Klarman: 
‘[T]he reason that capital markets are, have always been, and will always be 
inefficient is not because of a shortage of timely information, the lack of analytical tools, or 
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inadequate capital. The Internet will not make the market efficient, even though it makes far 
more information available at everyone's fingertips, faster than ever before. Markets are 
inefficient because of human nature—innate, deep-rooted, and permanent. People do not 
consciously choose to invest according to their emotions—they simply cannot help it.’86 
 
Shiller showed that fluctuations in the stock market were consistent with fads and euphoria 
and had little to do with the fundamental factors that determine the price of an asset.
87
 
Consequently if the available information does not lead to rational investment decisions by 
shareholders the market is still not efficient. The irrational assessment of information could 
affect the realisation of the benefits of the MCC because, as with the financial crisis, poorly 
ran companies would not become targets and instead carry on performing poorly. A possible 
rationalisation for the failure to assess the risks, however, is that even if the practices were 
regarded as risky, they may not have been considered as detrimental to the company, and thus 
may not have impacted share price and subsequently the shareholders evaluation of the risk.
88
 
Another possibility is that the banks were just too big to be a target of a hostile takeover. The 
Turner Review suggested that a reasonable conclusion is that the MCC cannot be expected to 
play a major role in constraining bank risk taking, and that the primary constraint needs to 
come from regulation and supervision.
89
 The only problem here is that internal governance 
(investors) also failed. Perhaps then the real problem was underestimating the risks being 
taken, which in future all parties should carefully consider.  
 
Removing the financial crisis out of the equation, looking solely from the target shareholders 
perspective only narrows the view of how takeovers operate in practice. Provided that the 
bidder is rational it does not matter if target shareholders are not. Bidders of hostile takeovers 
tend not to lead by emotion, rather by a cold assessment of what a firm is worth and what it 
could be worth if ran more efficiently. Fama criticises Shiller’s work, stating that even if 
investors’ assessment of information does affect the function of the MCC, he argues that 
disagreements among investors regarding the implications of given information do not in 
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itself imply that the market is inefficient. This is unless there are investors who can 
‘consistently make better evaluations of available information than are implicit in market 
prices.’90 In the Anglo-American market systems where the MCC is more profound, investors 
are largely institutional. They tend to have greater knowledge and experience which allows 
them to frequently assess information correctly or at least equally.  
 
It is thus generally agreed that a frictionless market in which all information is freely 
available and investors agree on its implications is not descriptive of markets met in 
practice.
91
 What can be taken away from the efficient market theory and Fama’s work is that 
markets are mostly efficient.
92
 The Turner Review also took this view concluding that:  
 ‘it is quite possible that efficient and liquid markets provide useful and accurate 
price signals as to the relative attractiveness of different equities or credits even if the overall 
level of prices is subject to irrational overshoots.’93  
These accurate price signals nevertheless allow bidders to identify possible targets in which 
they can buy-out and create value, utilising the benefits of MCC.  
 
2.3.2 The Market for Corporate Control does not act as a Disciplinary Device 
Franks and Mayer found little evidence that successful hostile takeovers are motivated by 
poor performance prior to bids.
94
 They rationalised that if hostile takeovers perform a 
disciplinary role, there should be (i) a high level of managerial turnover followed by large-
scale restructuring (ii) evidence of anticipated gains associated with the restructurings and 
poor performance prior to the takeover and (iii) high board turnover to be associated with 
poor performance of the target prior to the bid. They found that whilst hostile takeovers were 
indeed associated with a high level of board turnover and restructurings, there was no 
evidence of poor pre-bid performance and as such board turnover was not associated with 
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poor performance.
95
 They subsequently concluded the MCC does not function as a 
disciplinary device for poorly performing management. 
 
A similar study completed by Kini, Kracaw and Mian found no difference in the pre-takeover 
performance of hostile and friendly targets based on stock price and operating performance 
measures.
96
 They therefore concluded that the higher post-takeover CEO turnover rate 
associated with hostile targets was not related to past performance.
97
 They therefore posited, 
much like Franks and Mayer, that takeovers did not have a disciplinary effect. They 
submitted that the higher post-takeover CEO turnover rate for target firms in hostile 
takeovers may actually only reflect disagreements over the bid price and the future expected 
performance of the target firm.
98
 If takeovers do not perform a disciplinary role then 
efficiency gains of the MCC cannot be realised because hostile takeovers are not occurring to 
create value maximisation. This would also mean that MCC was not an effective corporate 
governance mechanism because it does not provide the much needed checks and balances for 
management in a dispersed ownership system. 
 
Shivdasani and Schwert however discovered that hostile targets have lower market-to-book 
ratios than friendly targets.
99
 This could indicate that rather than performing poorly at 
present, hostile targets have a worse predicted future performance than friendly target firms. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny also reported that the targets of hostile takeovers had lower 
Tobin’s-Q ratios,100 and thus were more undervalued than other Fortune 500 companies they 
examined.
101
 They also suggested that the targets of hostile takeovers are concentrated in 
low-Q industries.
102
 The targets of hostile takeovers, they therefore concluded, are poor 
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performers within poorly performing industries.
103
 The targets of friendly takeovers, on the 
other hand, were indistinguishable in terms of their performance characteristics. These 
findings are supportive of the disciplinary effect of the MCC.  
 
Martin and McConnell also support this view. When investigating takeovers that occurred 
over the period 1958 through to 1984 they indicated that, on average, all takeover targets 
come from industries that are performing well relative to the market, and that the targets of 
disciplinary takeovers are performing poorly within their industry. On the other hand the 
targets of non-disciplinary takeovers were performing about as well as the average firm in 
their industry.
104
 Moreover Mork, Shleifer and Vishny found that the targets of hostile bids 
were usually older, more slowly growing firms that were valued much below the replacement 
cost of their tangible assets.
105
 This indicates that disciplinary takeovers also target firms 
which have potential for growth that is not being utilised. Disciplinary takeovers therefore do 
not have to occur solely because of poor performance (in terms of performing badly relative 
to the whole market), a factor which is the focus of many studies.  
 
This would suggest that how poor performance is actually defined can drastically affect the 
results of these studies. Martin and McConnell’s findings for instance are essentially 
consistent with Franks and Mayer’s, as they too established that there was some evidence that 
poor performance was being capitalised in the targets of hostile bids when the comparison 
was made with firms in the same industry, but did not take these findings as supportive 
evidence of discipline.
106
 In stark contrast however Martin and McConnell interpreted the 
results as indicating that the takeover market did play an important role in disciplining top 
corporate managers.  
 
These studies also illustrate that the same data can be interpreted in different ways, and how 
data are compared can also affect the results. Kini et al, for example, compared pre-
performance across their whole sample, rather than comparing industry specific findings. In 
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order to capture the disciplinary effect of the takeover, analysis should focus on how the 
target is performing in their specific industry rather than the market as a whole. This makes 
sense and ensures that industry specific dips in the market don’t bias the results. 
Kerschbamer,
107
 and previously Eckbo,
108
 asserted this point, reasoning that industry 
averages are a better predictor for hostile takeovers than individual company data.  
 
It can, however, be unanimously taken from these studies that there is a high managerial 
turnover after takeovers. Why exactly this happens is still open for debate, but many studies 
indicate that the targets of hostile takeovers are performing poorly within their industry 
and/or have potential for growth which is not being realised. From this it can be argued that 
takeovers do play a disciplinary role as directors are either removed because they are 
performing worse than their peers or are not maximising the potential of the company’s 
assets. The MCC therefore seems to perform a disciplinary mechanism which is far reaching 
and often difficult to measure. 
 
2.4 Alternative Disciplinary Mechanisms? 
Holmstrom and Kaplan suggest that there has been a fall in hostile takeovers because the 
MCC is no longer needed as a corporate governance device. This is because there are a 
sufficient number of alternative governance mechanisms (e.g. stock options, shareholder 
activism, non-executive director monitoring): and therefore as these mechanisms become 
more prominent and effective, the takeover market’s role will decline.109 One of the major 
contenders of the MCC as an alternative mechanism is shareholder activism. Recent 
academic studies suggest that, by and large, activists are good for companies. An analysis of 
around 2,000 interventions in the US during 1994-2007 found that the share prices and 
operating performance of the firms involved improved over the five years after the 
intervention.
110
 High-profile cases also support this research for example: activist investors 
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led to new management being brought in at Yahoo, whose share price doubled; and activist 
investors encouraged the departure of Steve Ballmer from Microsoft, whose share price grew 
higher than at any time since the dotcom bubble burst.
111 
 
 
Shareholder activism has substantially increased over the last decade; for example an article 
in the financial times revealed that there has been an increase in active investors in US 
companies from 17 percent in 2010 to 43 percent in 2013.
112
 Significant problems however 
prevent shareholder activism being a viable alternative to the MCC, and the aforementioned 
survey highlights this issue. This is because the companies used within the data were all 
valued at over $10 billion or more. It is of course more than worthwhile for a large investor in 
multi-billion dollar companies to speak up. The same cannot be said however of all investors, 
particularly minority shareholders and/or those with sizeable portfolios, who tend to have a 
large number of interests in companies around the world. This is because small shareholders 
cannot effectively monitor management as well as block-holders (or those with large interests 
due to monetary value) can due to co-ordination problems.
113
 Bolton and von Thadden 
contend that dispersed owners do not have the same levels of control or incentives to shell out 
high agency costs.
114
 They reason that monitoring by block-holders takes place on an ongoing 
basis because major investors have strong incentives to monitor management and replace it in 
poorly performing companies.
115
 In systems of dispersed ownership, like the UK and US, 
shareholders own few shares and exert little internal control within companies (this is 
particularly exacerbated by the rise in foreign share-ownership), and will subsequently have 
to rely more heavily on external monitoring via the MCC.
116
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The MCC can also provide minority shareholders with an “exit on fair terms” opportunity.117 
Provisions such as the sell-out right, the mandatory bid rule, or the equal treatment principle, 
ensure such exit opportunities for these shareholders.
118
 This also allows the discipline of 
management via the MCC, and is considered imperative due to the difficulties in getting 
minority shareholders involved in decision making. Shareholders with small holdings 
consequently tend to resort to “exit” strategies rather than “voice” their complaints or engage 
in activism when problems emerge.   
 
Whilst encouraging shareholders to be actively engaged with decision making within their 
companies is important, due to the practical difficulties it is not currently a viable alternative 
to the MCC as a standalone corporate governance mechanism. The need for external control 
via the MCC therefore becomes ever more vital, as it is pivotal to making dispersed 
ownership systems viable.
119
 Coffee contemplates to this affect, stating that ‘the regime of the 
takeover is analogous to a political system in which the president could be forced to stand for 
election at any time’.120 A well-functioning MCC thus subjects companies to a continuous 
auction process and ensures that resources flow to their highest value use.
121
  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The existing literature indicates that the MCC provides for a broader, more effective and 
more efficient form of monitoring than any other corporate governance mechanism can 
currently offer. This is because hostile takeovers create economic efficiency which generates 
an overall efficient economy, in which management is submitted to continual checks by the 
market. Minority shareholders are also protected by the MCC as it allows them to easily exit 
companies when they are underperforming. These benefits are aided by a practically efficient 
market, in which relevant available information is rationally assessed by the market providing 
accurate share price signals. The accuracy of the share price consequently helps to identify 
both rightful bidders and targets.  
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Whilst there are some valid issues regarding overshoots in the market, the literature indicates 
that the market is sufficiently efficient to allow MCC to function on a day to day basis. The 
only real concern and an on-going issue for academia in this area are to understand why these 
overshoots occur, whether they happen rationally or due to fads and euphoria. This question 
cannot be answered by this research: but whatever the answer, it is still clear that the MCC is 
a necessary tool for corporate governance in the Anglo- American market system.  
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Chapter Three 
UK Takeovers: Practices and Regulation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Armour and Skeel
122
 identified a peculiar divergence between the UK and US when it came 
to the regulation of takeovers. They posited that given the perceived importance of the market 
for corporate control and the pivotal role this mechanism is thought to have in making 
dispersed ownership viable, it was strange, they reflected, that so little attention has been paid 
to the significant differences in the way in which takeovers are regulated between the two 
systems that together comprise the Anglo-American model.
123
 Both the mode and the 
substance of the regulation they noted are startlingly different. These differences have also 
had an impact upon the levels of takeover litigation. In seeking to answer why there is more 
or less litigation within these jurisdictions the next chapters will first describe the takeover 
practices and regulatory regime within the UK in this chapter and then secondly, will depict 
in chapter four the types and propensity to litigate in the UK (and will then do the same for 
the US). The further chapters (chapters seven and eight) will then build upon this groundwork 
to explain the propensity to litigate and evaluate the impacts the levels of litigation have on 
the takeover process in both jurisdictions. 
 
This chapter therefore offers a description of the practices of takeovers in the UK, including a 
discussion of the key players and their competing interests, and will give an outline of the 
UK’s regulatory regime. Section 3.2 will describe the process by which a takeover is 
completed. Section 3.3 will then describe the function and role of the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers (“the Panel”), the scope of the Takeover Code (“the Code”) and detail the core rules. 
Section three will look at the relevant company law provisions that impact upon the 
regulation of takeovers, with a specific focus on directors duties.  
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3.2 Offers and Schemes of Arrangement  
A takeover can be structured in two alternative ways: the first being, what is often referred to 
as a “takeover offer,” or as a “scheme of arrangement.” In a takeover offer a purchaser (“the 
bidder” or “predator”) will make an offer to the shareholders of the target company to 
purchase their shares. The offer may be supported by the directors of the target company, in 
which case it would usually be characterised as a friendly or an agreed takeover. Where the 
target directors oppose the offer, and refuse to recommend its acceptance to the target’s 
shareholders, it is labelled as a hostile offer. The primary relationship in the takeover offer is 
thus one of a contractual nature between the purchasing bidder and the selling target 
shareholders. Whether the bid succeeds or fails rests upon the total of the individual sale 
transactions between each shareholder and the bidder. The target company is therefore not 
directly involved in the transaction, and its board likewise is involved only to the extent that 
it offers its voice in support of, or in opposition to, the takeover bid.  
 
In contrast to the takeover offer, a scheme of arrangement typically does not involve a bidder 
making a general offer to each target shareholder individually to purchase their shares. 
Instead, the bidder’s acquisition of a controlling ownership of the target is achieved through a 
“scheme.” A bidder will normally approach the target company first to propose a scheme. 
The target board, on behalf of the company, will then make a proposal about the scheme to 
the shareholders. The co-operation that is required between the bidder and the target company 
means that there can never be a “hostile scheme of arrangement,” and that the board of the 
target company must therefore always agree to the scheme.  
 
A scheme can be completed by the acquisition and transfer of the targets shares to the bidder, 
in the same way in which a bidder buys the target shares within a takeover offer.
124
 The 
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bidder thus achieves control over the target through the acquisition of new shares in the target 
(rather than by the purchase of the target shareholders’ existing shares). The target 
shareholders will then either receive cash, or shares, in the bidding company, in return for 
their having agreed to the cancellation of their existing shares. 
 
How takeover offers and schemes of arrangements are completed highlights their core 
differences. Within a takeover offer there is a “straightforward” sale and purchase of the 
target shareholders’ shares, and at the core of forming a scheme of arrangement there is 
generally a cancellation of existing shares and the creation and allotment of new ones. Due to 
these processes the target company, and its directors, are side-parties to the takeover offer. 
Their involvement however is essential to the completion of a scheme. The directors are 
required to not only secure the scheme’s approval, but to cancel existing shares and to allot 
new ones. This explains the essence of these two approaches, the next sections will now go 
on to provide more detail in order to explain the typical moves by which each of these two 
methods of taking over a company might in practice progress, beginning with the takeover 
offer. 
 
3.2.1 The Process of a Takeover Offer 
The purpose of this section, and the next, is to highlight the commercial reality of a takeover 
bid separately from its regulation. This is in order to explain the essence of what tactical 
moves different parties to a takeover bid might make, or want to make, and will allow in turn 
an explanation of the conflicting interests of the parties involved. The parties integral to a 
takeover bid are generally the bidder, the target directors and the target shareholders. Each 
will have different goals that they will want to achieve from a takeover offer. For example the 
target directors may want to prevent the takeover or secure the best price for the company, 
whereas, bidders will want to succeed in taking over the company, and want to do this by 
avoiding paying a high premium.   
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At the outset, the bidder will form a takeover offer by valuing the shares of the target 
company. The offer will generally be formed in the medium of cash or shares of the bidding 
company, or a mix of both. For example, within the Kraft/Cadbury takeover, Kraft’s initial 
offer valued Cadbury's shares at 755 pence each, and was formed as 300 pence in cash and 
0.25 in new Kraft shares for each of Cadbury’s shares.125 Although the entire offer 
consideration sometimes takes the form of shares in the bidding company, it is usual for some 
or all of the consideration to be in the form of cash.
126
 The cash can be made up of the 
bidder’s own resources, but it can also be acquired in whole by underwriting shares in the 
bidding company.
127
 A common method of underwriting is called “cash-underpinning,” 
where the bidder arranges for its own financial advisor to make a separate offer to the 
shareholders in the target company to acquire shares in the bidder to which they are entitled 
to as consideration under the offer, such offer being at a fixed price.
128
 The bidder can 
alternatively raise cash funds using some or all of the consideration from a new bank facility 
using an unconditional loan agreement, which must be in place at the time of the 
announcement of a formal offer.
129
 A loan agreement may however be detrimental to a 
bidding company due to the typical stipulations of borrowing.  
 
Once a potential bid has been formulated a bidder can approach the target company 
informally about the possible offer.
130
 The bidder can then gauge whether the offer would be 
welcomed or not. If the target company is favourable to the offer the bidder will be able to 
carry out due diligence with the co-operation of the target company. Due diligence is 
common practice in any takeover scenario. It is an investigation that is carried out into the 
target company usually before a formal offer is made in order to gather information that 
would be relevant to the sale, and will include a review of the target company’s financial 
records. Due diligence is a way of protecting both parties to the takeover bid from any 
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unnecessary future harm.
131
 It is therefore beneficial to the bidder if due diligence can be 
completed with the help of the target company because the investigation will be more 
extensive.
132
 The extent of the due diligence exercise in a hostile situation would be severely 
limited as the bidder would only have access to publicly available information, such as the 
results of searches of public registers and financial analysts reports.
133
   
 
A co-operative target company will however often seek to limit the scope of the investigation 
to avoid the release of confidential information, particularly if the bidder is a competitor.
134
 
By limiting the scope of the due diligence the target company protects themselves if a formal 
offer does not later materialise. The target company may also wish to protect themselves 
from the bid being leaked to the public, at which point the bidder would have to make a 
formal offer or withdraw,
135
 or to prevent other potential bidders from obtaining information. 
Consequently, the target company will generally require the bidder to sign a confidentiality 
agreement, and may also request that the bidder agree to “standstill provisions” that restrict 
the bidder buying shares in the target company for a specified period of time without the 
consent of the target board.
136
 This will prevent the bidder from stake building, a takeover 
strategy that is advantageous to the bidder because it makes it easier for any offer to be 
successful. This is because a stake will give the bidder control, and therefore voting rights, in 
the target company prior to a formal offer being made.  
 
Whether the target company perceives the potential offer to be hostile or not, they will need 
to obtain independent advice on that offer, and will make their own opinion known to the 
target shareholders.
137
 The contents of the independent advice received by the target directors 
and their opinions on the offer are commonly contained in the offeree board circular, in the 
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event of a recommended offer, or in a defence document, if the offer is hostile.
138
 The 
opinion given by directors is one of only a few opportunities in which the target company can 
try to prevent an unwanted takeover, as they may persuade the target shareholders not to 
accept the offer. There are many reasons why a director may not want their company taken 
over by a bidding company (not least that it is likely that they would lose their position). The 
directors’ advice to the shareholders can therefore act as a defence against the takeover. 
 
Takeover defences can either be used before a takeover offer materialises, (these are known 
as embedded or pre-bid defences), or when a bid is “on the horizon,” (these are known as 
post-bid defences). A target director would ideally use a mixture of the two types of defences. 
This is because pre-bid defences are designed to make the company look less attractive, and 
also have the effect of making it more difficult for the bidder to succeed in taking over the 
company. Post-bid defences, on the other hand, have the ability to frustrate the bid, meaning 
either the bidder will be defeated or the offer process becomes substantially hampered, 
usually by causing a substantial time delay that may force the bidder to just walk away.
139
 
Obviously, the use of defences by the target board is not in the bidders interests. Target 
shareholders may however benefit from the use of defences because it could potentially 
increase the premium they receive for their shares, but it can also take away their decision 
making power. The use of pre-bid defences can prevent unwanted takeovers, but they can 
also prevent beneficial takeovers. In the UK however it is very difficult to implement pre-bid 
defences and any post-bid defences are prohibited by the Code.
140
 Once the offer has been 
formalised by the bidder and the bid has been publicly announced the decision of whether the 
offer is accepted rests solely with the individual target shareholders. The regulation of 
defences is a complex area of regulation in the UK and will be discussed in more detail in the 
following sections.  
 
From the time of the initial approach to the completion of the takeover, the bidder must 
follow a specified timetable set out in the Code. This is in part to protect the target company 
from the bidder drawing out the takeover process. More time could allow the bidder to 
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“divide and conquer” the target shareholders. A bidder can adopt this strategy by meeting 
with different shareholder groups, and persuading them to sell their shares by offering 
premiums. If a majority of the shareholders is persuaded, then other shareholder groups may 
feel pressured in to selling their shares to take advantage of any perceived benefits, and to 
avoid becoming minority shareholders in a company where the bidder has now become a 
controlling shareholder. In this situation the bidder would want to offer a lower price to the 
second group of shareholders for their shares; firstly because the shares would likely be worth 
much less than the original value when the bidder first approached the target, because they 
would now have a controlling majority and thus other shareholders would not be able to 
influence the direction of the company; and secondly because the shareholders would be 
more willing to sell their shares than the initial group because of the first point.  
 
In this scenario the initial group of target shareholders are happy because they were paid a 
premium for their shares, and the bidder is pleased because they would have taken over the 
company at a discounted price, in comparison to a fixed offer that had been made to all the 
target shareholders. This strategy however is not only limited due to the imposed timetable 
but by other restrictions on the bidder’s behaviour during the process of a bid. These 
restrictions, along with the proposed timetable for bids will be discussed in further detail in 
the next section. Further time would also however allow the bidder to build up a stake in the 
company, a strategy which can be accomplished within the confines of takeover regulation. 
An elongated timetable would additionally mean that a bidder would be able to strike at the 
most convenient time, perhaps when the target shares are at a low and the bidder could avoid 
paying premiums for the target shares. This concludes the discussion on the process of the 
takeover offer. The next section will now describe the process of the other takeover method, 
the scheme of arrangement. 
 
3.2.2 The Process of a Scheme of Arrangement  
The process of a scheme of arrangement can be summarised in three steps: the bidder 
approaches the target directors about the scheme; a meeting of the shareholders is held to 
vote on the proposal; and thereafter the court will decide whether to approve the scheme. It 
would be preferable for bidders to use a scheme of arrangement when the takeover is 
49 
 
recommended by the target board over a takeover offer for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
unlike a takeover offer, the bidder does not have to deal individually with each shareholder. 
Instead the scheme will commence when the bidder and the target board agree. In contrast 
with the offer process, which is led by the bidder, the scheme process is controlled by the 
target company. Its success therefore depends largely on the co-operation of the target 
company’s board, but this is usually secured by the initial agreement. 
 
Secondly, a scheme will be preferable to an offer to those bidders who want to acquire 100 
percent of the target’s shares. This may be crucial for a bidder who wants to acquire 100 
percent control of the target without minority interests remaining following the takeover. A 
scheme will achieve this outcome because a successful shareholder vote binds the whole 
company, even those who voted against the scheme.
141
 This consequently means that a 
scheme will either be agreed by the shareholders or not. This has its advantages for bidders, 
because if the scheme fails they are not left with a large, possibly even a majority, stake in the 
target and if it is agreed the bidder will have control of 100 percent of the company. 
 
The bidder, however, may find it more difficult to succeed in a scheme of arrangement than 
under an offer. This is because a majority number, representing 75 percent of the members 
must approve the scheme, in contrast to the 50 percent minimum required in an offer.
142
 
Moreover unlike an offer, the shares already owned by the bidder are not part of the class that 
is eligible to approve the scheme.
143
 In a scheme, once the threshold of 75 percent has been 
obtained, the bidder acquires all of the shares in the target company.
144
 Where the bid is 
structured as an offer the bidder may only obtain 100 percent of the shares in the target 
company if more than 90 percent of shareholders accept the offer, enabling the bidder to rely 
on the “squeeze-out” provisions to buy out the remaining minority shareholders.145 If less 
than 90 percent of shareholders accept the offer, the bidder is left with minority shareholders.  
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It may however be easier for dissenting shareholders to block a scheme as compared to an 
offer.
146
 The court hearing and shareholders’ meeting, which are necessary stages in a 
scheme, provide the ‘ideal forum in which opposition to the bid can be voiced publicly; such 
opposition may thwart the scheme, either by rousing other shareholders to oppose the deal or 
by persuading the court to withhold its sanction.’147 The only opportunity to voice public 
opposition to an offer is at the general meeting, which is itself only necessary in certain 
circumstances.
148
 It is also possible for an organised minority of shareholders opposed to the 
scheme, who between them hold more than 25 percent in value of the shares represented at 
the shareholders’ meeting, to prevent the scheme from being approved, whereas the 
comparative percentage required to block the passage of an offer would be more than 50 
percent.
149
 
 
Whilst the actual process of completing a takeover by an offer or a scheme is very different, 
the target shareholders and the bidder will generally have the same interests and want to 
achieve the same goals. Crucially however, the target directors interests and goals will 
depend upon whether the takeover is friendly or hostile, which will also impact upon how the 
takeover is proposed. This concludes the discussion of the process of the takeover offer and 
scheme of arrangement; the next sections will now turn to discuss the regulation of these 
processes.  
 
3.3 UK Regulatory Regime: Company Law  
Section 3 will be divided into four main parts. Section 3.3.1 will outline Part 28 of 
Companies Act 2006 (“CA”), which provides the collection of rules that are specifically 
focused on the takeover process, and most importantly govern the Panel and the Code. 
Section 3.3.7 will then turn to examine Part 27 of CA which governs the process of schemes 
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of arrangements. A number of other general rules in company law which are not designed 
specifically for takeovers, but which may nevertheless be a relevant, and which, crucially for 
the purposes of this thesis, generate causes of action which might be relied on by aggrieved 
participants in takeovers will then be discussed in parts 3 and 4. Specifically, part 3 will 
explain the duties of directors, which are vital in regulating the conduct and behaviour of 
directors during the takeover process, and more generally in part 4 the specific causes of 
action available to those who wish to pursue complaints.   
 
3.3.1 Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006 
The Panel is regulated by the CA, and is an independent body, its main functions are to issue 
and administer the Code, and to supervise and regulate takeovers and other matters to which 
the Code applies.
150
 The Panel and the Code have been in existence since 1968, when they 
were set up by the governor of the Bank of England and the chairman of the London Stock 
Exchange. The Panel’s central objective is to ensure fair treatment for all shareholders during 
takeover bids.
151
 Prior to the CA, the Panel was not regulated. Instead the Panel and Code 
operated as soft law, and any rulings made by the Panel were enforced by other regulatory 
bodies. The Panel’s activities are now regulated by the CA, which also confers the Panel with 
its own powers. This change was in order to comply with the European Directive on 
Takeover Bids.
152
 Because the Panel and the Code were well established prior to the 
enactment of the CA the Panel remains relatively free to conduct its functions as it had before 
the Act. The Panel and the Code are generally agreed to have been a great success, and as 
such have become a well-respected part of the UK financial services architecture.
153
  
 
3.3.2 The Panel 
Part 28 of the CA grants a number of significant powers to the Panel. Firstly, s.942 states that 
the Panel may do anything that it considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of, or in 
connection with its functions. S.943, additionally states that the Panel can make rules in 
connection with ‘the regulation of takeover bids, merger transactions and transactions that 
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have or may have, directly or indirectly an effect on the ownership or control of companies.’ 
These sections confer enormous power to the Panel to create rules and regulate the process of 
takeovers via the Code. The Panel also has the power to give rulings on ‘the interpretation, 
application, or effect of the rules.’154 These rulings will have a binding affect155 but can be 
subject to a review if appealed.
156
 The Panel: 
 ‘may give any direction that appears to be necessary in order to restrain a person 
from acting (or continuing to act) in breach of rules; to restrain a person from doing (or 
continuing to do) a particular thing, pending determination of whether that or any other 
conduct of theirs is or would be a breach of rules; or otherwise to secure compliance with 
rules.’157  
Failure to comply with any requirement or ruling will be a breach of the Code. It is 
the practice of the Panel, in discharging its functions under the Code, to focus on the specific 
consequences of breaches of the Code with the aim of providing appropriate remedial or 
compensatory action in a timely manner.
158
 The Panel’s remit covers public companies 
resident in the UK whether they are listed or not, and private companies whose shareholdings 
are widely dispersed.
159
 The Panel has up to 35 members, representing a wide range of 
expertise in takeovers, securities markets, industry and commerce.
160
 Membership is 
comprised of independent members appointed by the Panel itself with the rest appointed 
directly by organisations representing London’s financial institutions.161 The Panel is made 
up of the Executive and a number of committees, the most central being the Code committee 
and the Hearing committee.  
 
The Panel’s Executive comprises of full-time employees and employees on secondment from 
London firms. It deals with the day to day aspects of overseeing every takeover i.e. checking 
that all documents and announcements issued and actions taken comply with the Code.
162
 The 
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Executive may be approached for general guidance on the interpretation or effect of the Code 
and how it is usually applied in practice.
163
 This can be done on a “no names” basis, where 
the person seeking the guidance does not disclose to the Executive the names of the 
companies concerned.
164
 The informal guidance given at this time by the Executive is not 
binding.
165
 The parties seeking guidance, or their advisers, therefore cannot rely on such 
guidance as a basis for taking any action without first obtaining a formal ruling of the 
Executive on a named basis.
166
 In addition to these duties the Executive also publishes 
practice statements from time to time, which provide informal guidance as to how the 
executive usually interprets and applies particular provisions of the Code in certain 
circumstances.
167
 Practice statements do not form part of the Code and, accordingly, are not 
binding.
168
 The Panel therefore makes it clear that the statements are not a substitute for 
consulting the Executive to establish how the Code applies in any one particular case.
169
  
 
The Executive is overseen by the Hearings Committee, whose principal function is to review 
the rulings of the Executive. A person subject to a ruling of the Executive may therefore 
request the Hearings Committee to re-examine the decision. The Hearings Committee also 
hears disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Executive, when the Executive considers that 
there has been a breach of the Code or of a ruling of the Executive or the Panel.
170
 There is a 
further right to appeal against a decision of the Hearings Committee to an independent 
tribunal, the independent body being the Takeover Appeal Board (the “Board”).171 The 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the board are appointed by the Master of the Rolls and 
will usually have held high judicial office.
172
 The other members of the Board are appointed 
by the Chairman or Deputy Chairman, and will usually have relevant knowledge and 
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experience of takeovers and the Code.
173
 No person who is or has been a member of the Code 
committee of the Panel may simultaneously or subsequently be a member of the Board.
174
  
 
The functions of the Board are to ‘hear and determine appeals against rulings of the Hearings 
Committee, to make such directions (if any) to the Panel and to make such procedural rulings 
in connection with the performance of its other functions.’175 The Board may confirm, vary, 
set aside, annul or replace the contested ruling of the Hearings Committee. On reaching its 
decision, the Board ‘remits the matter to the Hearings Committee with such directions (if 
any) as the Board considers appropriate for giving effect to its decision.’176 The Hearings 
Committee will then give effect to the Board’s decision.177 These separate but distinct 
functions of the Panel’s committees and appeal boards ensures that there are proper 
procedures for review of and appeal against decisions taken by the Panel in connection with 
its regulatory functions.
178
 
 
The other central committee, the Code Committee, carries out the rule-making functions of 
the Panel and is solely responsible for keeping the Code under review and for proposing, 
consulting on, making and issuing amendments to the Code.
179
 The Code Committee 
represents a variety of shareholder, corporate, practitioner and other interests within the 
Panel’s regulated community and up to 12 members of the Panel are designated by the Panel 
as members of the Code Committee.
180
 Matters leading to possible amendments of the Code 
may arise from a number of sources; including specific cases which the Panel has considered, 
market developments or particular concerns of those operating within the markets.
181
 The 
Code Committee usually consults publicly on proposed amendments to the Code via a public 
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consultation paper. Following the end of the consultation period, the Code Committee 
publishes its conclusions and the final Code amendments in a response statement.
182
  
 
3.3.3 The Code 
The Code was developed by the Panel in order to reflect the collective opinion of those 
professionally involved in the field of takeovers as to appropriate business standards, fairness 
to offeree company shareholders and an orderly framework for takeovers.
183
 The Code is 
therefore designed principally to ensure that shareholders in a target company are treated 
fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover, and 
additionally that shareholders in the target company of the same class are afforded equivalent 
treatment by a bidder.
184
 The Code is not ‘concerned with the financial or commercial 
advantages, or disadvantages, of a takeover.’185 As such it will not matter that a takeover is 
not in the best interests of the company. In addition, the Code will not either facilitate or 
impede takeovers, and will not become involved with issues, such as competition policy, 
which are the responsibility of the government and other relevant bodies.
186
  
 
The Code is based upon six “general principles,” which are essentially statements of 
standards of commercial behaviour.
187
 They apply to takeovers and other matters to which the 
Code applies, and are expressed in broad general terms. This is in order to avoid defining the 
‘precise extent of, or the limitations on, the application of the principles, so that they are 
applied in accordance with their spirit to achieve their underlying purpose.’188 In addition to 
the general principles, the Code contains a series of rules. The Panel notes that although most 
of the rules are expressed in less general terms than the general principles, they are not 
framed in technical language, and like the general principles, are to be interpreted to achieve 
their underlying purpose.
189
 Therefore, their spirit as well as their letter must be observed.
190
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Both takeover offers and schemes of arrangements are regulated by the Code. The provisions 
of the Code therefore apply to an offer effected by means of a scheme of arrangement in the 
same way as they apply to a takeover effected by means of an offer, except as set out in the 
scheme focused, Appendix 7 of the Code.
191
 The Code does however have a greater focus on 
the regulation of takeover offers than schemes of arrangement. This may change in the future 
as schemes are growing in popularity as a means of affecting a takeover. The above gives a 
general overview of the Code. This section will now go on to outline the specific rules of the 
Code and its regulation of the takeover process. 
 
Before approaching a target or buying a substantial percentage of shares in a company, a 
potential bidder must consider the significance of Rule 9 of the Code, the mandatory bid rule. 
This rule states that a shareholder, or a concert party,
192
 who acquires more than 30 percent of 
a company must make an offer to buy the remaining shares of that company. A bidder must 
therefore be prepared to make an offer for one hundred percent of the shares in the target 
company if they intend to purchase over 30 percent of shares/voting rights. This rule requires 
the bidder to treat all shareholders equally by offering them the same price for their shares, 
and on terms as good as their most recent purchases of shares within the same company 
(within a 12 month period). Any purchase which results in a mandatory offer being required 
must be immediately followed by an announcement that an offer for the company is to be 
made.  
 
If a purchase has resulted in a mandatory offer being required, but the purchaser does not 
want to make an offer for the whole company, they may under Rule 9.7, apply to the Panel to 
request a disposal of their interests in shares. The Panel must be consulted as to the interests 
required to be disposed of and the application, pending completion of the disposal, of 
restrictions on the exercise of the voting rights attaching to the shares in which that person (or 
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persons acting in concert with that person) are interested. If a bidder has not triggered the 
mandatory bid rule they can approach the target company informally. 
 
The Code requires parties to a bid to maintain absolute secrecy in the early phases of a bid 
prior to a formal announcement, in order to prevent the creation of false markets. If the Panel 
determines that there has been a leak in respect of a potential offer (evidenced by an 
untoward movement in the target stock price, or rumour and speculation) the parties must 
release a public announcement. If there hasn’t been a leak, an announcement is generally 
required when a firm intention to make an offer is notified to the board of the target 
company; or, as noted above, immediately upon an acquisition of any interest in shares which 
gives rise to an obligation to make an offer under Rule 9 (mandatory offer). 
 
When approaching a target company, the Code makes it clear that a bidder must not be 
hindered in the conduct of their affairs for longer than is reasonable. This is because 
takeovers can be disruptive and destabilising not only to the target company but to the market 
as a whole. The Code therefore establishes a fairly rigid timetable for the entirety of the 
bid.
193
 In the initial stages of the approach, the potential bidder has 28 days in which to 
consider making an offer. On the 28th day, if the bidder hasn’t already made a decision about 
the offer they must either “put up or shut up.” In more specific terms the bidder must either 
announce a (fully financed) bid; obtain the agreement of the target and the Panel to an 
extension of that deadline; or walk away, in which case the bidder is precluded from making 
another bid for six months (except in limited circumstances).
194
 The target company should 
therefore not be subject to an offer, or speculation regarding an offer, for an excessive period 
of time. The formal offer, when made, must provide shareholders with a significant amount 
of information about the bid, the intention being that ‘[s]hareholders must be given sufficient 
information and advice to enable them to reach a properly informed decision as to the merits 
or demerits of an offer.’195  
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The Code additionally imposes significant restrictions on the ability of the bidder to place 
conditions on the offer, because shareholders should have a clear offer to either accept or 
reject.
196
 One condition that will always be present in a bid however, because it is required by 
the Code, relates to when an offer will become unconditional.
197
 The Code states that ‘an 
offer for voting securities will be conditional on acceptances being secured by the bidder 
sufficient to give it, together with securities already held, more than 50 percent of the voting 
rights in the target.’198 A bidder can however set a higher level than 50 percent.199 An 
important stage in any bid is therefore when it becomes “unconditional as to acceptances,” 
which means that it has satisfied all of its conditions (including passing the 50 percent hurdle, 
or such higher hurdle as the bidder has imposed on the bid) and the bid has effectively 
succeeded.
200
 Once the formal offer documents have been posted to the shareholders, the bid 
is open to acceptance by the shareholders to whom it is addressed. The offer must be kept 
open for acceptance for at least 21 days.
201
 After an offer has become unconditional as to 
acceptances, the offer must then remain open for at least a further 14 days.
202
An unsuccessful 
bidder may not normally make another offer for the same target within 12 months.
203
 This is 
because the Panel’s goal is to resolve bidding situations quickly and with minimum 
uncertainty.
204
 In the context of an active bid, the Panel requires participants to give it regular 
updates on compliance. Faced with a protest by one of the parties, it will issue rulings as 
appropriate. The informality of the Panel enables it to respond almost immediately.  
 
Defensive action may not be taken by a target company during a takeover bid unless they 
have the consent of the shareholders. Rule 21 states that:  
‘during the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer if the board of the 
offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the board 
must not, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting…take any action which 
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may result in any offer or bona fide possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being 
denied the opportunity to decide on its merits.’  
 
Simply put, the board of the target company cannot take any action which may frustrate an 
offer, which either has been formally made or they have reason to believe will be made, 
without the consent of the shareholders. The rule contains a list of examples of actions which 
will frustrate a bid: 
‘(i) issue any shares or transfer or sell, or agree to transfer or sell, any shares out of 
treasury; 
(ii) issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares; 
(iii) create or issue, or permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares; 
(iv) sell, dispose of or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of or acquire, assets of a material 
amount; or 
(v) enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.’205 
 
Frustrating action is not however limited to these particular scenarios. Any action which 
interferes with the bid will be considered frustrating. ‘The characterisation of an act of the 
target board as frustrating to target shareholders focuses on the effect of the act on target 
shareholders’ ability to exercise their proprietary rights.’206 Frustrating action can also 
include any litigation which would prevent a bid from proceeding. The Panel will then 
normally prohibit the target board from commencing legal action which might have the effect 
of frustrating a bid, regardless of the perceived merits of the claim in question, unless 
shareholder consent has been obtained.
207
 As noted above the Code is designed to ensure that 
                                                          
205
 Code Rule 21 
206
 Ogowewo (n2) 598; see also the Panel's statement in John Crowther Group Plc, 1988/9, 1 that ‘[r]ule 21 of 
the Code is designed to stop the board of an offeree taking certain actions where these could be unfair to an 
offeror’  
207
 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Panel Statement Consolidated Gold Fields 
Plc 1989/7  2 <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/statements/DATA/1989/1989-07.pdf > (Panel 
ruling forbidding Consolidated Gold Fields from taking legal action against a potential acquirer unless ‘the 
directors obtain shareholders’ approval’) 
60 
 
shareholders are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a 
takeover, and that shareholders of the same class are afforded equivalent treatment by an 
offeror.  
 
The non-frustration rule was therefore established to serve this purpose, and to set 
management aside when hostile bids are imminent so that shareholders have the final say on 
the merit of the bids. If a hostile bidder launches a takeover effort and believes that the 
target’s managers are interfering with the bid, the bidder can lodge a protest with the Panel. 
The no frustrating action principle of the Code, however only becomes relevant when a bid is 
on the horizon. In the UK provisions dealing with changes of control may be acceptable when 
they form part of a wider transaction.
208
 The concept of “bona fides offer” is one that focuses 
on the credibility of a possible offer and it’s financing, as opposed to the ethics of the 
business intentions of the bidder.
209
 
 
3.3.4 Enforcement of the Code 
Where the Panel considers that there has been a breach of the Code, the Panel’s executive 
may commence disciplinary proceedings before the Hearings committee. If the Hearings 
committee finds a breach of the Code or of a ruling of the Panel, it may: (i) issue a private 
statement of censure; or (ii) issue a public statement of censure; or (iii) suspend or withdraw 
any exemption, approval or other special status which the Panel has granted to a person, or 
impose conditions on the continuing enjoyment of such exemption, approval or special status, 
in respect of all or part of the activities to which such exemption, approval or special status 
relates; or (iv) report the offender’s conduct to a UK or overseas regulatory authority or 
professional body (most notably the FCA) so that that authority or body can consider whether 
to take disciplinary or enforcement action (for example, the FCA has power to take certain 
actions against an authorised person or an approved person who fails to observe proper 
standards of market conduct, including the power to fine); or (v) publish a Panel statement 
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indicating that the offender is someone who, in the Hearings committee’s opinion, is not 
likely to comply with the Code.
210
  
 
The Panel statement will normally indicate that this sanction will remain effective for only a 
specified period. The rules of the FCA and certain professional bodies oblige their members, 
in certain circumstances, not to act for the person in question in a transaction subject to the 
Code, including dealing in relevant securities requiring disclosure (so called ‘‘cold-
shouldering’’).211 For example, the FCA’s rules require a person authorised under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 not to act, or continue to act, for any person in 
connection with a transaction to which the Code applies if the firm has reasonable grounds 
for believing that the person in question, or their principal, is not complying or is not likely to 
comply with the Code.
212
 The “harshest sanction,” cold shouldering, has been rarely 
employed by the Panel. In 2010 a London tycoon, Brian Myerson, and two of his associates 
received three year cold shouldering penalties for breaching the Code. The Panel noted that 
the three had been “disingenuous and dishonest.”213 The cold shoulder order effectively 
barred the three from any takeover-related activity, including buying or selling shares during 
a live takeover period.
214
 The penalty meant that no firm regulated by the FCA could act for 
the cold shouldered individual in a takeover situation.
 215
 
 
3.3.5 Change in the Legal Status of the Panel 
In 2007 the European Commission passed the Directive on Takeover Bids,
216
 with the aim of 
harmonising takeover provisions within the EU.
217
 While the UK government emphasised 
that the final form of legislation implementing the Directive retains independence of the 
Panel, the Directive required the establishment of a statutory body which would oversee 
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statutory takeover provisions.
218
 The CA Part 28 in effect converted the Panel (s.942) into the 
required statutory body to oversee takeovers in the UK. Under the directive reforms the Panel 
subsequently has its own range of sanctions contained in The CA 2006 ss.952-956 (as 
discussed above). This meant that the Panel was given formal powers to issue statements of 
censure, issue directions, refer conduct to other regulatory bodies, order compensation to be 
paid for breach of the Code and refer a matter for enforcement by the court. The Directive 
has, however been implemented in a manner that enables the Panel to preserve its self-
regulatory advantages by retaining the power to make, interpret and apply the rules, and 
enforcing them on its subjects. Takeovers subject to the Code are therefore still largely 
governed by soft law rules. The Directive may not form part of the picture of regulation of 
takeovers in the UK after Brexit. 
 
The Panel has stated that the impact of Brexit on the framework of takeover regulation will 
depend upon the form of exit that the UK negotiates.
219
 If the UK becomes a member of the 
European Economic Area (“EEA”), the Takeovers Directive “would continue to apply,”220 
although this seems unlikely at present. If the UK does not remain in the EEA, ‘the Panel will 
seek to discuss with Government the extent to which Chapter 1 of Part 28 of the CA, which 
implemented the Directive in the UK, should be amended.’221 The Panel has concluded 
however that Brexit, whether the UK stays in the EEA or not, will have “relatively few direct 
consequences” for the Code.222  
 
3.3.6 Squeeze-out and Sell-out Rights 
If a bid has been successful, but the bidder has not acquired one hundred percent of the 
shares, the CA includes provisions for a squeeze-out right,
223
 which enables a majority 
shareholder to require the remaining minority shareholders to sell their securities at a fair 
price in connection with takeover offers in the following situations: (i) If the bidder holds 
                                                          
218
 Dignam, Lowry (n153) 79 
219
 The Takeover Panel, Reports and Accounts for the Year Ended 31 March 2016 (2016) 
220
 ibid 9 
221
 ibid 
222
 ibid (Other than in certain limited respects, for example in the provisions for regulating “shared jurisdiction” 
cases with takeover regulators in other EEA member states) 
223
 s.979 CA 2006 
63 
 
securities representing at least 90 percent of the capital carrying voting rights and 90  percent 
of the voting rights in the target company; or (ii) if through acceptance of the takeover offer, 
the bidder has acquired or firmly contracted to acquire securities representing at least 90 
percent of the capital carrying voting rights and 90 percent of the voting rights comprised in 
the takeover offer. 
 
These provisions also give a sell-out right
224
 which enables minority shareholders to require 
the majority shareholder (the bidder) to buy their securities following a takeover offer for fair 
consideration. This is, however, only if the bidder meets the requirements for the takeover-
related squeeze-out. The right of squeeze-out and the right of sell-out however can only be 
exercised within three months after the end of the acceptance period.  
 
3.3.7 Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 
Schemes of arrangement, like an offer, are an amalgamation of both statutory law under the 
CA and soft law under the Code, but unlike offers, they are more heavily regulated by statute, 
specifically Part 26 of the CA. A scheme of arrangement is defined by s.895(1) CA as ‘a 
compromise or arrangement [that] is proposed between a company and (a) its creditors, or 
any class of them, or (b) its members, or any class of them.’225 Nothing in the CA however 
prescribes the subject matter of a scheme. In theory a scheme could be a compromise or 
arrangement between a company and its creditors or members about anything which they can 
properly agree amongst themselves.
226
 The phrase “a compromise or arrangement” within 
s.895 CA has been construed widely by the courts. All that is required is some difficulty or 
dispute which the scheme seeks to resolve.
227
 The courts have not sought to provide a 
definition of the term “arrangement” for these purposes, limiting it only to the extent that the 
arrangement must have the features of “give and take.”228 It is therefore ideal for a situation 
in which two companies agree to a takeover. 
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As noted above, a scheme will commence when the bidder and target board agree to a 
scheme. Once a proposal is put forward to the shareholders, an application must be made to 
the court in order to hold a meeting of the shareholders and creditors to vote on the 
scheme.
229
 Where a meeting is summoned a notice must be sent to the shareholders and 
creditors together with a statement.
230
 The statement must explain the effect of the scheme, 
and in particular, state any material interests of the directors of the company (whether as 
directors, or as members, or as creditors of the company, or otherwise), and the effect on 
those interests of the scheme, in so far as it is different from the effect on the likely interests 
of other persons. If a majority representing 75 percent of the creditors or members present 
and voting, either in person or by proxy, at the meeting agrees to a scheme the court may then 
on an application, sanction the scheme.
231
 A scheme sanctioned by the court is then binding 
on the company and the bidder acquires 100 percent of the shares.
232
  
  
3.3.8 Directors’ Duties 
Directors’ duties originally evolved from common law and have now been codified in the CA 
under s.171 to s.177. They are owed by the director, not to the shareholders, but to the 
company.
233
 If a director breaches a duty then the wrong is done to the company itself.
234
 The 
company, however, is not seen as wholly distinct from the shareholders who have interests 
that identify with those of the company.
235
 Except as otherwise provided, more than one 
general duty may apply in any given case;
236
 as such duties can be cumulative, and a director 
can be found to be liable under one or more provisions. Enforcement of directors’ duties will 
be left to the company itself however there are provisions
237
 which allow shareholders to 
bring claims against directors for breaches of duties on behalf of the company. 
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There are a number of duties which a director must consider before and during a takeover 
bid. For example, a director has a duty to avoid conflicts of interest under s.175. This section 
requires directors to avoid situations in which they have, or can have, a direct or indirect 
interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company. This 
‘applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is 
immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or 
opportunity).’238 Directors must not accept benefits from third parties under s.176 and must 
declare any interests that they have (either directly or indirectly) in a proposed transaction or 
arrangement, such as a takeover or scheme.  
 
 
Directors have also been found to owe fiduciary duties which require disclosure to 
shareholders during a takeover bid.
239
 The most relevant of these duties however are s.171 to 
act within their powers, s.172 to promote the success of the company, and s.174, which 
requires a director to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. Each of these duties will 
now be discussed in turn.   
 
3.3.8.1 Duty to Act Within Powers 
Under s.171 directors must act in accordance with the company’s constitution, and only 
exercise their powers for the purpose for which those powers are conferred. An example of a 
breach of this duty in a takeover scenario would be the use of defences to prevent a bid from 
being successful, such as employing pre or post bid defences
240
 when the director has no 
power to do so, or the shareholders have not agreed to take that action. This would however, 
also be regulated by Rule 21 of the Code.  
 
In order to assess whether this duty has been breached, the courts will first look to the 
company’s articles and constitution to determine whether the power has been conferred to the 
director and then whether the particular purpose for which they exercised that power is 
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proper.
241
 If a director has exercised a power which has not been granted to them they will be 
in breach of this duty. If the company’s constitution has granted the powers to the directors to 
undertake certain actions, they may still be in breach of this duty if they have not exercised 
that power appropriately. For example, if a power is exercised primarily for some other 
collateral purpose, which will be objectively assessed by the courts, then the director is guilty 
of an abuse of power and their action can be set aside. Directors must therefore exercise 
discretion in what they consider is in the interest of the company, and not for any other 
collateral purpose.
242
 So even if the director acted honestly they may be in breach of their 
duty if they have exercised their powers for a purpose outside those for which their powers 
were conferred upon them.
243
 The courts have however acknowledged that there might be a 
range of purposes associated with a particular action of directors;
244
 in this case the test is 
applied to the dominant or primary purpose of the directors’ actions.245  
 
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd
246
 illustrates how the courts will determine a 
director’s primary purpose or motivation. In this case a majority shareholder (Ampol) in a 
company (Miller) made an offer to acquire the remaining shares. The directors of Miller 
however preferred a takeover offer from Howard Smith, but this could not succeed as long as 
Ampol retained its majority shareholding. The directors therefore issued new shares to 
Howard Smith in order to reduce Ampol to a minority position. Ampol claimed that this issue 
of new shares involved the directors acting for an improper purpose. The court however 
rejected the idea that the only purpose of an issue of new shares was to raise new capital for 
the company when it needed it. There could be other, proper, purposes involved in a share 
issue. In this case, however, no such alternative purpose was evident. The only purpose was 
to block the bid by Ampol. Even though the directors in that case were not acting self-
interestedly, they were held to be in breach of the proper purpose rule. This case developed a 
two-fold process for determining a breach of the duty to act within powers.
247
 Firstly, the 
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courts will consider the power in question, and the limits in which they may be exercised; and 
secondly, the substantial purpose for which the power was exercised.  
 
Whilst judges will not challenge the director’s judgment and will take into account the 
subjective intention of the director, they will ultimately take an objective approach in 
deciding whether the director has acted within their powers, and their primary motivations for 
doing so. It is therefore not sufficient for directors to act in what they believe is in the best 
interests of the company unless they can also establish that their actions are within the scope 
of the powers conferred to them. As long as a director can satisfy to the court that the primary 
purpose of the action was indeed proper, then they will not be in breach of this duty even if 
the incidental result is to secure the director’s control of the company. In Criterion Properties 
plc v Stratford UK Properties
248
 a poison pill arrangement was entered into by Criterion and 
another company. The agreement ultimately deterred a takeover from occurring. The court 
held that the agreement could not only be triggered by a hostile takeover, but even one that 
was wholly beneficial, and as such was an improper use of the directors’ powers to bind the 
company.
249
 The court looked at the directors’ authority in particular and found that the 
directors did not have actual, apparent or ostensible authority to sign the poison pill 
agreement.
250
   
 
3.3.8.2 Duty to Promote the Success of the Company 
A director of a company must act in a way which he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole; and 
in doing so have regard to other stakeholders such as employees, creditors and the 
community.
251
 Directors are thus precluded from exercising their powers to further their own 
interests or the interests of some third party.
252
 During a takeover a director must therefore act 
in the best interests of the company, and as such advise shareholders honestly about the 
merits of the offer or proposed scheme of arrangement. For example, this duty means that a 
director cannot advise against a takeover just because they are worried they will lose their 
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position, or be in favour of the takeover if it is only in their interests to do so, even though it 
would not be beneficial to the company. 
 
The directors’ duty to promote the success of the company is a subjectively assessed 
obligation. In assessing breaches of this duty the courts will therefore consider whether the 
director exercised their discretion bona fide in what they consider, not what the courts may 
consider, to be in the interests of the company.
253
 Self-dealing on the part of the directors and 
giving preference to one shareholder group over and above the shareholders as a whole, are 
types of motivation which could lead a court to conclude that the directors had not acted in 
good faith for the benefit of the company.
254
 
 
Under this duty the director is also required to have regard to the likely long-term 
consequence of their decisions. This is specifically relevant in a takeover contest, for 
instance, a director must consider whether the prospect of the bidder taking control of the 
company is harmful to the company’s long-term business plans. The basis of the duty is 
therefore not just confined to the existing body of shareholders but also future 
shareholders.
255
 Where the directors must only decide between rival bidders, however, the 
interests of the company must be the interests of the current shareholders.
256
 This is because 
the future of the company will lie with the successful bidder.
257
 Where directors are required 
to give advice to current shareholders in respect of an offer, they have a duty to advise in 
good faith and not fraudulently, and not to mislead whether deliberately or carelessly.
258
 
Provided directors act in good faith and in the interests of the company, and are not wilfully 
blind to the company’s interests they will not be liable for breach of this duty if they make a 
mistake and/or act unreasonably.
259
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3.3.8.3 Duty  to Exercise Reasonable Care, Skill and Diligence 
The level by which the director will be judged will be what a reasonably diligent person may 
be expected to have done, having regard to the director’s particular role and experience.260 In 
order to determine whether a director has breached this duty the courts will therefore look at 
the director’s actions in both a subjective and objective manner. Subjective considerations 
will include whether the director has any special skills. A director must also acquire and 
maintain sufficient knowledge of the company’s business in order to enable them to 
discharge their responsibilities.
261
  
 
3.3.9 Causes of Action under Company Law 
 
3.3.9.1 Unfair Prejudice 
A shareholder may apply to the court by petition for an order using s.994 (unfair prejudice) 
on the ground that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is 
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members 
(including at least himself), or that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company 
(including an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. 
 
In order to satisfy a claim under s.994 the conduct must be unfair and prejudicial in the sense 
of causing prejudice or harm to the relevant interest of the members or some part of the 
members of the company (shareholders). The test as to what amounts to unfair prejudice is 
objective. It is accordingly unnecessary for the claimant to show that the persons controlling 
the company have acted deliberately in bad faith, or with a conscious intent to treat them 
unfairly. Fairness is judged in the context of a commercial relationship, the contractual terms 
of which are set out in the articles of association of the company and in any shareholders’ 
agreement. The starting point is, therefore, to ask whether the conduct which the shareholder 
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has complained about is in accordance with the articles and the powers that the shareholders 
have entrusted to the board. 
 
The rights of the shareholder must then have been prejudiced. A member’s interest is not 
limited to their strict legal rights under the articles of association, but can extend to legitimate 
expectations arising from the nature of the company, as well as agreement and 
understandings between the parties. Common examples of what may constitute unfairly 
prejudicial conduct are: exclusion from management in circumstances where there is a 
legitimate expectation of participation; diversion of business to another company in which the 
majority shareholder holds an interest; the awarding of excessive financial benefits by the 
majority shareholder to themselves, and abuses of power and breaches of the articles of 
association. 
 
S.996 lists particular types of orders which may be made by the court if it decides that there 
has been unfair prejudice. The powers listed provide that the court can: regulate the conduct 
of the company's affairs in the future; require the company to refrain from doing or 
continuing an act complained about, or to do an act which the petitioner has complained that 
it has omitted to do; authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of 
the company by such persons and on such terms as the court may direct; require the company 
not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its articles without relief of the court; provide 
for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members or by the 
company itself and, in the case of the purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the 
company’s capital accordingly. 
 
3.3.9.2 Other Causes of Action under Companies Act 2006 
There are other causes of action in which a claim can be brought, in regards to the examples 
of complaints highlighted above. These causes of action are under s.33, s.549, s.793, s.803 
and s.911B of the CA 2006. This section will give a brief description of each section and the 
actions that can be brought.  
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A claim can be brought via s.33 which concerns a breach of the companies’ articles. s.549 
covers the directors power to allot shares, and states that the directors of a company must not 
exercise any power of the company to allot shares in the company, or to grant rights to 
subscribe for, or to convert any security into, shares in the company, except in accordance 
with s.550 (private company with single class of shares) or s.551 (authorisation by company).  
 
S.793 allows a company to impose restrictions on shares. A public company may give notice 
under this section to any person whom the company knows or has reasonable cause to believe 
to be interested in the company's shares, or to have been so interested at any time during the 
three years immediately preceding the date on which the notice is issued. The notice may 
require the person to confirm that fact or to state whether or not it is the case, and if he holds, 
or has during that time held, any such interest, to give such further information as may be 
required. For instance, the notice may require the person to whom it is addressed to give 
particulars of his own present or past interest in the company's shares (held by him at any 
time during a three year period). S.803 gives the members of a company the power to require 
it to exercise its powers under s.793. A company is required to do so once it has received 
requests (to the same effect) from members of the company holding at least 10 percent of 
such of the paid-up capital of the company as carries a right to vote at general meetings of the 
company (excluding any voting rights attached to any shares in the company held as treasury 
shares). A request will specify the manner in which the company is requested to act, and give 
reasonable grounds for requiring the company to exercise those powers in the manner 
specified. 
 
S.911B concerns the reporting on material changes of assets of merging companies. The 
directors of each of the merging companies must report to every meeting of the members, or 
any class of members, of that company summoned for the purpose of agreeing to the scheme, 
and to the directors of every other merging company, any material changes in the property 
and liabilities of that company between the date when the draft terms were adopted and the 
date of the meeting in question. The directors of each of the other merging companies must in 
turn report those matters to every meeting of the members, or any class of members, of that 
company summoned for the purpose of agreeing to the scheme: or send a report of those 
matters to every member entitled to receive notice of such a meeting. The requirement in this 
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section is however subject to s.915A (other circumstances in which reports and inspection not 
required) and s.918A (agreement to dispense with reports etc). 
 
3.4 Other Relevant Regulation 
As noted already, much of the takeover process depends upon ‘private ordering’, in the sense 
of agreements reached between the parties.  This section will therefore consider the law 
which may regulate these agreements and the extent to which these agreements may also 
serve to constrain takeover participants, in that they may become a cause of action to pursue a 
complaint. This section will therefore discuss other important regulation pertaining to a 
takeover, contract law, judicial review and common law fiduciary duties. 
 
3.4.1 Other Legislation 
Whilst the CA is the main piece of legislation regulating takeovers in the UK, there are a 
number of other laws that regulate the takeover process. This other legislation includes: the 
Fair Trading Act 1973 (“FTA”); the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (“MA”); and the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”), all of which will now be discussed. 
 
Under s.75 FTA the Secretary of State can request a merger reference to be made to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission where it appears that it is or may be the fact that 
arrangements are in progress or in contemplation which, if carried into effect, will result in 
the creation of a merger situation qualifying for investigation. Where a merger reference is 
made under this section, it shall be unlawful, except with the consent of the Secretary of State 
for any party involved to directly or indirectly acquire an interest in the shares of the 
companies.  
 
S.2(1) MA allows a person who has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been 
made to him by another party, and as a result thereof he has suffered loss, to claim damages. 
The person making the misrepresentation would be liable for damages in respect of the 
misrepresentation if they have been made fraudulently. The person shall be liable 
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notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently, unless he proves that 
he had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe up to the time the contract was made, 
that the facts represented were true. 
 
S.90 FSMA concerns the accurate and timely publishing of information on listing securities. 
Any person responsible for listing particulars is liable to pay compensation to a person who 
has acquired securities to which the particulars apply, and suffered loss in respect of them as 
a result of any untrue or misleading statement in the particulars; or the omission from the 
particulars of any matter required to be included. If listing particulars are required to include 
information about the absence of a particular matter, the omission from the particulars of that 
information is to be treated as a statement in the listing particulars that there is no such 
matter. Any person who fails to comply is liable to pay compensation to any person who has 
acquired securities of the kind in question, and suffered loss in respect of them as a result of 
the failure. The particulars must contain all such information as investors and their 
professional advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect to find there, for the 
purpose of making an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, 
profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer of the securities; and the rights attaching to the 
securities. 
 
3.4.2 Contract Law 
Contract law only regulates the takeover process if there is an existing contract between the 
parties. A contract may be formed, for instance, if the parties agree to a standstill clause. A 
claim can be brought under contract law for a breach of contract or for a negligent 
misstatement made during the takeover process. A negligent misstatement is a false statement 
of fact made honestly but carelessly where the circumstances disclose a duty to be careful.
262
 
A statement of opinion, such as a directors’ opinion on the merits of a takeover, may be 
treated as a statement of fact if it carries the implication that the person making it has 
reasonable grounds for trusting his opinion.
263
 A negligent misstatement is however only 
actionable in tort if there has been breach of a duty to take care in making the statement that 
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has caused damage to the claimant.
264
 There is no general duty of care in making statements, 
particularly in relation to statements on financial matters.
265
 Responsibility for negligent 
misstatements is imposed only if they were made in circumstances that made it reasonable to 
rely on them.
266
   
 
3.4.3 Judicial Review 
Judicial review claims are actions taken by parties to the bid against the Panel on a point of 
law, and take place once the bid has been completed.
267
 The court thus only considers 
intervening, if at all, later and in retrospect by declaratory orders which would enable the 
Panel not to repeat any error, and would relieve individuals of the disciplinary consequences 
of any erroneous finding of breach of the rules.
268
 Subsequently this type of litigation cannot 
be used tactically to frustrate a bid.  
 
3.4.4 Common Law (non-directorial) Fiduciary Duties 
These are common law duties which are not related to those duties owed by the director to 
the company, but are duties owed specifically in a fiduciary relationship. Fiduciary 
relationships are those between trustee and cestui que trust, such as solicitor and client, parent 
and child, or guardian and ward.
269
 There are other circumstances in which the law imposes a 
duty to be careful, which is not limited to a duty to be careful to avoid personal injury or 
injury to property but covers a duty to avoid inflicting pecuniary loss, provided always that 
there is a sufficiently close relationship to give rise to a duty of care.
270
 This duty could arise 
between the bidder and the target company, or between these parties and their advisors (such 
as their legal or financial advisors). In order for a duty of care to arise three elements need to 
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exist: there must be reasonable foreseeability; a close and direct relationship of 'proximity' 
between the parties; and it must be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability.
271
  
 
The duty of avoiding conflicts of interest (which is also linked with a duty of confidence) was 
discussed in the Marks and Spencer v Freshfields case in which the court noted that in respect 
of a firm of lawyers acting for both bidder and target: 
‘[A] fiduciary cannot act at the same time both for and against the same client, and his 
firm is in no better position. A man cannot without the consent of both clients act for one 
client while his partner is acting for another in the opposite interest. His disqualification has 
nothing to do with the confidentiality of client information. It is based on the inescapable 
conflict of interest which is inherent in the situation.’272 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
There are two main ways in which a takeover can be completed in the UK:  via a takeover 
offer, or a scheme of arrangement. The method that will be used will generally depend upon 
whether the bid is hostile or friendly. For example, if the bid is hostile then the takeover 
would have to be completed via a takeover offer. The takeover offer and scheme of 
arrangement are regulated primarily by the Code, and by certain provisions of company law. 
The Panel plays a key role in the regulation of takeovers in the UK by ensuring that the Code 
is adhered to, giving guidance, and dealing with any breaches of the Code and regularly 
updating and changing the rules of the Code. The behaviour of the target director, which 
includes whether any defensive mechanisms are used to defeat takeovers, is regulated by the 
Code, but for the main part is enforced by directors’ duties within the CA. Directors will 
therefore find it extremely difficult to defend against an unwanted takeover. The UK system 
of regulation is primarily aimed at empowering the target shareholders to decide on the merits 
of the bid, and whether a company is taken over (either by a takeover offer or scheme of 
arrangement). 
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Chapter Four 
UK Takeover Litigation: Typology and Propensity 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the regulatory regime for takeovers in the UK. This chapter 
will now turn to mapping the “litigation landscape” of UK. It is often assumed that the UK 
has little propensity to litigate over issues arising from takeover disputes,
273
 but the actual 
levels of this litigation have yet to be ascertained. The aim of this chapter is to establish those 
levels by revealing the findings of the empirical study undertaken to identify UK takeover 
cases. This chapter will also identify what causes of action generate litigation in the UK, who 
instigates this litigation, and who is the subject of these complaints. In determining the actual 
levels of takeover litigation other questions can begin to be answered, such as explaining the 
UK’s propensity to litigate, comparing those levels to other jurisdictions like the US, and 
answering whether the level of litigation in the UK is indeed advantageous or not. 
 
An initial hurdle to ascertaining the level of litigation, however, is that the category of 
“takeover litigation” is not objectively given; cases are not reported bearing the label 
“takeover case.” For this reason, what constitutes takeover litigation or a “takeover case” was 
determined by a number of different factors. Firstly, the litigation must involve a “takeover 
agreement,” such as a scheme of arrangement, a “takeover bid” (whether the bid has been 
formally made or not, in line with the Code understanding that a bid is something which may 
be on the horizon) or any other agreement that would result in a change of control. Secondly 
the type of complaint which motivated the litigation had to involve a complaint about the 
process or effect of the takeover. These features cannot however be immediately identified. A 
list of complaints that may arise from the process or effect of a takeover was therefore 
compiled, and from this list, causes of action in which to pursue these complaints via 
litigation were identified.  
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The next section, section 4.2, sets out the typology of the range of complaints a party to a 
takeover may have, and section 4.3, discusses the potential causes of action which may arise 
from these complaints. The causes of action that were identified were then used as a basis for 
the search undertaken to establish the propensity of the main parties to a UK takeover to 
litigate during or after the takeover process. These main parties to a takeover were identified 
as the target company, target directors, target shareholders, the bidder and the bidding 
shareholders. The methods of this search are outlined in section 4.4 and the results are 
discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 identifies whether the complaints listed in section 4.2 are 
covered by the Code, and therefore can be pursued via dialogue with the Panel. Section 4.6 
also outlines the number of Panel decisions that have been made in regards to some of these 
complaints. This is in order to compare the rate of litigation identified in section 4.5 to the 
decisions made by the Panel, and determine whether the level of litigation also reflects in the 
level of Panel decisions made.  
 
4.2 Typology of Range of Complaints 
In order to determine what takeover litigation might be, it is first necessary to think of all the 
possible complaints a party to a takeover may have during and after the takeover process.
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This is because the complaints give a basis in which to begin to isolate the legal causes of 
action the parties could use in order to pursue their complaint via litigation. These complaints 
are linked to the different interests and goals of the different parties to a takeover
275
 that 
would arise during the takeover, or after the takeover has been completed (or failed). Table 1 
below lists the substance of these complaints, the complainant (who is making the complaint) 
and the target of the complaint (who they would be complaining about). It must be noted that 
the majority of the complaints listed are specific to takeover bids, rather than schemes of 
arrangements. However there are some similar complaints which can arise from both 
methods of takeover, for example those listed within column 2A regarding target shareholder 
complaints. Some of these complaints are expanded upon further below Table 4.1. The 
abbreviations are also explained after the table. 
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Table 4.1 
  Complaint 
Complainant Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint 
1. Target Directors 1A. Target Shareholders 1Ai. Identity of TS* 
1Aii. Concert party arrangements 
1B. Fellow Target Director 1Bi. Failure to disclose information 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  
1Biii. Acting in concert with the Bidder  
1Biv. Interest in bid 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill clause 
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality agreement 
1Ciii. Failure to disclose information 
1Civ. Conflict of interest 
1Cv. Breach of timetable 
1Cvi. Bidder pressured TS to sell shares 
1Cvii. Extension of timetable 
1Cviii. Takeover detrimental to long term 
plans of the TC** 
1Cix. Breach of Code 
1Cx. Misrepresented information 
1Cxi. Value of bid 
1Cxii. Failure to formalise bid 
1Cxiii. Loss of employment 
1Cxiv. Change to contract of employment  
1D. Bidder/Government 1Di. Breach of competition laws 
1Dii. TC is a ‘national treasure’ or ‘jewel 
company’  
1Diii. Takeover will have detrimental effect 
to UK economy  
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  
1F. Takeover Panel 1Fi. Decision or ruling 
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  Complaint 
Complainant Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint 
2. Target Shareholders 2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD*** misrepresented information  
2Aii. Failure to disclose information 
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not complying with the 
Code 
2Aiv. TD valuation of the share price 
2Av. TD advice on the merits of the bid  
2Avi. TD interest in bid 
2Avii. TD knew or ought to have known that 
the advice given to the shareholders by other 
professionals was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
2Aviii. TD issued new shares 
2Aix. TD knew or ought to have known that 
bidder would strip company of assets  
2Ax. TD knew or ought to have known that 
the takeover was detrimental  
2.B Bidder/New Directors 2Bi. Long-term plans have been unnecessarily 
disregarded by the new directors/majority 
2Bii. New directors issues shares (after 
takeover), and as a result remaining target 
shareholders vote is diluted 
2Biii. TS who are unable to take advantage of 
sell-out rule, but are affected by a new 
majority want their shares to be bought by 
the bidder  
2Biv. New directors/majority have stripped 
company of assets  
2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  
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  Complaint 
Complainant Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint 
3. Bidding Company 3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable  
3Aii. TC used takeover defence  
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate defence  
3Aiv. Failure to disclose information  
3Av. TD refused to negotiate  
3Avi. Value of bid 
3Avii. TD misrepresent information  
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders 
3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  
3C. Takeover Panel 3Ci. Decision or ruling 
4. Bidding Shareholders 4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover is not in the best interests of 
the BC**** 
4Aii. BD did not obtain best price for shares 
4Aiii. BD misrepresented information 
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of bid 
4Av. BD knew or ought to have known that 
the advice given to the BS by other 
professionals  was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  
 
*TS = Target Shareholder 
**TC = Target Company 
***TD = Target Director 
****BC = Bidding Company 
*****BD = Bidder Director 
 
4.2.1 Explanations 
 
1Aii (Concert Party Arrangements)  
A concert party is a group of people acting together in a takeover bid. 
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1Ci (Standstill Clause) 
The target company and bidder can agree to a standstill clause, which generally means that 
the bidder will agree not to buy any further shares in the company (than they already own) 
without first receiving permission from the target board of directors.  
 
1Bi, 1Ciii, 2Aii, 3Aiv (Failure to Disclose Information) 
The meaning of information in this context is any information that would be relevant in 
deciding upon the merits of the bid. For example, a director could fail to disclose to the 
shareholder any interest they have in the transaction.  
 
1Civ, 1Eii, 2Aii, 2Cii (Conflict of Interest) 
A conflict of interest can arise when a target director has any interest in the outcome of the 
takeover bid which conflicts with the best interests of the company. For example, a target 
director may have made a deal with the bidder to keep their position in the company once the 
takeover was completed, or to receive another benefit, in exchange for their support. 
Conflicts of interest can also arise when a party has received an advantage which would lead 
to the process of the takeover being unfair. For example, a bidder may receive or have 
information that would help them succeed in the takeover bid. Advisors may also be in a 
position where a conflict of interest would arise, for instance a firm of solicitors could have 
professional ties to both the target company and the bidder, and as such may have 
information that would be relevant and valuable to the bid.  
 
1Dii (National Treasure or Jewel Company) 
Directors may believe that their company is important to the UK and is therefore a ‘jewel 
company’ or ‘national treasure’. A company may be considered a jewel company if it 
significantly contributes to the economy. If a company has historical significance in the UK it 
may also be considered a national treasure. For example, a company which has been at the 
centre of the economy and popular with UK customers for a long period of time may be 
considered as having either of these titles.  
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2Aviii (Issue of New Shares) 
This complaint refers to any tactical dilution of shares in order to give the bidder a better 
chance of succeeding in a bid attempt, or to water down shares of other independent 
shareholders once the bid has been completed.  
 
2Aiv (Target Directors Valuation of Share Price) 
Generally if shareholders do not agree with the share price valuation they will not sell to the 
bidder. However, they may wish to sell their shares to the bidder but want to do so at a higher 
price and therefore want the target directors to negotiate an increased premium. If the target 
directors refuse to do so it may lead the shareholders to disagree and split into groups, those 
of whom may just simply decide to sell at that price if they believe that they will not get 
offered more, and those who may have to simply sell because the first group did, in order to 
avoid becoming minority shareholders. The second group may then feel that their shares were 
undervalued but were forced to sell despite disagreeing with the price offered.  
 
2Biii (Unable to Take Advantage of Sell-Out Rule) 
Shareholders who are still members of the company post-takeover may be affected by a new 
majority and want their shares to be bought by the bidder but are unable to take advantage of 
the sell-out rule. This is possible if the shareholders did not sell initially because they were 
unsure whether the bid would succeed (a bid needs only 50 percent of the shares to be 
successful, but 90 percent is required to take advantage of the sell-out rule).  
 
4.3 Causes of Action 
By identifying the substance of the parties’ takeover complaints the potential legal causes of 
action that could form the basis of takeover litigation can be established. The table below 
shows these potential causes of action beside the original complaint. It is interesting to note 
that some complaints do not seem to have a legal cause of action. Most of the complaints can 
nevertheless be litigated using sections from the CA, most notably via directors’ duties under 
s.171 to s.177. There are however other pieces of legislation and common law precedent 
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which can form the basis of litigation. These are non-directors common law fiduciary duties, 
breach of contract, FTA, MA and FSMA. These causes of action were discussed and 
explained in the chapter three. 
Table 4.2 
Complaint: Complainant: Target Directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
1A. Target Shareholders 1Ai. Identity of TS s.793, s.803 CA 2006 
1Aii. Concert party arrangements s.793, s.803 CA 2006 
1B. Fellow Target Director 1Bi. Failure to disclose information Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 
1Biii. Acting in concert with the Bidder  Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, s.175, 
s.177  CA 2006 
1Biv. Interest in bid Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, s.175, 
s.176, s.177  CA 2006 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill clause Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality agreement Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
1Ciii. Failure to disclose information   
1Ciii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to act 
in best interests 
1Civ. Breach of timetable   
1Cv. Bidder pressured TS to sell shares   
1Cvi. Extension of timetable   
1Cvii. Takeover detrimental to long term plans 
of the TC 
  
1Cviii. Breach of Code   
1Cix. Misrepresented information s.2(1) MA 
1Cx. Value of bid   
1Cxi. Failure to formalise bid   
1D. Bidder/Government 1Di. Breach of competition laws s.75 FTA 
1Dii. TC is a ‘jewel company’    
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1Diii. Takeover will have detrimental effect to 
UK economy  
  
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
1Eii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to act 
in best interests 
1F. Takeover Panel 1Fi. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
 
 
  
Complaint: Complainant: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD misrepresented information  Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006); Part 26; 
s.994 CA 2006  
2Aii. Failure to disclose information Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006); Part 26; 
s.994 CA 2006  
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not complying with the 
Code 
  
2Aiv. TD valuation of the share price   
2Av. TD advice on the merits of the bid  Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006); s.994 CA 
2006  
2Avi. TD interest in bid Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.173 s.174, s.175, s.176, 
s.177 CA 2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
2Avii. TD knew or ought to have known that the 
advice given to the shareholders by other 
professionals was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006); s.994 CA 
2006 
2Aviii. TD issued new shares Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.171 CA 2006), s.33, s.549 CA 
2006 
2Aix. TD knew or ought to have known that 
bidder would strip company of assets  
Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
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2Ax. TD knew or ought to have known that the 
takeover was detrimental  
Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
2.B Bidder/New Directors 2Bi. Long-term plans have been unnecessarily 
disregarded by the new directors/majority 
  
2Bii. New directors issues shares (after 
takeover), and as a result remaining target 
shareholders vote is diluted 
s.549 CA 2006 
2Biii. TS who are unable to take advantage of 
sell-out rule, but are affected by a new majority 
want their shares to be bought by the bidder  
  
2Biv. New directors/majority have stripped 
company of assets  
s.911B CA 2006  
2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
2Cii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to act 
in best interests 
 
Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Company 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable    
3Aii. TC used takeover defence   
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate defence    
3Aiv. Failure to disclose information  Duty of care; s.90A FSMA 
3Av. TD refused to negotiate    
3Avi. Value of bid   
3Avii. TD misrepresent information    
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders   
3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
3C. Takeover Panel 3Ci. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
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Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover in not in the best interests of the 
BC 
Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Aii. BD did not obtain best price for shares Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Aiii. BD misrepresented information Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of bid Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Av. BD knew or ought to have known that the 
advice given to the BS by other professionals  
was negligent or misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006); s.994 CA 
2006 
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent misrepresentation 
 
Once the potential legal causes of action had been identified a search could then be 
undertaken to find takeover litigation using the provisions as a starting point for the search. It 
is essential to note here that some of these causes of action can be brought using a derivative 
claim under s.260 CA, which is not a cause of action in of itself but a way of advancing some 
of the complaints and causes of action identified. A distinction between the substances of a 
claim, (i.e. the complaint), must be made from the procedural form, (i.e. whether the claim 
will be brought as a derivative action). For the purposes of this search, unfair prejudice has 
been listed as a cause of action. This is because it is essentially a claim which alleges that the 
company has been run in an unfairly prejudicial manner.
276
 Even though the unfair prejudice 
provisions give the complainant a procedural form in which to pursue the complaint as 
litigation it is still a specific complaint in itself, whereas a derivative action is a procedure in 
which to advance other complaints, largely those relating to a breach of a director’s duty. 
 
A breach of a director’s duty is a cause of action under which many of the above complaints 
can be brought. Only the company, however, may bring a claim for a breach of these duties, 
because they are only owed to the company.
277
 Claims brought by a company are very often 
retrospective and are brought by members of the existing board usually for the actions of 
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dismissed directors. If a breach is established the company can seek an injunction to stop the 
director from carrying out or continuing with the breach; damages by way of compensation 
where the director has been negligent; restoration of the company’s property; voiding a 
contract; or  rescinding a contract in which the director had an undisclosed interest.
278
 An 
unfair prejudice claim is on the other hand an action which is brought by shareholders in 
order to directly benefit them for a wrong committed to them.
279
  
 
4.4 Method of Search 
The search that was undertaken to find all instances of litigation in respect of those causes of 
action as identified in Table 4.2 above. This section will now outline the method used for this 
search and more interestingly reveal the results the search generated.   
 
As explained above, before beginning the search, the possible complaints that the parties to a 
takeover might have were listed. From this list, the legal causes of action in which these 
complaints could be brought as litigation were identified. The causes of action then became 
the basis of the search, however first a few issues, which are listed below had to be clarified. 
 
4.4.1 Reported Versus Non-Reported Cases 
The search was limited to cases which generated a reported decision.  The reason for this 
limitation was that the time constraints of this project prevented a deeper search. There is 
therefore the possibility that beneath the tip of a few reported cases lays a hidden iceberg of 
litigation which was abandoned before a judgment was produced by the court.  To try to 
address this remote possibility, informal interviews with practitioners were conducted.  See 
appendix one for the completed interviews, which confirmed that takeover litigation in 
practice is very rarely undertaken or even threatened.  
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4.4.2 Cases Recorded Since 1960 
Cases were examined from 1
st
 January 1960, in order to give an extensive view of the cases 
brought over a long period of time. It also seemed futile to search before this point since 
takeovers were not abundant prior to this date.  
 
4.4.3 Jurisdictions  
Excluded from the search were cases from Scotland and Commonwealth countries such as 
New Zealand and Australia. This is simply because the focus of this chapter is the laws of 
England and Wales. 
 
4.4.4 Substance of Claim 
The cases which were of interest involved a takeover by either a scheme of arrangement, 
takeover offer, or any case in which there was a change of control or threat of a change of 
control. Both friendly and hostile takeovers were counted, and also claims brought either 
during or after the takeover. This is to enable a good overview of the litigation which can be 
brought during the whole of the takeover process including the effects of a takeover.  
 
4.4.5 The Search 
Using the LexisNexis Professional internet database, a search was undertaken in June 2015, 
initially by searching against each cause of action, for example, s.171 CA. Once this search 
was completed, a case search was undertaken in order to seek out cases under the causes of 
action which did not have a relevant provision, such as the common law duty of care. Old 
common laws which are now codified in provisions of the CA were also searched for, such as 
the equivalent common law principle for s.171 of the CA which is the improper purpose 
doctrine. Defunct legislation was also searched when there was an identical provision that 
existed during the time period looked at, for example s.459 of the Companies Act 1985 has 
now been replaced by s.994 CA. 
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These case searches however brought up many cases that were not relevant. In order to find 
those cases which involved takeover litigation, each case was examined individually. In some 
instances this was not possible to do with the initial search term (which was the cause of 
action). Therefore some searches were refined by selecting the company law field, and then 
searching within the results using the term “takeover.” Once the whole search was complete, 
each case that had been found was then examined further using the case history function. This 
function allows the cases which had referred to the judgment of the relevant case to be 
shown, and also the cases which the relevant case had used in its judgment. Each relevant 
case was then checked to ensure that all the pertinent cases had been found. This search was 
also undertaken again in November 2016 to identify litigation that might have occurred since 
the original search. 
 
4.5 The Findings 
Between 1960 and 2016 there were 43 cases reported.
280
 Table 4.3 below displays the number 
of cases litigated for each provision or principle that was searched.  
 
Table 4.3 
  Cause of Action No of Cases Litigated 
Companies Act 2006 s.33 0 
s.171 0 
s.172 1 
s.173 0 
s.174 0 
s.175 0 
s.176 0 
s.177 0 
s.549 0 
s.793 1 
s.803 0 
Part 26 1 
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s.911B 0 
s.994 3 
Companies Act 1985 s.216 3 
s.459 (s.994 CA06) 4 
Companies Act 1948 s.164/172 1 
s.209 2 
Fair Trading Act 1973 s.75 1 
Misrepresentation Act 
1967 
s.2(1) 1 
Financial Services and 
Markets Act 
s.90 0 
Contract Law (common 
law) 
Breach of contract 1 
Negligent misstatement 4 
Directors Duties 
(common law position 
pre Companies Act 
2006) 
Improper purpose 4 
Duty to act in good faith 3 
Duty of Care 0 
Conflict of interest 0 
Fiduciary Duties 
(common law) 
Duty of care 5 
Duty to act in best interests 0 
Duty of confidence 2 
Conflict of interest 3 
Judicial Review   3 
Total (inc. common law 
directors duties) 
  43 
* Common Law Fiduciary Duties are duties which arise from certain relationships (for example between a 
company and an accountant). They are not duties owed by directors specifically.  
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4.5.1 Common Causes of Action 
Table 4.4 
Cause of Action 
Number of 
Takeover Litigation 
Percentage of total cases 
recorded % 
Common Law Fiduciary Duties 10 23 
Directors Duties  8 19 
Unfair Prejudice (s.994 CA06 & s.459 CA85) 7 16 
Negligent Misstatement 4 9 
 
Table 4.4 shows the most popular causes of action and demonstrates that the most popular 
basis was the breach of a common law fiduciary duty. There were 10 cases alleging a breach 
of a fiduciary duty against non-directors (and one claim which alleged directors had breached 
a common law fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders)
281
 which represents 36 percent of the 
cases overall. The most frequent fiduciary breach that was litigated was that of the duty of 
care, which totalled five of the 10 cases. Unsurprisingly, a majority of the cases were brought 
as an action against a director for a breach of their duties. Only one of the eight cases had 
been brought under the directors’ duties provisions in the CA (this was s.172 duty to promote 
the success of the company). The rest of the cases were brought under the old common law 
directors’ duties which existed prior to the 2006 Act. Out of these cases, five were for the 
breach of the proper purpose doctrine, and three were brought as a breach of the directors’ 
duty to act in good faith. A possible explanation for the abundance of claims recorded under 
the old common law directors’ duties may simply be that there was a longer period of time 
sampled for these duties, than for the provisions which have only come into force in the last 
10 years. Unfair prejudice claims totalled 16 percent of the cases brought and negligent 
misstatement claims amounted to nine percent.  
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4.5.2 Propensity to Litigate 
Table 4.5 
Year Number of Takeover Litigation Number of Takeovers Percentage % 
2015 0 49 0 
2014 2 211 0.95 
2013 1 326 0.31 
2012 0 373 0 
2011 1 564 0.18 
2010 1 537 0.19 
Total 5 2060 0.24 
* Figures for the number of takeovers (domestic) per year are taken from the Office for National Statistics.
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The data above demonstrates that takeover litigation occurs in less than one percent of 
completed takeovers in the UK. In a five year period from 2010 to 2015 only five claims 
were commenced out of 2060 transactions in the same period. If we also take into account the 
number of uncompleted takeovers then the rate of litigation falls further still.
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Unfortunately, there is no available data to indicate the number of these uncompleted 
takeovers to confirm the exact rates.  
Table 4.6 
Decade Number of Takeover Litigation 
60's 4 
70's 4 
80's 10 
90's 11 
00's 8 
10's 6 
Total 43 
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Figure 4.1 
 
Table 4.5 illustrates that the number of cases increased significantly from four cases in the 
1960’s and the 1970s’ to 10 in 1980’s, and 11 cases in the 1990’s. The decade of the 1990’s 
showed a small peak in takeover litigation in the UK. From the 1980’s to 2009 there has been 
a steady state of takeover litigation, with an average of around 10 takeover cases per decade. 
It is likely, looking at the data in Table 4.5 that this trend will continue in the next decade, as 
there have already been six cases from 2010 to 2015.  
 
4.5.3 Instigator and Target of Litigation 
 
Table 4.7 
Instigator of Litigation Number Percentage % 
Target Shareholder 17 39.6 
Target Company 6 14 
Target Director 0 0 
Bidder 15 34.8 
Other 5 11.6 
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Table 4.8 
Target of Litigation Number Percentage % 
Target Shareholder 0 0 
Target Company 17 39.6 
Target Director 5 11.6 
Bidder 10 23.2 
Other 11 25.6 
 
Figure 4.2 
 
 
The group who instigated the most takeover litigation in the UK, within the cases recorded, 
were the target shareholders. Out of 43 cases the target shareholders initiated 17 of these 
claims which totalled almost 40 percent. This is closely followed by the bidder, who 
instigated 15 of the claims recorded. The rest of the claims were brought by the target 
company, who instigated six of the cases, or by other parties such as the Secretary of State, 
who began four of the cases. The target directors did not bring any individual claims on 
behalf of themselves, an example of which would be severance of employment terms. As 
noted above target directors complain on behalf of the target company. This particular search 
is not looking at personal claims a target director may bring on behalf of themselves. If they 
were involved in instigating the claim it was on behalf of the target company. 
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The focus of the majority of the litigation was the target company, as 17 cases out of the 43 
recorded were brought against the target company. This represents just under 40 percent of 
the litigation overall. This finding makes sense considering that the main instigators were the 
target shareholders and the bidder. The cases recorded generally involved the target company 
being sued for alleged wrongdoings during the process of the takeover. The next group of 
targets of litigation was the “others” category, who attracted 11 cases of the 43 recorded. This 
group included advisors, such as accountants and other bodies such as the Panel. The bidder 
was the target of nine of the cases, and the target directors were sued in five of the cases. The 
target directors were named as the main defendants in these cases due to an individual 
wrongdoing in which they could be found personally liable. 
 
The reasons for instigating the litigation were varied and numerous, for example the target 
directors actions fell outside of powers;
284
 the target company would not lift restrictions on 
the shareholder/bidder from buying further shares in the company;
285
 the offer proposed 
during the scheme of arrangement was unfair, but the target company notified minority 
shareholders with an intention to acquire shares despite this;
286
 the target company agreed not 
to co-operate with the rival bidders, and then did;
287
 the advisors prepared misleading 
accounts;
288
 the target shareholders were dissatisfied with how the takeover had been 
conducted;
289
 a target director was bribed by the bidder;
290
 a rival bidder agreed with the 
original bidder that they would withdraw their bid, and then did not;
291
 the target company 
undervalued their own shares;
292
 and the target directors exerted pressure on shareholders in 
order to achieve the bid.
293
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4.5.4 Outcome of Litigation 
 
Table 4.9 
  Number Percentage % 
Litigation Successful 12 28 
Litigation Unsuccessful 31 72 
 
Table 4.9 illustrates that out of the 43 cases recorded only 12 were successful. 72 percent of 
the claims that were brought were unsuccessful. This means that the claimant did not achieve 
the outcome they desired, such as an injunction or remedies such as the mandatory buying or 
selling of shares. The types of litigation that were successful were very different, and 
therefore it would be difficult to ascertain what type of claim would succeed or not. It seems 
to very much depend on the individual claim and the facts surrounding the circumstances of 
the litigation.  
 
A number of successful claims, however, involved allegations that the director was acting 
outside of their powers.
294
 An example of this is the case of Howard Smith v Ampol.
295
 Two 
companies, Ampol and Bulkships, held 55 percent of the issued shares of another company, 
which required more capital (Millers). Ampol made an offer for all the issued shares of 
Millers, and another company, Howard Smith, announced an intention to make a higher offer 
for those shares. Miller’s directors considered Ampol's offer too low and as such decided to 
recommend that the offer be rejected. Ampol and Bulkships then stated that they intended to 
act jointly in the future operations of Miller and would reject any offer for their shares. 
Howard Smith then applied to Miller for an allotment of four and a half million ordinary 
shares. Miller's directors subsequently decided by a majority to make the allotment and 
immediately issued the shares. The effect of that issue was that firstly, Miller’s obtained the 
much needed capital; secondly, Ampol and Bulkship's shareholding was reduced to 36.6 
percent of the issued shares. This consequently meant that Howard Smith was now in a 
position to make an effective takeover offer. Ampol however challenged the validity of the 
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issue of the shares to Howard Smith and sought an order in the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, Australia for the rectification of the share register by the removal of Howard Smith as 
a member of Miller’s in respect of the allotted shares. Miller's directors contended that the 
primary reason for the issue of the shares to Howard Smith was to obtain more capital. 
 
Other successful claims resulted in the lifting of a restriction to buy shares;
296
 poison pill 
agreements being quashed;
297
 the declaration that an offer was unfair;
298
 that an agreement to 
withdraw a bid could be relied upon
299
 and that the accounts of the target company which 
were relied upon to make a bid were misleading.
300
 Although the successful claims do not 
demonstrate any sort of pattern, claims which were rarely successful, however were 
derivative or unfair prejudice claims. 
 
4.5.5 Summary of Findings 
It is clear from data collected that there is little to no litigation during or after a takeover in 
the UK. If litigation does take place the likely causes of action are common law fiduciary 
duties or breach of contract. This is because the main complaints pursued in takeover 
litigation are advisors’ abuse of confidentiality or conflict of interest. Interestingly, whilst this 
litigation can have an indirect effect of frustrating the bid, it seems this is not the purpose for 
commencing these types of claims. There are very few claims which have been brought that 
frustrate a bid over the entire period looked at, in fact many of the claims were brought after 
the takeover had been completed. There are also a number of cases involving unfair prejudice 
claims, however as noted above, this litigation only benefits the shareholder who brings the 
claim as they are not suing so as to benefit others (as opposed to a derivative claim which 
benefits the company). The pursuit of this litigation may therefore be solely motivated by a 
direct personal benefit. It is therefore clear that the courts do not often affect the outcome of a 
takeover. As such the process of a takeover is rarely interrupted by litigation in the UK. 
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4.6 The Code and Panel Decisions  
Once the search had been completed, in respect of the legal causes of action available for 
parties to continue their complaints, it was interesting to compare these to the Code. Table 
4.10 below enables us to see whether there is a parallel right to complain to the Panel, 
whether there is a right to complain to the Panel when there is no legal cause of action, and 
even more interestingly when parties to a takeover can neither pursue their complaint via 
litigation or a complaint to the Panel (which is rare). 
Table 4.10 
Complaint: Target Directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
1A. Target Shareholder 1Ai. Identity of TS s.793, s.803 CA 2006 Rule 5.4, Rule 8 
1Aii. Concert party 
arrangements 
s.793, s.803 CA 2006 Rule 9.1, Rule 8 
1B. Fellow Target Director 1Bi. Failure to disclose 
information 
Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 Rule 20.1, Rule 23.1 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 Rule 23.1, rule 20.1 
1Biii. Acting in concert with 
the Bidder  
Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, 
s.175, s.177  CA 2006 
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
1Biv. Interest in bid Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, 
s.175, s.176, s.177  CA 2006 
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
 
Complaint: Target Directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill 
clause 
Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
  
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality 
agreement 
Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
Rule 20 
1Ciii. Failure to disclose 
information 
  Rule 8, Rule 20.1, 
Rule 23.1, Rule 24.2, 
Rule 24.3, Rule 25.3 
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1Ciii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to 
act in best interests 
 Rule 3.2 
1Civ. Breach of timetable   Rule 31 
1Cv. Bidder pressured TS to 
sell shares 
  Rule 16.1 
1Cvi. Extension of timetable   Rule 31 
1Cvii. Takeover detrimental 
to long term plans of the 
target company 
  Rule 24.2 
1Cviii. Breach of Takeover 
Regulations 
  Breach of any Code 
rule 
1Cix. Misrepresented 
information 
s.2(1) MA 67 Rule 19.1, 19.3 
1Cx. Value of bid     
1Cxi. Failure to formalise bid   Rule 2.7 
1D. Bidder/Government 1Di. Breach of competition 
laws 
s.75 FTA 73   
1Dii. TC is a ‘national 
treasure’ or ‘jewel company’  
    
1Diii. Takeover will have 
detrimental effect to UK 
economy  
    
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
  
1Eii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to 
act in best interests 
  
1F. Takeover Panel 1Fi. Decision or ruling Judicial Review   
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Complaint: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD misrepresented 
information  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 19.1, 19.3 
2Aii. Failure to disclose 
information 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 23.1, Rule 20.1 
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not 
complying with the Code 
   A number of Code 
rules could be 
breached 
2Aiv. TD valuation of the 
share price 
    Rule 3.1 
2Av. TD advice on the merits 
of the bid  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 23.1, Rule 20.1  
2Avi. TD interest in bid Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.173 s.174, 
s.175, s.176, s.177 CA 2006); Part 26; 
s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
2Avii. TD knew or ought to 
have known that the advice 
given to the shareholders by 
other professionals was 
negligent or 
misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); s.994 CA 2006 
Rule 19.1, 19.3 
2Aviii. TD issued new shares Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.171 CA 2006), 
s.33, s.549 CA 2006 
 Rule 21 
2Aix. TD knew or ought to 
have known that bidder 
would strip company of 
assets  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
 Rule 23.1 
2Ax. TD knew or ought to 
have known that the 
takeover was detrimental  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
 Rule 23.1 
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Complaint: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
2.B Bidder/New Directors 2Bi. Long-term plans have 
been unnecessarily 
disregarded by the new 
directors/majority 
    
2Bii. New directors issues 
shares (after takeover), and 
as a result remaining target 
shareholders vote is diluted 
s.549 CA 2006   
2Biii. TS who are unable to 
take advantage of sell-out 
rule, but are affected by a 
new majority want their 
shares to be bought by the 
bidder  
    
2Biv. New directors/majority 
have stripped company of 
assets  
s.911B CA 2006    
2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
  
2Cii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to 
act in best interests 
  
 
Complaint: Bidding Company 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable    Rule 31 
3Aii. TC used takeover defence    Rule 21 
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate defence    Rule 21 
3Aiv. Failure to disclosure of information  Duty of care; s.90A FSMA 2000  Rule 8, Rule 20.1, 
Rule 25.3 
3Av. TD refused to negotiate      
3Avi. Value of bid     
3Avii. TD misrepresent information      
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders     
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3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
  
3C. Takeover Panel 3Ci. Decision or ruling Judicial Review   
 
 
   
Complaint: Bidding Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover in not in the 
best interests of the BC 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Aii. BD did not obtain best 
price for shares 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Aiii. BD misrepresented 
information 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of 
bid 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Av. BD knew or ought to 
have known that the advice 
given to the BS by other 
professionals  was negligent 
or misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); s.994 CA 2006 
  
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
  
 
As shown in Table 4.10 there are some complaints which neither have a legal cause of action, 
nor a specific Code provision, in which to pursue the complaint with the court or the Panel. 
These complaints are generally those surrounding the merits of the takeover, for example 
when the takeover is not in the best interests of the company’s future plans. The fact that a 
takeover cannot be prevented on grounds related to the merit of the takeover may seem odd 
however the Code is built around the principle that target shareholders are, as the owners of 
the company, the only party who should decide on the merits of the bid.
301
 They make their 
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decision by either deciding to sell their shares or not. How they decide what the merits of the 
bid are, and subsequently whether to sell, will be considered by each individual shareholder. 
They may for instance consider the effect of the takeover on the future of the company’s 
plans or its stakeholders, or they may also make their decision by considering the value 
offered for their shares. Some would therefore argue that a right of action to continue a claim 
regarding the merits of the takeover is unnecessary or contrary to the provisions of the Code. 
As can be seen above however a target director and the bidder both have duties which they 
must do, such as disclosing certain information, so that a shareholder can make this decision. 
These are duties which, if not done correctly, can be pursued by parties via litigation.  
 
Those complaints which do not have a legal cause of action, but can be pursued via the 
Panel’s system, are generally those surrounding the process of the actual takeover (i.e. 
timetable for offer) or the conduct of the parties involved (i.e. disclosure requirements or use 
of frustrating actions). A number of complaints do have a corresponding right of action which 
a party can pursue via the courts. However whether these legal rights can be pursued will be 
subject to the no frustration principle (and other company law provisions), and therefore even 
though there is a cause of action the party (specifically the target company) may not actually 
be able to commence litigation. This is discussed in more detail in chapter seven.  
 
It is interesting here to be able to identify which complaints can be pursued via the court, the 
Panel, by both or by none. It is also interesting to identify how many decisions the Panel 
makes regarding these complaints. It must be noted, firstly however, that the Panel deals with 
a large number of queries and complaints on a daily basis, and the decisions shown below are 
those cases in which the Panel has made a ruling. There is no data available which details the 
number of decisions the Panel makes informally on a daily basis. It could be argued, however 
that those complaints which received a ruling are equal to those complaints which if litigated 
would actually reach the courts, and is therefore more suitable data in which to make a 
comparison with the legal cases recorded in the previous sections.  
 
Table 4.11, below, shows the number of rulings the Panel has made in respect of the Code 
provisions outlined in Table 4.10.  
104 
 
Table 4.11 
Code Rule Rulings* 
2.7 22 
5.4 0 
8 1 
9.1 3 
16.1 0 
16.2 0 
19.1 0 
19.3 1 
20 0 
20.1 0 
21 0 
23.1 0 
24.5 0 
25.3 0 
31 0 
Total 27 
  
From the period of 2010 to 2015 there have been a total of 27 rulings made on the provisions 
of the Code as identified in Table 4.10. In the same period there were only five claims 
brought before the court as shown in Table 4.5. Based on these data there are five times more 
rulings made by the Panel than by the courts regarding the takeover complaints identified 
above. 
 
The most frequent issue the Panel rules upon was Rule 2.7 (for which they have made 22 
rulings out of the 27 concerning this complaint).  Rule 2.7 of the Code requires the bidder to 
make a firm intention to put forward an offer to the target company. The other provisions the 
Panel has made rulings regarding are Rule 8 which concerns disclosure; Rule 9.1 which is in 
relation to concert parties; and Rule 19.3 which requires the clarification of a statement, for 
example when information may have been misrepresented. The Rules of the Code that have 
been outlined above correspond to the list of complaints identified in Table 4.10 however 
they are not exhaustive of the Rules that the Panel has made decisions regarding.  
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Table 4.13 below shows the number of rulings made by the Panel in total (including the 
figures from Table 4.11 and 4.12) each year since 2010. 
Table 4.12 
Year  No of Rulings 
2015 0 
2014 2 
2013 3 
2012 5 
2011 14 
2010 11 
Total 35 
Table 4.14 shows how these rulings compare with the number of takeovers completed in each 
year.  
Table 4.13 
Year No of Rulings No of Takeovers Percentage % 
2015 0 49 0 
2014 2 211 0.95 
2013 3 326 0.92 
2012 5 373 1.34 
2011 14 564 2.48 
2010 11 537 2.05 
Total 35 2060 1.75 
 
Overall, rulings by the Panel are made on less than two percent of completed takeovers. 
Although this number is small it is still an increase upon the small percent of takeovers which 
experience litigation. As such, the Panel makes six times more rulings than the court makes 
decisions regarding takeover litigation. When considered together there are approximately 
two percent of takeovers which involve either litigation or a Panel ruling. This means that 
interference to the takeover process in the UK is relatively rare. There is neither a propensity 
to litigate, nor to seek or require the Panel to make a formal ruling. From the small numbers 
seen the Panel, whilst more active than the courts in settling takeover disputes, does not seem 
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to be dealing with a large number of cases. It should also be noted however, that the Panel are 
contacted on a daily basis to give informal guidance and rulings on complaints.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The findings of the search established that less than one percent of “takeover litigation” is 
brought in the UK. The amount of litigation does not seem to have increased or decreased in 
the last three decades, and therefore remains steady. The main instigators of the litigation are 
the target shareholders and the bidders, and the claims are usually against the target company. 
The most popular causes of action in which to pursue takeover litigation are breaches of 
director’s duties, unfair prejudice under s.994 CA, negligent misstatements and breach of 
common law non-directors fiduciary duties.  The litigation brought is however rarely 
successful, as 71 percent of claims fail to give the claimant their desired outcome. The Panel 
delivers decisions in less than two percent of takeovers. This figure is slightly more than the 
amount of takeover litigation brought but is still not a significant amount. It can therefore be 
concluded that there is not a propensity to litigate during or after a takeover in the UK by the 
main parties to a takeover. 
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Chapter Five 
US Takeovers: Practices and Regulation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters described the regulation of takeovers in the UK and mapped its 
litigation landscape. This chapter will now turn to describing the US regulation of takeovers, 
which is very different from the regulation of takeovers in the UK. One of the main 
differences is that corporations in the US, particularly those that are held publicly, function in 
a dual regulatory system, which is the combination of federal securities law and state 
corporate law.
302
 Both state and federal law play very important regulatory roles. The way in 
which takeovers are completed in the US is also very different. In the UK there is the 
takeover offer and the scheme of arrangement, but in the US single and two step mergers are 
used. 
 
This chapter offers a description of the practices of takeovers in the US, including a 
discussion of the key players and their competing interests, and will give an outline of the US 
regulatory regime. Section 5.2 will describe the process by which takeovers are completed in 
the US. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will then describe the federal and state laws which regulate US 
takeovers.  
 
5.2 US Practices: Single-Step Mergers and Two-Step Mergers 
There are at least five major ways of acquiring control of a corporation in the US: via a 
single-step merger; a two-step merger using the tender offer; purchase of all or substantially 
all of the target’s assets; a proxy contest; and negotiated or open market stock purchases.303 
These methods can be distinguished by whether they are statutory or non-statutory 
acquisition techniques: the former includes the merger and its variants, and the sale of all or 
substantially all corporate assets; the latter includes the proxy contest, the tender offer and 
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stock purchases.
304
 Statutory forms of takeovers require approval of the target board, whilst 
the non-statutory techniques do not.
305
 This distinction can be made between the takeover 
offer and takeover scheme of arrangement in the UK. Whilst the scheme of arrangement 
requires the boards of directors to agree to the takeover, the takeover offer does not. The 
focus of this chapter however will be the “single-step merger,” in which the bidder requests 
the approval of the target shareholders to acquire 100 percent of the shares of the target 
company, similar to the scheme of arrangement approach in the UK; and the two-step merger 
using a tender offer, in which a bidder can make an offer directly to target shareholders to 
purchase their shares, and then follow the tender offer with a “two-step merger” to eliminate 
minority shareholders. This is the equivalent of the UK’s takeover offer, followed by the use 
of the squeeze out rights. Another tactic that can be used to takeover a US company is 
stakebuilding. This involves a stake in a company being built up over time in order to make it 
easier for the shareholder to eventually commence a takeover. This tactic has become an 
increasingly popular method in the US to secure a takeover. This section will now discuss 
each approach in more detail. 
 
5.2.1 Single-Step Merger 
In a single-step structure (or statutory merger), no tender offer is made but instead the merger 
is submitted to a vote of the target’s shareholders.306 A single-step merger transaction always 
requires the approval of the board of directors of the target company, so it is not available if 
the acquirer is proceeding on an unsolicited (or hostile) basis.
307
 A single-step merger will 
always assure that the bidder will receive 100 percent of the shares of the target company.
308
 
Transactions being done on an agreed basis that involve the use of bidder shares as 
consideration will normally be structured as a single-step merger.
309
 The main characteristics 
of a single-step merger are almost identical to those of the scheme of arrangement. The key 
difference however is the absence of court approval in a single-step merger, unlike in the UK 
which requires the courts approval for a scheme of arrangement to become binding. 
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If a bidder wishes to proceed by way of single-step merger, the bidder and the target 
company will begin to negotiate and then enter into a merger agreement.
310
 Whether the 
bidder is proceeding by way of a single-step merger or tender offer, it is almost universal for 
the bidder and the target company to enter into a merger agreement (except in the case of a 
hostile takeover).
311
 This agreement customarily sets forth the terms upon which the takeover 
will be completed. These agreements are tremendously advantageous to the bidder as the 
agreement will usually include favourable terms for the bidder should the target company 
change their mind about the merger. The terms can include any provisions agreed between 
the bidder and the target company regarding such matters as restrictions on the ability of the 
target company to solicit competing proposals, and the payment by the target company to the 
bidder of a termination fee in the event the takeover is not completed because a third party 
makes a competing offer.
312
  
 
The agreement will also include covenants on the structure of the transaction, the conditions 
to the bidder’s obligation to complete the takeover and the commitment of the board of 
directors of the target company to recommend the acquisition. The merger agreement for a 
single-step acquisition also typically includes covenants on the part of the target company to 
make the necessary SEC filings, complete the SEC clearance process and hold its 
shareholders’ meeting as soon as reasonably practicable, and to consult with the acquirer 
about SEC filings, submissions, comments and other developments.
313
 Subject to these 
contractual provisions, though, in a single-step transaction the process of preparing the key 
disclosure document and dealing with SEC comments is controlled by the target company.
314
 
For these reasons it would be impossible to complete a single-step merger without the co-
operation of the target’s board of directors.  
 
Following the execution of the merger agreement, the parties (bidder and target) prepare 
proxy materials, which include all the information shareholders need in order to vote on the 
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proposed merger transaction, including terms of the deal and reasons why the target board is 
recommending the merger. Once the proxy materials have been finalised and sent to the 
shareholders this commences the proxy solicitation period. The bidder often engages the 
services of a proxy soliciting firm at this stage to assist them in this process.
315
 In order to 
assure a favourable result, proxy solicitation firms typically recommend a solicitation period 
of at least 35 days before the shareholder meeting in which the proposed transaction will be 
voted upon.
316
 Once the single-step merger has been voted upon by the shareholders at the 
meeting the decision becomes binding (this process does not require court approval, as is 
required in the UK). Below gives an idea of the general timeline of a single-step merger: 
 
Single-Step Transaction 
  
Day(s) Activity 
1 Announcement 
2 to 15 Prepare proxy statement (Target with the Bidder's input) 
16 File preliminary proxy materials with SEC 
26 to 50 Receive and resolve SEC comments 
55 Print and mail proxy materials 
90 Target shareholders' meeting to vote on merger 
91 Complete merger (provided requisite vote is obtained) 
  Bidder now controls and owns 100% of Target 
*Data from ‘A Guide to Takeovers in the United States’, Clifford Chance Guide (2010) 
 
Situations in which a single-step merger might be preferred over a two-step merger include: 
(i) when there are regulatory or other approvals that cannot be satisfied quickly (such as, 
antitrust approvals, or registration with the SEC if the consideration being offered to the 
target company’s shareholders consists in whole or in part of shares of the acquiring 
company); (ii) when the bidding company is financing the transaction with loans and the 
lenders do not wish to provide bridge financing for the purchase of shares in a tender offer; 
(iii) when the transaction will include an equity roll-over by management or other target 
shareholders, and the bidder wishes to avoid the technical difficulties presented by the 
                                                          
315
 Bainbridge (n302) 17 
316
 Guide to US Takeovers, Clifford Chance (n313) 16 
111 
 
application of the SEC’s rules to those kinds of arrangements; and (iv) when the target’s 
board of directors wishes to expose the transaction to competing bids for a longer period of 
time than would be available in a two-step transaction.
317
  
 
5.2.2 Two-Step Merger (Tender Offer) 
There are a number of important variations on the basic tender offer theme. The two main 
variations are: a partial tender offer, which is for less than all of the target’s outstanding 
shares that leaves minority shareholders in place; or a two-tier tender offer (or two-step 
merger) where the offer is designed to proceed in two steps and results in 100 per cent of the 
shares being obtained.
318
 In a two-step structure, the merger agreement will provide for a 
tender offer to be made to the target company which is then followed by a two-step merger 
between the bidder and the target in order to “squeeze out” any remaining shareholders. In 
the tender offer, the bidder offers to buy any and all of the shares of the target that have been 
tendered before the expiration of the offer, provided the conditions to the offer are satisfied at 
that time.
319
 Those offer conditions customarily include a sufficient number of shares having 
been tendered so that the bidder can vote through the two-step merger alone (without needing 
the votes of any other shareholders). The two-step merger is used to eliminate the shares not 
tendered in the tender offer by converting them into the right to receive the same amount of 
consideration per share that is paid in the tender offer.
320
 Even if the two-step merger takes 
some time to complete, the acquirer controls the target company from the time it completes 
its tender offer.
321
 In the US unsolicited or hostile transactions are nearly always structured as 
two-step mergers.
322
  
 
The process of the two-step merger is similar to the UK’s takeover offer, and therefore the 
parties to the bid will have very similar interests and goals. There is however a crucial 
difference between the two systems processes because directors in the US are generally free 
to use any pre or post bid defences to ward off unwanted takeovers. It is therefore much more 
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difficult to succeed in a hostile bid situation in the US than in the UK. Additionally even if 
the takeover is on a friendly basis the target directors are able to tactically frustrate the bid, 
often to try and recover greater premiums for the target company’s shares. Below gives an 
idea of the general timeline of a (“straight-forward,” i.e. no frustrating action) two-step 
merger:  
Two-Step Transaction 
Day(s) Activity 
1 Announcement 
2 to 15 Prepare Offer to Purchase and Schedule 14D-9 (Target) 
15 Commence tender offer; file definitive tender offer materials with 
SEC; mail materials to Target Shareholders 
15 to 43 Address any comments provided by SEC staff 
43 Close tender offer (if minimum tender offer and other conditions 
satisfied) 
  Bidder now controls Target 
47 If Bidder now owns at least 90% of Target's outstanding shares - file 
short-form merger certificate 
  Bidder now owns 100% of Target 
47 to 77 If Bidder owns less than 90% of Target's outstanding shares - prepare 
and file proxy materials with SEC relating to "squeeze-out" merger 
88 Mail proxy materials 
108 Target shareholder meeting to vote on 'squeeze out' merger 
109 Complete merger 
  Bidder now owns 100% of Target 
*Data from ‘A Guide to Takeovers in the United States’, Clifford Chance Guide (2010) 
 
5.2.3 Stakebuilding 
It is becoming increasingly common in the US for bidders to make open-market or negotiated 
block purchases of a target company’s shares before beginning negotiations with the target or 
before a negotiated transaction with the target is announced (these are sometimes called 
“toehold” purchases).323 There are several possible reasons to pursue toehold purchases: 
firstly, such purchases are likely to be at a less expensive price per share than the transaction 
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price finally agreed with the target, thereby helping lower the total cost of the acquisition; 
secondly, if the acquirer is outbid by a third party, the profit on the toehold share position will 
help cover transaction costs that otherwise would be borne by the would-be acquirer; thirdly, 
a sizeable toehold might help defeat a competing bid; and finally, if the approach has the 
potential to turn hostile, the bidder may need to hold shares in order to have standing to sue 
the target or its board of directors.
324
 This method is also known as a creeping tender offer, 
which does not involve an actual tender offer, the bidder will keep buying target shares on the 
open market or in privately negotiated block purchases until it has a controlling interest at 
which point a proxy contest to nominate a board favourable to the takeover can be elected by 
the bidder.
325
 The bidder may then follow up with a freeze-out merger to eliminate remaining 
majority shareholders.
326
 Unlike in the UK, there is no mandatory offer regime in the US 
requiring that a person, who acquires a specific percentage of shares in a target company, 
make an offer for the remaining shares. As such toehold purchases (even substantial ones) in 
the US will not trigger an obligation to make a follow-on offer. This concludes the discussion 
of the process of takeovers in the US; the next section will now turn to describe the system 
that regulates this process. 
 
5.3 US Regulatory Regime: Federal Regulation of Takeovers 
The regulation of takeovers in the US is governed both by federal and state law. The process 
of the takeover (i.e. how a bid should be made) is regulated principally by three pieces of 
federal legislation: the Securities Act of 1933,
327
 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
328
 
(the “Exchange Act”) and the Williams Act 1968.329 These Acts are overseen by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“The SEC”), a regulatory body which assesses 
compliance with the disclosure and process rules, much like the Panel does in the UK. 
Managerial conduct within takeover bids is regulated primarily by state law and state courts, 
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which usually means Delaware’s Chancery judges and the Delaware Supreme Court.330 This 
is because Delaware serves as the state of incorporation for more companies, and more public 
companies, than any other state, and as such Delaware serves as the model for most corporate 
law in the US.
331
  
 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery is the forum where many, if not most, of the significant cases 
concerning corporate law have been litigated. There is a considerable body of case law 
interpreting the Delaware corporate statute, which allows legal questions to be answered with 
confidence.
332
 The court therefore has a special expertise in corporate law and corporate 
governance issues, and because the case law concerning corporate control issues is not as 
well developed in other states, many states specifically look to Delaware case law as 
precedent for decisions in their own courts.
333
 The court’s decisions also tend to render 
decisions quite quickly; thereby facilitating transactions that are often time sensitive.
334
 
Delaware’s cases are therefore the focus of any discussion regarding managerial conduct 
more generally, and more specifically during the process of a takeover bid. The focus of any 
discussion of state law will therefore focus on that of Delaware’s State Law, unless stated 
otherwise.  
 
The US Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal securities laws do not pre-empt state 
corporate law, but instead place only a “limited gloss” on the broader body of state law.335 
Bainbridge notes that a fair rule of thumb is that state law is concerned with the substance of 
corporate governance, whilst federal law is concerned with disclosure and a limited number 
of procedural aspects of corporate governance.
336
 This particular section will give a brief 
overview of the federal law that governs takeovers and section 5.4 will do the same for state 
law. The following will therefore give a brief description of federal law, an outline of the 
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relevant federal acts and how they apply to the process of single and two step mergers, as 
well as stakebuilding.  
 
5.3.1 Federal Law 
In the US, federal laws generally apply to the whole of the US and its territories, and are 
created by Congress, who draft and pass proposed bills. These bills are then signed into law 
by the President. Federal courts may review these laws and remove them if they do not 
correspond with the US Constitution.
337
 All the federal laws of the US, once passed, can be 
found within the US Codes, which is a consolidation and codification by subject matter of the 
general and permanent laws of the United States, and can be accessed online.
338
 The Codes 
are prepared by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the United States House of 
Representatives. The Codes, however, do not include regulations issued by executive branch 
agencies (such as the SEC), decisions of federal courts, treaties, or laws enacted by state or 
local governments.
339
 
 
The US takeover regime is often associated with a cluster of Delaware takeover cases in the 
1980s; however the foundations of the regulation of takeovers were laid much earlier under 
federal law. The 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts were passed in the wake of the 1929 Crash 
and the early years of the Depression.
340
 The Securities Act of 1933 regulates primary market 
sales of securities by issuing corporations.
341
 The Exchange Act of 1934 regulates a number 
of transactions but is generally concerned with the trading of corporate securities on 
securities exchanges and other secondary markets.
342
 Subject to certain exemptions, all 
corporations that sell securities to the public are subject to the Securities Act.
343
 In contrast, 
the Exchange Act applies to a narrower range of business, although as Bainbridge notes, the 
Act has a complex set of rules for deciding which provisions apply to which corporations, 
                                                          
337
 Federal Laws and Regulations, USA.gov <http://www.usa.gov/Topics/Reference-Shelf/Laws.shtml> 
accessed 3 December 2014 
338
 Office of the Law Revision Counsel: United States Code <http://uscode.house.gov/> accessed 3 December 
2014 
339
 Federal Laws and Regulations (n337) 
340
 Armour, Skeel (n34) 1752 
341
 Bainbridge (n302) 8 
342
 ibid 
343
 ibid fn 19 
116 
 
however generally it applies only to publicly held corporations.
344
 The Exchange Act also 
established the Securities and Exchange Commission to serve as the “principal policeman of 
the markets.”345 Whilst the various federal statutes are concerned with different transactions, 
they have the same basic purpose, which is to require corporations and other issues of 
securities to provide full disclosure to ensure that investors have all the information they need 
to make an informed decision about buying, selling, or voting securities; and to punish fraud 
committed in connection with securities transactions.
346
 The next sections will give a brief 
outline of the content and purpose of these acts, and explain the framework and jurisdiction 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
5.3.1.1 The Securities Act of 1933 
The Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: firstly it assures investors receive 
financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; 
and secondly prohibits deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.
347
 
A primary means of accomplishing these objectives is the disclosure of important financial 
information through the registration of securities.
348
 This information enables investors to 
make informed judgments about whether to purchase a company's securities. Investors who 
purchase securities and then suffer losses have important recovery rights under this 
legislation, if they can prove that there was incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of important 
information.
349
 The main provisions of this act that apply in a takeover setting are thus the 
registration requirements that relate to mergers and acquisition transactions, when the 
consideration to be received by the target’s shareholders includes securities. Accordingly the 
act only applies when an issuer is actually selling securities, if a company can raise funds by 
other means, the Securities Act does not require it to provide any disclosures.
350
 It instead 
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focuses attention on regularly and routinely getting information from the issuer to the 
market.
351
  
 
5.3.1.2 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The Exchange Act of 1934 identifies and prohibits certain types of conduct in the markets, 
and provides the SEC with disciplinary powers over regulated entities and persons associated 
with them.
352
 The act also empowers the SEC with broad authority over all aspects of the 
securities industry, and requires periodic reporting of information by companies with publicly 
traded securities.
353
 The act governs both tender offers and proxy solicitations.  The Act 
requires disclosure of important information by anyone seeking to acquire more than five 
percent of a company's securities by direct purchase or tender offer. This allows shareholders 
to make informed decisions on these critical corporate events. In regards to proxy 
solicitations, the act governs the disclosure in materials used to solicit shareholders' votes in 
annual or special meetings held for the election of directors, and the approval of other 
corporate actions.
354
 The information, contained in proxy materials, must be filed with the 
Commission in advance of any solicitation to ensure compliance with the disclosure rules. 
Solicitations, whether by management or shareholder groups, must disclose all important 
facts concerning the issues on which shareholders are asked to vote.
355
 
 
5.3.1.3 The Williams Act 1968 
In 1968 the Williams Act amended the Exchange Act in order to impose some substantive 
regulation on the terms and procedures for takeover bids. These amendments to the Exchange 
Act included mandatory pre-bid disclosure of information regarding cash tender offers, and 
created a fraud remedy for communications concerning an offer. Congress passed the 
Williams Act due to market abuses that occurred within cash tender offers. The purpose of 
the act was therefore to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of shareholders, whilst 
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at the same time providing the bidder and target management with equal opportunity to fairly 
present their cases.  
 
The act subsequently requires any person who makes a cash tender offer to a company to 
disclose to the SEC, the source of the funds used in the offer, the purpose for which the offer 
is made, the plans the purchaser might have if successful, and finally any contracts or 
understandings concerning the target corporation. The Williams Act also makes it mandatory 
for anyone who acquires more than five percent of the outstanding shares of any class of a 
corporation subject to federal registration requirements to comply with filing and public 
disclosures with the SEC.
356
 Copies of these disclosure statements must also be sent to each 
national securities exchange where the securities are traded, making the information available 
to shareholders and other investors.
357
 The law also imposes miscellaneous substantive 
restrictions on the mechanics of a cash tender offer, and it imposes a broad prohibition 
against the use of false, misleading, or incomplete statements in connection with a tender 
offer. Moreover the Williams Act gives the SEC the authority to institute enforcement 
lawsuits and engage in litigation. 
 
5.3.1.4 The SEC 
The role of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation.
358
 Major pieces of legislation (such as the Securities Act, the 
Exchange Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) provide the framework for the SEC's 
oversight of the securities markets. These statutes are broadly drafted, establishing basic 
principles and objectives, and as such the SEC must ensure that the intent of Congress is 
carried out in specific circumstances.
359
 The SEC must also engage in rulemaking as the 
securities markets evolve technologically and expand in size.
360
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As noted above any regulations issued by executive branch agencies, such as the SEC, are not 
made into federal law, rather they become federal regulations. These regulations explain how 
the agency intends to carry out a certain federal law, and are created through the process 
known as rulemaking.
361
 By law, federal agencies must consult the public when creating, 
modifying, or deleting rules in what is called the Code of Federal Regulations, which is an 
annual publication that lists the official and complete text of federal agency regulations.
362
 
Once an agency decides that a regulation needs to be added, changed, or deleted, it typically 
publishes a proposed rule in the Federal Register to ask the public for comments.
363
 After the 
agency considers public feedback and makes changes where appropriate, it then publishes a 
final rule in the Federal Register with a specific date for when the rule will become effective 
and enforceable.
364
 When the agency issues a final rule for comment, it must describe and 
respond to the public comments it has received.
365
 
 
The SEC consists of five presidentially-appointed Commissioners, with staggered five-year 
terms.
366
 The agency's functional responsibilities are organised into five Divisions, which are: 
Corporate Finance, Trading and Markets, Investment Management, Enforcement and 
Economic and Risk Analysis. It is the responsibility of the Commission to interpret and 
enforce federal securities laws; issue new rules and amend existing rules; oversee the 
inspection of securities firms, brokers, investment advisers, and ratings agencies; oversee 
private regulatory organisations in the securities, accounting, and auditing fields; and co-
ordinate US securities regulation with federal, state, and foreign authorities.
367
 The 
Commission convenes regularly at meetings that are open to the public and the news media 
unless the discussion pertains to confidential subjects.
368
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5.3.2 Federal Regulation of Single-Step Merger Process 
The regulatory framework for single-step merger transactions is quite different as compared 
with tender offers.
369
 A single-step merger is primarily regulated under the state corporation 
laws for mergers, and only secondarily by the federal securities laws applicable to the 
solicitation of the approval of the shareholders of the target company (the proxy rules).
370
 A 
tender offer is primarily regulated under the federal securities laws relating to tender offers.
371
 
Both single-step mergers and tender offer transactions may however implicate the general 
fiduciary duty law of the state of incorporation of the target company.
 372
  
 
In a single-step transaction, modern corporation statutes give primary responsibility for 
negotiating a merger agreement to the target board of directors.
373
 The target’s board possess 
broad authority to determine whether to merge the firm and to select a merger partner
374
 
(much like a scheme of arrangement in the UK). Shareholders have no statutory power to 
initiate merger negotiations,
375
 and the directors have the sole power to negotiate the terms on 
which the merger will take place and to construct a merger agreement.
376
 The target directors’ 
decision to enter into a negotiated merger transaction will however be subject to the business 
judgment rule. Following execution of the merger agreement, which includes such factors as 
price, form of consideration and other covenants including remedies for breach, the parties 
(bidder and target) prepare proxy materials, which are required by the SEC, to be delivered to 
the target company’s shareholders before there is a meeting to approve the transaction.  
 
The state laws governing shareholder voting are highly relevant to these transactions because 
a merger requires shareholder approval.
377
 Likewise, single-step mergers also implicate the 
proxy rules under the Exchange Act because companies will ordinarily need to solicit proxies 
in order to conduct a shareholder vote, and therefore the federal proxy rules need to be 
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followed.
378
 The proxy rules are designed to ensure that shareholders are given enough 
information by the target directors so that they can make an informed voting decision. The 
proxy materials (including the company’s annual report which contains detailed financial 
statements and a discussion by management of the company’s business) will therefore be 
required to be filed, in preliminary form, by the target company with the SEC before they are 
sent to the target shareholders, in order to assess whether they have sufficiently met the 
disclosure requirements.
379
 The SEC then decides whether or not to review the proxy 
materials. If the SEC decides that it will not review the proxy materials they can then be sent 
directly to the target’s shareholders, but this must be done within 10 days after the 
preliminary proxy materials are filed.  
 
If the materials are reviewed and commented on by the SEC staff the process of obtaining 
and resolving any comments for amendment will most likely take four to six weeks (although 
longer or shorter periods are possible). The SEC’s rules do however permit preliminary proxy 
materials to be sent to shareholders before they are cleared by the SEC staff, but this is rarely 
done except in hostile or contested takeovers.
380
 After the proxy materials are cleared by the 
SEC, they are then sent to shareholders, and this thereby commences the proxy solicitation 
process.  
 
5.3.3 Federal Regulation of the Two-Step Merger (Tender Offer Process) 
There is no fixed definition of what constitutes a tender offer, and as such various other types 
of transactions may also implicate the tender offer rules’ including debt or equity 
repurchases, and certain debt restructurings. A tender offer can however be generally 
construed as a broad solicitation by a company, or a third party, to purchase a substantial 
percentage of a company’s registered equity shares or units for a limited period of time.381  
The courts developed a test in Wellman v Dickinson,
382
 which approved the use of eight 
factors suggested by the SEC to determine when a tender offer may materialise (though not 
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all eight have to be present for a tender offer to be found). These factors are: whether there is 
an active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders; the solicitation made for a 
substantial percentage of the target's stock; the offer is at a premium to the prevailing market 
price; the terms are fixed rather than negotiable; the offer is contingent on the tender of a 
fixed minimum number of shares to be purchased; the offer is only open for a limited period 
of time; the offerees are subjected to pressure to sell their stock; and public announcements of 
a purchase programme for the target's securities precede or accompany rapid accumulation of 
large amounts of the target's securities. Other courts have also focused on whether there is a 
likelihood that, unless the tender offer rules are complied with, there will be a substantial risk 
that persons solicited will lack information needed to make a carefully considered appraisal 
of the bidder's proposal.
383
  
 
Any bidder seeking to make a tender offer must prepare and file with the SEC a disclosure 
statement on a Schedule TO form, and comply with the relevant rules relating to tender 
offers.
384
 Similar to the proxy materials required in a single-step merger, the Schedule TO 
includes disclosures relating to the terms of the tender offer, the background to the offer, a 
summary of the funds to be used and the sources thereof, and other relevant information. The 
Schedule TO must be filed with the SEC and given to the target company on the date of 
commencement of making the tender offer.
385
 Determining when the tender offer commences 
is critical for several reasons: it tells the bidder when its disclosure obligation is triggered, 
and also many tender offer rules contain time periods that run from the commencement 
date.
386
 
 
In the case of an all-cash tender offer, although the Schedule TO (Schedule 14D-1) must be 
filed with the SEC, it is not subject to any pre-clearance process within the SEC.
387
 
Accordingly, the bidder may (and customarily does) commence the tender offer and 
distribute the offer to purchase the target shares before receiving comments, if any, from the 
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SEC on the Schedule TO.
388
 The bidder is required however to promptly amend the Schedule 
TO if there is any material changes in the information provided.
389
 The bidder is not in 
general required to distribute to target shareholders any supplement or similar document in 
the event of an amendment to the Schedule TO (even amendments in response to SEC 
comments). 
 
Making a tender offer is subject to a variety of substantive rules with respect to the conduct 
of tender offers. These rules are known as the “Traffic Rules,” and constitute federal 
regulation established by the SEC. These rules state that the tender offer must be open for 
acceptance for at least 20 business days from the commencement of the offer.
390
 There is 
however no maximum limit on the duration of a tender offer, unlike the UK’s strict offer 
timetable established by the Code; and there is no requirement under the tender offer rules for 
a bidder to bid for a minimum or a maximum percentage of the target common shares, in 
sharp contrast to the mandatory bid rule in the UK. The company that is the target of the 
takeover must file with the SEC its response to the tender offer on a Schedule 14D-9 form 
within 10 business days of the commencement of the offer. Within this form the target 
company must state its position on the tender offer. Specifically the target must disclose to 
the bidder whether they are recommending acceptance or rejection of the offer, expressing no 
opinion and remaining neutral toward the offer; or whether they are unable to take a position 
with respect to the offer.
391
 
 
5.3.4 Federal Regulation on Stakebuilding 
Stakebuilding potentially falls under the umbrella of a number of regulations, for example: if 
the bidder holds material non-public information regarding the target, purchases of the 
target’s shares may be a violation of the SEC’s Rule 10b-5; or if the takeover is to be 
implemented by way of a tender offer the SEC’s Rule 14e-3 will prohibit certain third parties 
who learn of the tender offer, from acquiring the target’s shares before the acquirer’s plans 
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have been publicly announced; or under the “short-swing profits” rule, contained in Section 
16(b) of the Exchange Act.  
 
The other main provisions that may be triggered by stakebuilding are those under the SEC 
regulations, which require a person or group of persons that acquires “beneficial ownership” 
of more than five percent must file a Schedule 13D with the SEC (within ten days after 
crossing the five percent threshold).
392
 In short those individuals who purchase more than five 
percent of shares registered on a US stock exchange must disclose their purchase. The 
Schedule 13D is publicly available immediately upon filing, and discloses, among other 
things, information about the acquirer’s share position and intentions with respect to the 
target. The person or group is however permitted to acquire more shares after passing the five 
percent threshold during the 10-day period prior to the filing of the Schedule 13D. The 
definition of “beneficial ownership” for this purpose is broad and includes not only direct 
ownership but also, potentially, shares held by third parties that are the subject of options or 
voting commitments in favour of the acquirer, and some types of long positions established 
through the use of derivatives. The table below is a summary of some of the key pieces of US 
regulation of mergers, tender offers and the acquisition of shares under federal regulations.
393
  
Table 5.1 
Regulation Section/Rule Description 
SEA* s.13(a) Requires that issuers whose securities are 
registered with the Commission pursuant 
to s.12 SEA file with the Commission 
accurate annual reports 
SEA s.13(d) Persons owning >5% of stock must file 
holdings on Schedule 13D report with the 
SEC within 10 days of purchase 
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SEA s.13(d)(3) Requires that when two or more persons 
act as a group for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding or disposing of shares 
they will be deemed a “person” (acting in 
concert), such a group must file a 
Schedule 13D report if exceed 5% 
threshold 
SEA s.13(e) Regulates self-tender offers 
SEA s.13(f) All institutional Investors must disclose 
ownership regardless of number of stock 
owned 
SEA s.14(a) Rules on proxy solicitation 
SEA s.14(d) Regulates tender offers generally (rules 
on disclosure and procedure) 
SEA s.14(e) Regulates unlawful tender offer practices 
(prohibits fraud) 
SEC 12b-20 Requires that reports required under 
s.13(a) contain any additional information 
necessary to ensure that the required 
statements in the reports are not, under 
the circumstances, materially misleading 
SEC 13a-11 Every registrant subject to s.13(a) shall 
file a current report on Form 8-K within 
the period specified in that form 
SEC 14a-3, 14a-8, 14a-12 Rules on exempt communications from 
definition of solicitation regarding proxy 
rules 
SEC 14d-1 Regulates the scope and definitions of 
s.14(d) and s.14(e), including required 
mandatory disclosures under these 
provisions 
SEC 14d-2 Governs the commencement of an offer 
SEC 14d-5 Dissemination of certain tender offers by 
the use of stockholder lists and security 
position listings. 
SEC 14d-6 Disclosure requirements with respect to 
tender offers 
126 
 
SEC 14d-7 Withdrawal rights: any person who has 
deposited securities pursuant to a tender 
offer has the right to withdraw any such 
securities during the period such offer 
request or invitation remains open 
SEC 14d-9 Regulates target directors' disclosure 
statement, on the 14D-9 form, to target 
shareholders 
SEC 14d-9(f) Target board must file 14D-9 Form with 
SEC disclosing reasons for boards position 
on an offer 
SEC 14d-10 If the bidder increases offer, target 
shareholders who have already accepted 
the previous offer are also entitled to the 
increased offer 
SEC 14e-1 Bidder must keep offer open for at least 
20 business days 
SEC 14e-2 Target Directors must disclosure their 
position on an offer to shareholders 
within 10 business days of 
commencement of the offer 
*Securities Exchange Act 
 
5.4 US Regulatory Regime: State Laws 
State laws generally apply to the particular state that enacted the law. State legislatures create 
and pass bills, and the governor of the state then signs the bills into law. State courts may 
review these laws and remove them if they feel they do not agree with the state's constitution. 
Virtually all US corporations are formed (or incorporated) under the laws of a single state by 
filing articles of incorporation with the appropriate state official.
394
 The state in which the 
articles of incorporation are filed is known as the state of incorporation. Selecting a state of 
incorporation has important consequences because of the internal affairs doctrine, which is a 
conflicts of law rule, holding that corporate governance matters are controlled by the law of 
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the state of incorporation.
395
 Almost all US jurisdictions follow the internal affairs doctrine, 
even if the corporation in question has no ties to the state of incorporation other than the mere 
fact of incorporation.
396
  
 
In the context of takeovers, state corporate laws govern the ability of a target company’s 
board of directors to reject or resist unsolicited takeover proposals, as well as the board’s 
responsibilities when negotiating the terms of a takeover or merger, and choosing among 
competing proposals.
397
 State corporate laws, which govern a company’s ability to resist 
unwanted takeovers, tend to be anti-takeover. Delaware laws, which are the focus of the 
discussion in regards to US state regulation, are in favour of directors being able to defend 
against undesirable takeovers however they are by no means the most stringent anti-takeover 
laws. This section will discuss these anti-takeover statutes in more detail, focusing not just on 
Delaware statutes but more generally the types of anti-takeover laws that may be found 
across the US.  But first, the section will address the standard of conduct required by the 
target company’s board of directors which are imposed through the imposition of fiduciary 
duties.
398
  
 
5.4.1 Fiduciary Duties 
The fiduciary duties of directors in the US were first established by common law judges, 
operating without any guidance from the formal written law.
399
 This is identical to the 
development of such duties in the UK. The UK directors’ duties are now however codified 
within the 2006 Companies Act; by contrast the company laws of the US still contain no 
clarification of the core fiduciary duties.
400
 This has meant that directors’ fiduciary duties 
continue to evolve without any formal written law.
401
 This has created some confusion in the 
courts as to what duties directors owe and what those duties encompass. It is however argued 
that there are three fundamental fiduciary duties which are imposed upon directors, 
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specifically the duties of loyalty, care and disclosure. A controversial issue however 
surrounds the disagreement by court judges as to whether good faith, a standard integral to 
the evaluation of directors’ behaviour, is a separate duty owed by directors. Furthermore, 
these duties are subject to the business judgement rule, which shields corporate managers 
from judicial scrutiny of their decisions. To complicate matters further, there may also be at 
least two additional core duties that directors have today when takeovers are specifically 
concerned. These are known as enhanced duties and will be discussed in section 5.4.6.
402
 The 
main duties of loyalty, care and disclosure will be discussed in detail in this section, together 
with a discussion of the issue of good faith, and an explanation of the business judgement 
rule. Firstly however a brief overview of fiduciary duties of Delaware state law will be given.  
 
5.4.2 State Law: The General Corporation Law 
In order to ensure that directors act in the best interests of the company, state law which 
encompasses both statutory and common law, imposes fiduciary duties upon directors. This is 
because the discretion afforded to directors by state law is so wide, it is vitally important that 
directors do not exercise this discretion for improper purposes.
403
 The General Corporation 
Law of the State of Delaware (“DGCL”) embraces a strong “republican model” of 
representation, investing corporate directors with broad managerial powers and duties during 
their terms in office and giving directors extensive authority to undertake lawful actions in 
the pursuit of profit.
404
  
 
In Delaware the duties of loyalty and care are governed under the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act (LLC Act). Whilst the LLC Act does not directly impose fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care on a manager, it does allow parties to contract for these fiduciary duties in an 
LLC operating agreement. One of the LLC Act’s main policy objectives under section 18-
1104 is to ‘give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.’405 Accordingly, Delaware courts, 
when deciding if a duty has been breached, will turn first to the contracted for provisions in 
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the governing LLC operating agreement, in order to determine the parameters of a manager’s 
duties.
406
 Since August 2013, however, the Delaware General Assembly has amended Section 
18-1104 of the LLC Act, to provide that, unless the limited liability company agreement says 
otherwise, managers and controlling members of a limited liability company will owe 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the limited liability company and its other members.  
 
The amendment was prompted by a Delaware Supreme Court decision in Gatz Properties 
LLC v Auriga Capital Corp
407
 in which the court declined to express any view regarding 
whether default fiduciary duties applied as a matter of statutory construction and suggested 
that the General Assembly resolve any statutory ambiguity on this issue.
408
 The General 
Assembly therefore explained that the amendment to the act was to do just that, and to 
confirm that in some circumstances fiduciary duties not explicitly provided for in the limited 
liability company agreements do apply. By way of example, a manager of a manager-
managed limited liability company would ordinarily have fiduciary duties even in the absence 
of a provision in the limited liability company agreement establishing such duties.
409
 The 
General Assembly went on to explain that  Section 18-1101(c) continues to provide that such 
duties may be expanded, restricted or eliminated by the limited liability company agreement 
but this is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
410
 Directors may 
therefore exclude themselves from these duties if explicitly stated in the company’s operating 
agreement.  
 
5.4.3 Duty of Loyalty, Care and Disclosure 
The duty of loyalty, arguably the most important fiduciary duty, requires directors to act in 
the interests of the company, and not in their own interests. The easiest way to comply with 
this duty is not to engage in transactions that involve a conflict of interest, or "self-dealing" 
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transactions. An alleged conflict of interest will provide a basis to attack a board’s decision 
when a self-interested director meets the following criteria: firstly that they constitute a 
majority of the board of directors; secondly that they control and dominate the board of 
directors as a whole; and thirdly they fail to disclose their interests in the transaction in a 
situation where a reasonable member of the board of directors would have regarded the 
existence of the material interest as a significant fact in the evaluation of the proposed 
transaction.
411
 Some academics however believe that every fiduciary act implicates the duty 
of loyalty, because every act must be taken for a proper corporate purpose.
412
  
 
The duty of care requires directors to act on an informed and deliberate basis, with the degree 
of care that an ordinarily prudent person would use under similar circumstances.
413
 In 
essence, this duty requires directors to make well-informed business decisions. To satisfy the 
duty of care in connection with making decisions on behalf of the corporation, a director must 
inform himself of all material, relevant information that is reasonably available to him.
414
 
This is typically accomplished by, among other things, attending and participating in 
meetings of the board of directors; asking questions; probing assumptions and studying 
materials necessary to vote or act in an informed manner; taking time to evaluate the action 
under consideration; considering the advice of experts; and making deliberate decisions after 
thorough and candid discussions.
415
 There does not need to be a conflict of interest in order 
for the duty of care to arise. The duty however requires that the directors show up, pay 
attention and to try to make good decisions.
416
  US courts simply do not hold directors liable 
for business decisions, made without a conflict of interest, unless those decisions are 
completely irrational. This doctrine of non-interference is known in the US as the business 
judgment rule.  
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The third duty, the duty of disclosure, or the “duty of candor,” requires directors to fully and 
fairly disclose all material information within a board’s control417 and to provide a balanced, 
truthful account of all matters disclosed in communications with shareholders.
418
 Information 
is treated as material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider information important in deciding how to vote.
419
  
 
5.4.4 Duty of Good Faith 
The duties as outlined above are the main fiduciary duties applied by the courts to corporate 
actions by directors. There has however been confusion in the US courts as to whether the 
concept of good faith, amounts to a separate and distinct fiduciary duty from that of loyalty 
and care. This confusion began in Cede & Co v Technicolour when it was stated that there 
was a triad of fiduciary duties, specifically, loyalty, care and good faith.
420
 The court in a 
leading case on this matter gave a detailed definition of good faith (though whether good 
faith amounted to a separate and distinct duty was not commented on).
421
 It was established 
that good faith amounts to all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
422
 It was stated by the court that ‘[T]he 
concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, is 
an appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have 
acted in good faith.’423 In a more detailed elaboration, the court said, a failure to act in good 
faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other 
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the 
intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the 
face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.
424
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In Stone v Ritter,
425
 the courts conclusively confirmed that good faith is not an independent 
fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as care and loyalty,
426
 but that good faith was 
to be subsumed within the duty of loyalty. This reasoning was developed from the notion that 
a director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless they acted in good faith, and that 
those actions were in the best interests of the company.
427
 Traditionally however, the duty of 
loyalty focused on cases in which the defendant fiduciary received an improper financial 
benefit and the traditional remedy was to therefore strip the benefit away from the director. 
Bainbridge has therefore put forward the argument that the effect of Stone extends the 
domain of loyalty to one in which the director received a financial benefit and makes it even 
more doctrinally difficult to require causation, while simultaneously creating a conceptually 
difficult task of crafting appropriate remedies.
428
Alternatively, Hill and McDonnell
429
 state 
that although it is true that recessionary damages are the standard form of remedy in standard 
loyalty cases, the Delaware Supreme Court had already held that in loyalty cases the court 
may ‘fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropriate.’430 Thus, 
recessionary damages are not the exclusive remedy available, and compensatory damages 
may also be used, as appropriate.
431
 As such, if there is no ill-gotten gain in any particular 
case, that simply means that one of several possible damage measures is not available in that 
case, but other measures may still be used.
432
 
 
Strine et al noted that Stone v. Ritter was an important, but ultimately, mundane and 
unsurprising decision.
433
 The concept of good faith has long been a vital one in Delaware’s 
corporate law, but not as a fiduciary duty separate from the fundamental duty of loyalty. They 
argued that the term good faith had long been used as the key element in defining the state of 
mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary.
434
 The Delaware Supreme Court, both in 
Technicolor itself and in other decisions contemporaneous with it, understood and frequently 
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applied the concept of good faith in just this traditional way, as the state of mind required of a 
loyal director.
435
  
‘[US law] has been clear that the duty of loyalty is implicated by all director actions, 
because all such actions must be undertaken in good faith to advance the corporation’s best 
interests and because directors owe an affirmative obligation to put in a good faith effort to 
responsibly carry out their duties. To shrink the hallmark duty of loyalty to make way for a 
separate duty that simply embraces the traditional definition of a loyal state of mind adds 
confusion not clarity. In so stating, we acknowledge that the duty of loyalty remains, as it 
always has, most difficult to apply to circumstances when directors act without an apparent 
selfish interest for injuring the corporation. We also acknowledge that it is in that context 
that the concept of good faith has its greatest utility.’436 
 
5.4.5 The Business Judgement Rule 
The business judgment rule shields corporate managers from judicial scrutiny of their 
decisions, however it will not apply if it can be demonstrated that there is a conflict of 
interest. If there is a conflict of interest the standard required by the duty of loyalty will be 
applied. If there is no conflict of interest, the business judgment rule comes into play.
437
 
According to the canonical formulation of the business judgment rule, it is ‘a presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.’438 Bainbridge however notes that rather than “presumes,” it is assumed that the 
courts should not review directors’ decisions unless there has been fraud, illegality or self-
dealing.
439
   
 
Consequently in order for the business judgement rule to protect directors the court must find: 
(i) an exercise of judgement; (ii) disinterested and independent decisions makers (i.e. no self-
dealing); (iii) an absence of fraud or illegality, rationality (which is interpreted as a decision 
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which is not egregious, irrational or so beyond reason); (iv) an informed decision (which 
demonstrates process due care). The exercise of process of due care is separate from the duty 
of care, and is an essential precondition for application of the business judgement rule. The 
leading authority on the business judgement rule, Smith v Van Gorkom,
440
 affirmed that 
directors must inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to them. In 
the context of mergers and takeover offers, directors must consult with senior management 
when setting the price and they must focus on the primary objective (i.e. to secure the 
transaction offering the best value reasonably available to all shareholders). They must also 
negotiate, and not be pressured by a short-time frame (the courts have noted that those boards 
that have failed to exercise due care are frequently boards that have been rushed).
441
 In order 
for the decision to be an informed decision, directors must have informed themselves of all 
information reasonably available to themselves, they must not just be going through the 
motions, and the decision making process must be adequate.  
 
5.4.6 Enhanced Fiduciary Duties  
In addition to the fiduciary duties noted above (loyalty, care and disclosure) Delaware 
common law also applies a special enhanced standard of review in two specific 
circumstances relating to mergers and acquisitions. These specific circumstances are firstly, 
when a company is resisting an unwanted takeover, and secondly when a company is willing 
to be taken over but employs tactics in order to gain a better financial outcome for its 
shareholders. Bainbridge notes that because of the conflict of interest that can exist between 
those of the company and those of the directors in these situations, judges can justify an 
intervention of the commercial decisions of directors, and as such scrutinise decisions made 
by the board of directors of a target company much more closely.
442
 The permissibility of 
target directors’ behaviour in these circumstances is decided by applying these specifically 
developed enhanced duties, which are referred to by the names of the cases that gave rise to 
the doctrines, Unocal
443
 and Revlon.
444
 Unocal duties apply in circumstances where a board 
takes corporate steps that may deter one or more potential buyers, which are frequently called 
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defensive measures.
445
 Revlon duties primarily, but not exclusively, arise when a company 
engages in a transaction that results in a change of control.
446
 These cases and the standards 
of review which were developed by the Delaware courts will now be discussed. 
 
5.4.6.1 The Unocal and Revlon Standards 
It has been difficult for the US courts to unite the principles of traditional fiduciary duties 
imposed upon directors with the unique circumstances which takeovers and mergers present. 
For instance, takeover defences such as a question of loyalty would include a question of 
fairness. The director would therefore be required to establish that the transaction was fair to 
the corporation.
447
 Bainbridge notes that this burden is exceedingly difficult to prove and 
would result in the judicial scrutiny and invalidation of takeover defences.
448
 As such 
defences of takeovers would never be allowed.
449
 In terms of the duty of care, Bainbridge 
states, that all takeovers would survive judicial review, because before the director is called to 
account for their actions, the court would have to rebut the business judgement rule by 
demonstrating fraud, illegality or self-dealing.
450
 Delaware Supreme Court therefore tried to 
“steer a middle ground” between these two duties by creating the enhanced business rule 
which is applied using the Unocal and Revlon doctrines.
451
 These doctrines play an extremely 
important role in the development of the regulation of takeovers in the US, and in particular 
the behaviour of the target board in refusing a tender offer. In order to describe the doctrines 
however, a brief historical explanation of the cases themselves and some of the related case 
law that led to the development and stability of these doctrines must be outlined.   
 
The courts initially in Cheff v Mathes
452
 developed a primary purpose test (similar to the 
proper purpose doctrine in the UK), in which directors were not given immediate sanctuary 
under the business judgement rule until it could be shown that: there was a reasonable ground 
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to believe that a danger to corporate policy or ineffectiveness existed; and that the director 
did not act for the primary purpose of preserving themselves. This test however became easy 
to overcome because directors could easily justify defensive action on policy grounds. The 
court therefore developed a new standard, in which directors were to be judged during a 
takeover or merger, in the leading case of Unocal.
453
 This was to be called the enhanced 
business judgement rule. This enhanced standard would now need to be satisfied before the 
business judgement rule could be applied. This was due to the board’s potential conflict of 
interest in corporate takeover situations, and therefore judicial review needed to be more 
intrusive. The court stated ‘because of the omnipresent spectre that a board may be acting 
primarily in its own interests rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is 
an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before protections of 
the business judgement rule may be conferred.’454  
 
In Unocal a discriminatory self-tender offer was made in which the target firm offered a huge 
premium for its shares but excluded the bidder from the offer, subject to the proviso that the 
self-tender would become effective only if the bidder acquired a specified amount of stock. It 
is evident that the target's self-tender was intended never to take effect, since rational 
shareholders would never tender to the bidder when they could obtain more from the target. 
Despite the target's seemingly sham offer and the management’s discrimination between 
shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the target's strategy as ‘reasonable in 
relation to the threat…posed’ by the bidder.455 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court in upholding Unocal’s exclusionary self-tender, ‘made it plain 
that it was not prepared to defer blindly to any and all takeover defences.’456 In the case of 
such transactions, the court said, that the business judgment rule would be applied if two pre-
requisites were established. First, the directors must show that they reasonably determined 
that the threatened takeover was a danger to corporate policy or effectiveness.
457
 The 
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directors can satisfy that burden by showing good faith and reasonable investigation.
458
 Good 
faith is understood as acting in response to a perceived threat and not for the purpose of 
entrenching themselves. Reasonable investigation is met when a board has been adequately 
informed.
459
 Second, the defensive transaction must bear a reasonable relationship to the 
perceived threat. The court would not tolerate resistance to takeovers by any draconian means 
available.
460
 This test can therefore capture cases in which conflicted interest drove the 
board’s decision making process.461 If the directors met the grounds under the two step 
burden the business judgement rule applied but if directors failed to do so the duty of loyalty 
applied.
462
 This has become known as the Unocal standard, and is how directors’ actions are 
judged during a takeover bid. The courts then went on to develop a further standard in Revlon 
for situations where it was felt Unocal may no longer be an effective standard to be held to.  
 
The case of Revlon involved competing bids, and in this situation the courts decided that the 
directors no longer faced threats to corporate policy and effectiveness. That the director’s role 
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best 
price for shareholders at the sale of the company. The Delaware Supreme Court therefore 
crafted a “duty to auction” that seemed to prune back the broadest implications of the earlier 
Unocal case.
463
 The court stated that once the target firm was clearly going to be sold, the 
duty of the target's board ‘changed from the preservation of ... [the target firm] as a corporate 
entity to the maximisation of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit.’464 
This significantly altered the board's responsibilities under Unocal. 
 
For some time Revlon appeared in tension with Unocal.
465
 The courts were in confusion as to 
when each would apply, and therefore how it has been interpreted by a small number of cases 
has been highly controversial. In Paramount Communications v Time Inc.,
466
 the Delaware 
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Supreme Court held that the Revlon duty to auction was not triggered, even though there was 
a change in control and competing bidders. In this case Time’s management had rejected an 
all cash offer from Paramount which was financially superior to the merger proposal they 
previously had agreed to with Warner Brothers. They found that Time's response to 
Paramount's bid was reasonable in relation to the threat posed, stating that ‘[d]irectors are not 
obligated to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder 
profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.’467 The Time case 
seemed to suggest that Revlon's duty to auction could be avoided rather easily with proper 
legal and business planning, and that the Delaware courts would not overturn management's 
purported reasons for opposing a hostile bid so long as the current board could point to some 
type of long term business plan which was inconsistent with a hostile acquisition.
468
 The 
court in Paramount stated that Revlon did not apply to this case because it was a merger 
agreement and was therefore not a change of control. This case had the result of weakening 
Unocal by expanding the list of cognisable threats and weakened the proportionality test.
469
 
The Time interpretation of Revlon has now however been “consigned to the dust bin of 
history,”470 as it has been limited to its own unique facts by the later decision of Paramount 
Communications Inc. v QVC Network.
471
 
 
Within this case Paramount's board approved a merger with Viacom and adopted defensive 
measures to block an unsolicited, more valuable tender offer from QVC Network. 
Distinguishing the Time case on the somewhat tenuous ground that no “sale of control” was 
involved in the earlier matter, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Revlon duties 
applied to the actions of Paramount's board and that the board had breached its duty by 
rejecting the QVC bid.
472
 The court confirmed that Revlon will therefore apply in situations 
where: (i) the corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or a clear 
break-up of the company; (ii) in response to a bidders offer, a target abandons its long-term 
strategy and seeks an alternative transaction including the break-up of the company; (iii) 
when approval of a transaction results in a sale or change of control. Outside of these 
scenarios Unocal remains as the defining standards. The courts have confirmed that Revlon is 
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a variant of Unocal and not a separate doctrine. If the board of a target company is pursuing a 
sale of the company, it may seek to satisfy its Revlon obligation to maximise value for 
shareholders by running an auction or market check process. Delaware courts have said, 
however, that while an auction or market check process may be desirable, it is not invariably 
required.
473
 
 
The courts also verified that control transactions justified enhanced judicial scrutiny, and that 
it will take form as a reasonableness inquiry to be applied on a case by case basis. The key 
features of the enhanced scrutiny are: (i) judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the 
decision making process of the directors including the information upon which the directors 
based their decision; (ii) reasonableness of directors’ actions in light of the existing 
circumstances. The burden of proof is on the directors in respect of both issues (directors do 
not need to prove it was the “right” decision). As long as the board’s conduct falls within the 
bounds of reasonableness the Delaware courts will not second guess the board’s decision. 
Therefore ‘motive is what counts; a reasonable decision is unlikely to be motivated by 
conflicted interests.’474  
 
The leading cases in Delaware demonstrate the sometimes inconsistent nature of the courts 
approach to the regulation of incumbent management's fiduciary duties in response to an 
unsolicited takeover bid.
475
 In order to defend against a takeover, however, managers would 
generally be required to show that the hostile offer represented a threat to the corporation and 
the defence was reasonably proportionate to the threat.
476
 If it became clear that the company 
would be sold or broken up, managers’ use of defences would be limited still further. 
Consequently defences would be permissible only to the extent target managers used them to 
try to get the highest price for their shareholders.
477
  The discretion vested in target managers 
is however not absolute. Managers are sometimes required to remove takeover defences, 
when the defences tilt the playing field toward one bidder in the heat of an actively contested 
takeover battle. The board must, in using defensive tactics leave some mechanism by which 
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the bidder can eventually present an offer to the shareholder.
478
 The court strongly 
emphasised that the directors have an authority to erect defences with teeth.
479
 The court has 
however held that no-hand pills are invalid because these defences affect the ability of new 
directors to carry out their best judgement.
480
 Under Unocal, a director can discriminate 
against bidders, but once Revlon has been triggered the target board loses most of its power 
to affect the outcome of a contest. They must secure/endeavour to secure the highest value 
reasonably attainable and take an active role in the sale process. Liability will only arise out 
of bad faith or self-interest. Under Revlon favouritism has been the trigger for asserting that a 
board is acting from improper motives.  
 
Revlon should be understood as a special case of the Unocal heightened scrutiny standard of 
review.
481
 The target board of directors’ sole Revlon duty is to obtain the best deal for their 
shareholders. In doing so any favouritism of one bidder over another must be motivated by a 
concern for immediate shareholder value and not by any improper motives.
482
 Target boards 
under Unocal, do however have extensive discretion, particularly if they wish to “just say no” 
to any bid to acquire the company.
483
 “Just say no” is a strategy used by corporations to 
discourage hostile takeovers in which board members quite literally reject a takeover bid 
outright by refusing the offer, a concept which has caused much controversy because it can 
be used to take away decision making power from shareholders.  
 
5.4.7 “Just Say No”: Managerial Discretion  
Though the Delaware courts have not endorsed the “just say no” strategy, their recent 
decision in Air Products & Chemicals Inc. v Airgas Inc.
484
 demonstrates that a board may 
refuse a bid outright if the target company has a long-term strategy that it is pursuing, or if 
the takeover bid simply undervalues the company (as was decided in the Time case).  
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In this case, Air Products sought to acquire Airgas through discussions with management, but 
the Airgas board rejected the proposal. The Airgas board, relying principally on its belief in 
management’s long-term business plan, repeatedly rejected a number of offers made by Air 
Products as inadequate despite several increases in the offer price during the course of the 
contest. Ultimately, Air Products asked the court to order Airgas to redeem its poison pill so 
that the company’s shareholders could decide whether to accept the Air Products offer. 
Viewing the case fundamentally as a decision on whether a board’s fiduciary duties, in the 
context of a hostile takeover, require it to abandon its long-term plans and instead permit 
stockholders to decide the target’s fate,485 the court concluded that ‘as Delaware law currently 
stands, the answer must be that the power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender offer 
ultimately lies with the board of directors.’486 Using the Unocal analysis, the court found that 
the Airgas board acted in good faith and had demonstrated that it had conducted a reasonable 
investigation.
487
 The credibility of Airgas’ business plan, which had been carefully reviewed 
by the board and which, as the court noted, was not “tweaked” or “fudged” on an ad hoc basis 
during the takeover contest, was a major factor in the court’s deference to the Airgas board’s 
business judgment not to sell the company. The court also noted that while many of Airgas’ 
shareholders clearly wanted to tender their shares for short-term gain, under Delaware law the 
board has sole authority, when acting deliberately and in an informed manner, to decide the 
time frame for realising corporate goals and strategies. 
 
The court confirmed that a board may "just say no" to a tender offer, but only in certain 
circumstances. A board of directors for example, found to be acting in good faith, after 
reasonable investigation and reliance on the advice of outside advisors, can convince the 
court that a hostile tender offer posed a legitimate threat to the corporate enterprise, and that 
they addressed that perceived threat by blocking the tender offer and forcing the bidder to 
elect a board majority that supports its bid.
488
 The Delaware Chancery Court in Airgas also 
confirmed that directors of a target company can refuse to redeem the company’s poison pill 
in the face of an inadequate hostile offer to its shareholders, even if a majority of the 
shareholders would likely tender into the offer, and even if the board has had adequate time 
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to explore alternatives and fully explain its views to the shareholders. The court concluded 
that responding to the threat by maintaining the poison pill was within a range of reasonable 
responses, noting that the use of defensive measures to prevent a change of control from 
occurring at an inadequate price is a ‘course of action [that] has been clearly recognized 
under Delaware law.’489 A board cannot therefore just say no. Instead the board must conduct 
a reasonable investigation, it must hire independent outside experts, and it must then 
determine that at least the threat of inadequate value is present, only then can a board just say 
no.
490
 This however may be a trivial standard, as a target will always be able to find credible 
experts who could put a higher value on the company than the hostile bidder offers.
491
 The 
Airgas decision therefore stands as the most important pill reaffirmation case in a number of 
years and should provide added comfort to a target board that a decision to refuse an 
inadequate bid is a valid strategy.
492
 
 
In summary, the Airgas case confirmed that: inadequate price is a valid threat to corporate 
policy and effectiveness; the selection of time frame for achievement of corporate goals may 
not be delegated to the shareholders; directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately 
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is no basis to sustain 
the corporate strategy; in line with the previous decisions if a board, in good faith, on a 
reasonable basis, believes a bid is inadequate it may block that bid using a poison pill 
irrespective of shareholders desire to accept; and finally, that defensive measures are not 
preclusive as long as obtaining control at some point in the future is realistically attainable. 
 
5.4.8 Anti-takeover Statutes 
Nearly every state has enacted anti-takeover legislation that is designed to slow down 
unwanted takeovers.
493
 Initially, however these statutes were so anti-takeover they were 
struck down as unconstitutional in Edgar v MITE Corp
494
. State lawmakers subsequently 
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revised their anti-takeover statutes, and are now known as the second generation statutes, 
which were upheld as constitutional in CTS Corp v Dynamics Corp of America.
495
  
 
These second generation statutes are for the most part, tailored to avoid direct regulation of 
tender offers; instead they address issues purporting to fall within the sphere of corporate 
governance concerns, which are traditionally subject to state law.
496
 The statutes come in a 
variety of forms, but all share the common feature of serving to consolidate the ability to 
respond to tender offers. Some state statutes provide discretion to directors to impede and 
delay unwanted tender offers, thereby significantly raising their cost.
497
 Other statutes go so 
far as to enable managers and directors to revoke the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 
traditionally owed to shareholders, by enabling or requiring such managers and directors to 
consider the effects of a takeover on customers, employees, suppliers, creditors and even the 
local economy when deciding whether or not to resist a takeover.
498
  
 
Although anti-takeover provisions come in various forms they are generally categorised into 
four different varieties: control share acquisition statutes, fair price statues, business 
combination statutes and cash-out statutes.
499
 The first of these, control-share acquisition 
statutes, rely on the state’s traditional power to define corporate voting rights as a 
justification for regulating the bidders right to vote shares acquired in a control transaction.
500
 
A control share acquisition is typically defined as the acquisition of a sufficient number of 
target company shares to give the acquirer control over more than a specified percentage of 
the voting power of the target.
501
 These provisions operate by requiring shareholder approval 
before acquirers of large blocks of stock can vote on their shares.
502
 The typical thresholds 
are 20, 33 and 50 percent, because these are the trigger levels of share ownership which 
would bring the bidder within a range of voting power. The purpose of control share statutes 
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is to provide shareholders with an opportunity to vote on a proposed acquisition of large 
share blocks that may result in, or lead to, a change in control of the target.
503
 
 
Fair price statutes are modelled on the approach taken in company charters that include fair 
price provisions.
504
 These provisions require that a company obtain a two-thirds or higher 
supermajority vote of its shareholders before entering into a business combination with a 
person owning a certain, threshold percentage of the company’s shares.505 The only way to 
avoid the necessity of a shareholder vote is for the business combination to obtain the 
approval of the board of directors or for the bidder to pay a fair price for the shares acquired 
in the combination.
506
 A fair price is defined as ‘the higher of any price the interested party [, 
the bidder,] paid to obtain its shares or the market price at the time of the combination.’507  
 
The third variety of anti-takeover provisions is the business combination statues, which are 
sometimes known as “freeze-out” statutes. These provisions are an ‘extension of the fair price 
statute concept, providing substantially greater teeth.’508 ‘The typical statute prohibits a target 
from engaging in any business combination with an interested shareholder
509
 of the target 
company for a set period of time, often for a period of five years, following the date on which 
the interested shareholder is still prohibited (unless the business combination is approved by a 
specified vote of the outstanding shares not beneficially owned by the interested 
shareholders, or the business combination meets the specified fair price).
510
 The fourth 
variety of anti-takeover laws is the cash-out statutes, which ‘require a bidder of more than a 
threshold percentage of a target’s shares to offer to purchase the remaining shares of all of the 
other shareholders at a price which reflects the highest premium paid by the bidder in 
accumulating target stock.’511 
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Some states have also passed laws granting firms the right to adopt poison pill takeover 
defences. These laws have an important impact upon a target board of directors’ ability to 
defend against an unwanted bid because the right to use poison pill defences is presumably 
more secure when explicitly authorised by statute, and is thus less likely to be seen as an 
unreasonable measure by the courts.
512
 Other states have also passed laws that can be referred 
to as registration and disclosure laws. These laws require bidding firms to file certain 
documents with the state to register their ownership stake in the target firm and to disclose 
their funding and intentions. These requirements are minor extensions of the disclosure 
provisions contained in federal law under the Williams Act.
513
  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
There are two main ways in the US in which a takeover can be completed, namely via a 
single-step or two-step merger. The method that will be used will generally depend upon 
whether the bid is hostile or friendly. For example, if the bid is hostile then the two-step 
method will be more appropriate. Both of the different methods are regulated by federal and 
state regulations. Federal laws, for the most part, regulate the process of the takeover, 
ensuring that a proper process is followed and that parties to the bid meet the disclosure 
requirements. The SEC both oversees and enforces federal regulation. By contrast, state law 
plays a greater role in regulating the behaviour of the target directors. These laws do this by 
requiring target directors to not only meet the standard fiduciary duties of loyalty, care and 
disclosure placed on any director making any commercial decision, but also to meet enhanced 
duties. These enhanced duties allow judges to scrutinise decisions made during a takeover in 
order to be certain that directors are acting in the best interests of the company, and not for 
any other self-serving reasons.  
 
The heightened examination by judges of directors commercial decisions are justified by the 
courts on the grounds that takeovers put directors in an odd situation in which there may be a 
conflict of interest between what is best for the company and what is best for the individual 
director. Generally in the US, as with the UK, directors are permitted a great deal of 
                                                          
512
 Jonathan M Karpoff, Paul H Malatesta, ‘The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover 
Legislation’ (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 291. 299 
513
 ibid 
146 
 
discretion when making commercial decisions and therefore judges will not decide on the 
merits of those decisions. The enhanced fiduciary duties placed on target directors during 
takeovers, however, allow the courts to disregard this norm and decide whether the behaviour 
of the director was reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Despite these enhanced 
duties, however, directors in the US still retain a great deal of discretion when deciding on 
how to deal with a takeover bid. This is evidenced by the recent “just say no” cases, in which 
target directors have been able to defend against unwanted takeover bids, regardless of 
whether the shareholders wished to sell or not, on the grounds that the takeover would be 
detrimental to the long-term business plans of the company. This is a divergence from the 
position in the UK, where directors cannot generally defend against an unwanted bid whether 
the takeover has merits or not.  
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Chapter Six 
US Takeover Litigation: Typology and Propensity 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter described the regime that regulates the takeover process in the US. This 
chapter seeks to build upon this and map the litigation landscape of the US by identifying the 
levels of litigation that parties to a takeover in the US undertake during the takeover process. 
The method for gathering the data ascertaining these levels differs from that in chapter four, 
which used hand collected data. This chapter will instead use reliable empirical studies which 
have already been completed in the US, which give sufficient data for this assessment. First 
however, section 6.2 will discuss the types of complaints that US parties to a takeover may 
have, and in section 6.3 the different causes of action that might be available to them in order 
to pursue litigation will be outlined. Section 6.4 will then summarise the different US 
empirical studies completed to establish the level of litigation in the US, and section 6.5 will 
then discuss the findings of these studies and identify the propensity to litigate in takeovers in 
the US. Section 6.6 will then compare the US findings with those recorded in the UK, as 
outlined in chapter four. This chapter will complete the foundation required to explain the 
divergent levels of litigation, which will be discussed in chapter seven, and then to evaluate 
the impacts of the different litigation landscapes in chapter eight. 
 
6.2 Typology of Range of Complaints 
The range of complaints that parties to a US takeover may have are similar to those that 
parties to a UK takeover may have. For example, US shareholders may allege that the target 
directors breached their fiduciary duties. There are however, many complaints that parties to 
a US takeover may have that differ from their counterparts in the UK. For instance, the 
complex proxy rules mean that there are many opportunities for parties to complain if 
something is not correctly completed; a target company can also complain that a bidder has 
violated federal or state corporate law and thus its bid should be enjoined by the courts.
514
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These complaints are not possible in the UK because there simply are not complex proxy 
rules or different types of legislation, such as state or federal legislation regulating takeovers. 
Bainbridge notes, however, that in the US the cause of action (as long as you can show 
grounds for equitable relief)
515
 will either be that there has been a failure to file a required 
document or the filings contain a material misstatement or omission.
516
 The type of complaint 
that parties to a takeover in the US may have generally corresponds to the desired outcome of 
that complaint. Cain and Davidoff Solomon classified these outcomes into three categories: 
categories based on disclosure, amendment settlements, and consideration increase 
settlements.
517
 Disclosure settlements are those in which the target and bidder agree to correct 
or provide additional disclosure to target shareholders.
518
 This disclosure is typically provided 
to settle state law claims, and therefore complaints, by target shareholders alleging that the 
target directors have failed to disclose or otherwise misstates material information concerning 
the transaction. Complaints about inadequate disclosures can also be made regarding a failure 
to disclose a substantial acquisition by individuals or groups, who acquire more than five 
percent of the company’s shares; material misrepresentations and omissions in proxy 
statements; if a federal procedural and disclosure requirement for a tender offer is not met; 
and a complaint about the breach of anti-fraud regulations if material misrepresentations and 
omissions in connection with the offer, including in the offering materials are made. 
 
Amendment settlements involve a change to the deal’s transaction terms, in which the 
original complaint may, for example, be in regard: to a reduction of the termination fee, post-
sale closing limitations, extended appraisal periods, and modification or elimination of voting 
arrangements.
519
 Consideration increases, are classified as outcomes which have monetary 
benefits to the target shareholders, and usually originate from complaints about the 
insufficient value of shares. The complaints that parties to a US takeover may have that are 
different from those in the UK therefore emerge from the difference in the regulatory 
takeover processes (i.e. how a takeover is conducted), and the other different regulatory 
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requirements imposed on each party by state and federal law. For the most part, however, 
complaints that arise from a takeover will be the same in both the UK and the US. This is 
because, despite regulatory differences, the goals of each party to a takeover largely remain 
the same (as discussed in chapter three). 
 
6.3 Typology of the Cause of Action 
The cause of action in which a party to a takeover in the US may use to further their 
complaint will depend upon whether they choose to litigate at the federal level or state level. 
This is simply because claims can be brought in either federal or state courts under the 
relevant legislation.  This is, of course, something that cannot be done in the UK. The only 
choice available in the UK is whether to complain directly to the Panel or to commence 
litigation in the courts; however whether a claim can be commenced at court is subject to a 
great number of limitations.  
 
There are three main routes in which takeover litigation can be brought as a claim in both the 
federal and state courts, these are: via class action lawsuits, derivative claims and individual 
actions. Class actions and derivative lawsuits are shareholder representative litigation, which 
are brought against the target board or directors for a breach of a fiduciary duty. Individual 
claims can be brought by the target board against the bidder’s board, by the bidding board 
against the target board, or by the government or other bodies such as the SEC.  
 
6.3.1 Federal Level Causes of Action 
There are various routes in which parties can bring a claim under federal law both during and 
after a takeover bid; these are (as mentioned above) via a federal securities class action, a 
derivative claim, or via an individual action. Claims can be brought by the parties to the bid 
(i.e. either board or the target shareholders) against other parties to the bid or against the state 
of incorporation.  
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Claims can be brought against either of the parties using federal securities laws such as the 
Securities and Exchange Act 1934 (Exchange Act), the Williams Act 1968 and via the SEC’s 
own rules. These different pieces of legislation give significantly more causes of action for 
US parties to pursue their complaints as litigation than their counterparts in the UK. This is 
because, the behaviours these laws deal with are regulated by the Code in the UK. As 
explained in chapter three, the Code is a form of soft law which cannot be pursued in court. If 
there has been a breach of the Code, it is the domain of the Panel and not the courts to deal 
with such breaches. The US however relies on the courts to enforce breaches of federal (and 
state) regulation.  
 
An example of some of the causes of action which parties to a takeover in the US may use are 
s.14(a) of the Exchange Act which sets out a mandatory disclosure process that is designed to 
force companies to make public the information that investors would find pertinent in making 
investment decisions. So for instance a claim may be brought under s.14 (a) for solicitation of 
proxies in violation of the rules and regulations. The Williams Act also regulates the 
adequacy of the disclosures mandated under federal laws; and claims may also be brought 
under this legislation (which amends the Exchange Act) concerning share accumulation 
disclosure under Section 13(d); trade secret claims; antitrust claims; and insider trading.
520
 
Under the SEC Rules claims may be additionally brought under sections such as 14 a-9 
which deals with false or misleading statements.  
 
Federal litigation can also be brought against the state of incorporation based on their anti-
takeover statutes. This is because anti-takeover statutes can have a devastating effect in 
delaying and/or preventing the consummation of a hostile tender offer, and as such they are 
pre-empted by federal law (namely, the Williams Act) or impose unconstitutional 
impediments to interstate commerce.
521
 Under a Supremacy Clause pre-emption analysis, if 
the state statute does not directly conflict with the Williams Act, then the question is whether 
the statute “frustrates the purposes” of the Act.522 Pre-emption arguments often focus on the 
conflicts or discrepancies between these federally-regulated areas and the requirements 
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imposed by the state anti-takeover statute at issue.
523
 Under a Commerce Clause, attack on 
state anti-takeover statutes typically focuses on the potential impact of inconsistent state 
regulations on interstate commerce.
524
 Any Commerce Clause attack on such a statute would 
however have to show that a state’s interest in defining its corporations and protecting 
shareholders does not, under the circumstances, justify the statute’s negative effect on 
interstate commerce.
525
 Thus there are many causes of action under federal law, in which 
parties to a takeover can pursue their complaints as litigation. Table 6.1 below outlines more 
clearly some of the US specific complaints and corresponding causes of actions available to 
parties in order to pursue litigation at the federal level. 
 
Table 6.1 
Complaint Cause of Action 
Non-disclosure of acquisition above 5% s.13(d) SEA 
Material misrepresentations and omissions in 
proxy statements 
s.14(a) SEA 
Breach of the federal procedural and disclosure 
requirements for a tender offer 
s.14(d) SEA 
Misrepresentations and omissions in connection 
with the offer 
s.14(e) SEA 
Mandatory SEC filings have not been made 
SEC Rule 14d-1  
Target has not responded to the offer by filing 
the information required by SEC within 10 
business days 
SEC Rule 14d-9  
The offer has not been kept open for the 
minimum of 20 business days 
SEC Rule 14e-1  
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6.3.2 State Level Causes of Action 
As in the UK, US target shareholders can litigate against the target directors under state laws 
alleging that the directors have breached their fiduciary duties. Plaintiff attorneys can for 
example, allege that the target’s board of directors violated its fiduciary duties by conducting 
a flawed sales process that failed to maximise shareholder value.
526
 They can also pursue 
complaints regarding: the failure of the target directors to conduct a sufficiently competitive 
sale; the existence of restrictive deal protections that discouraged additional bids; and 
conflicts of interests, such as executive retention or change-of-control payments to 
executives.
527
 Another typical cause of action under state law is that the target board failed to 
disclose enough information about the sales process and the financial advisor’s valuation.528 
Alternatively, a bidder may file a case, claiming that a target’s board of directors refused to 
sell the company at an advantageous price and therefore breached its fiduciary duties to its 
shareholders.
529
 This is not something that is required of a target director in the UK. It is up to 
the target shareholders alone to decide on the merits of the takeover and therefore how much 
the shares are worth. The bidder has no recourse in the UK to allege a breach of a director’s 
fiduciary duty, unless they are target shareholders themselves. For the most part however, if 
UK target shareholders feel that the company is undervalued they do not sell their shares, or 
vote in favour of a scheme of arrangement. Shareholders in the US can also challenge a 
merger or acquisition based on a specific violation of the state laws governing the 
organisation of the corporation, such as whether a transaction requires a shareholder vote
530
 
or the scope of shareholder’s rights following an acquisition of shares by a potential 
acquirer.
531
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Table 6.2 
Complaint: Complainant: Target directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
1A. Target 
Shareholders 
1Ai. Identity of TS s.13(d) SEA  
1Aii. Concert party arrangements s.13(d) SEA 
1B. Fellow Target 
Director 
1Bi. Failure to disclose information s.13(a), s.13(d) s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 
12b-20 13a-11, 14d-9; Directors duty of 
candor 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
1Biii. Acting in concert with the 
Bidder  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of candor 
and duty of care 
1Biv. Interest in bid Directors duty of loyalty, duty of candor 
and duty of care 
Complaint: Complainant: Target directors (continued) 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill clause Breach of contract (specific to each 
governing State) 
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality 
agreement 
Breach of contract (specific to each 
governing State) 
1Ciii. Failure to disclose or 
misrepresented information 
s.13(d), s.14(a), s.14(e) SEA ; SEC Rule 
14d-1  
1Ciii. Conflict of interest Directors duty of care 
1Civ. Breach of timetable SEC Rule 14e-1  
1Cv. Bidder pressured TS to sell 
shares 
  
1Cvi. Extension of timetable   
1Cvii. Takeover detrimental to long 
term plans of the target company 
  
1Cviii. Breach of Regulations s.13(d), s.13(e), s.14(a), s.14(d), s.14(e) 
SEA; SEC Rule 14d-1 
1Cix. Misrepresented information s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA 
1Cx. Value of bid   
1Cxi. Failure to formalise bid   
1D. 1Di. Breach of competition laws s.7 The Clayton Antitrust Act 1914 
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Bidder/Government 1Dii. TC is a ‘national treasure’ or 
‘jewel company’  
  
1Diii. Takeover will have 
detrimental effect to the economy  
  
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
1Eii. Conflict of interest Duty of care 
1F. Regulating Body 1Fi. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
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Complaint: Complainant: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD misrepresented 
information  
s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 12b-20 13a-11, 
14d-9; Directors duty of candor 
2Aii. Failure to disclose 
information 
s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 12b-20 13a-11, 
14d-9; Directors duty of candor 
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not 
complying with takeover 
regulations 
  
2Aiv. TD valuation of the share 
price 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
2Av. TD advice on the merits of the 
bid  
s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rule 14d-5, 14d-6; 
Directors duty of candor and the duty 
of loyalty 
2Avi. TD interest in bid s.14(d) SEA; Directors duty of loyalty, 
duty of candor and duty of care 
2Avii. TD knew or ought to have 
known that the advice given to the 
shareholders by other 
professionals was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
2Aviii. TD issued new shares   
2Aix. TD knew or ought to have 
known that bidder would strip 
company of assets  
  
2Ax. TD knew or ought to have 
known that the takeover was 
detrimental  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
2.B Bidder/New 
Directors 
2Bi. Long-term plans have been 
unnecessarily disregarded by the 
new directors/majority 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care; Breach of controlling shareholders 
duty 
2Bii. New directors issues shares 
(after takeover), and as a result 
remaining target shareholders 
vote is diluted 
  
156 
 
2Biii. TS who are unable to take 
advantage of sell-out rule, but are 
affected by a new majority want 
their shares to be bought by the 
bidder  
  
2Biv. New directors/majority have 
stripped company of assets  
  
2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
2Cii. Conflict of interest Duty of care 
Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Company 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable  SEC Rule 14d-9 (recommendations or 
solicitations by the target company or 
others) 
3Aii. TC used takeover defence  Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate 
defence  
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
3Aiv. Failure to disclosure 
information  
s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 12b-20 
13a-11, 14d-9; Directors duty of candor 
3Av. TD refused to negotiate  Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
3Avi. Value of bid s.14(a), s.14(d) SEA 
3Avii. TD misrepresented or did 
not disclose information  
s.14(a) SEA; SEC Rule 14D-9 
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders   
3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
3C. Regulating Body 3Ci. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
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Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover in not in the best 
interests of the BC 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
4Aii. BD did not obtain best price 
for shares 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
4Aiii. BD misrepresented 
information 
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of bid Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
4Av. BD knew or ought to have 
known that the advice given to the 
BS by other professionals  was 
negligent or misrepresentative  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
 
There are similarities between the US and UK in terms of causes of action that can be used to 
pursue a complaint, for example the breach of a director’s duty. There are however, more 
causes of action available to US parties to a takeover than their UK counterparts. As noted 
above, this is because the way in which a takeover is conducted and the behaviour expected 
of the parties are regulated in the US by hard laws, by legislation such as the Williams Act. 
This means that complaints can be pursued as litigation in the courts. Whereas in the UK 
similar requirements for behaviour and how a takeover is to be conducted (i.e. timetables 
which are to be followed) are regulated under soft laws within the Code. Whether the 
existences of extra rights in the US provides a good explanation as to why there are such 
differing levels of litigation between these two jurisdictions will be looked at in more detail 
in the next chapter. The next section will outline US empirical studies undertaken to ascertain 
these exact levels of litigation. 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
6.4 US Empirical Studies  
 
6.4.1 Cain and Davidoff Solomon 
The main survey data relied on is provided by the studies of Cain and Davidoff Solomon.  
These studies comprise annual surveys of litigation arising from a selection of takeovers. 
Their original academic study ‘A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and 
Litigation’ looked at takeover litigation over a period of six years from 2005 to 2011. They 
continued this research project by releasing preliminary statistics, and the latest results cover 
the year 2013-2014 (over two papers). Their sample contains all completed transactions listed 
in the FactSet MergerMetrics database and announced from 2005- 2014 that meet the 
following criteria: (i) the target is a US firm publicly traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ stock exchanges; (ii) the transaction size is at least $100 million; (iii) the offer 
price is at least five dollars per share; (iv) a merger agreement is signed and publicly 
disclosed through a SEC filing; (v) it was completed by 2
nd
 January 2015. They documented 
all class action litigation brought in connection with a merger.
532
 The sample does not include 
a small number of suits brought by individual activist shareholders or hostile bidders.
533
   
 
6.4.2 Daines and Koumrian 
The second survey relied on here is a Corner Stone Research Report completed by Daines 
and Koumrian. Daines and Koumrian also undertook an empirical study to determine the 
levels of litigation in takeover transactions in the US. The transactions of interest to their 
study are similar to those in Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s, being of a high value. The method 
adopted by Daines and Koumrian however differs from the Cain and Davidoff Solomon 
surveys in the following ways: firstly the report looks specifically at litigation challenging 
merger and acquisition transactions, filed by shareholders of large US public target 
companies;
534
 secondly the report uses a different database and method to gather its data. The 
report uses the Thomson Reuters’ SDC database to obtain a list of all acquisitions of US 
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public targets valued at or over $100 million announced in each year. The authors then went 
on to search the SEC filings of the targets and acquirers for discussion of shareholder 
litigation. After the deals were closed, they used court dockets to trace litigation outcomes.
535
 
 
This second study compliments Daines and Koumrians’ surveys, which give a good overall 
picture of the litigation undertaken in takeovers, because it allows a more focused look at the 
litigation of target shareholders. In the US target shareholders, as will be explained below, are 
the parties to a takeover who are the instigators of takeover litigation.  
 
6.5 Propensity to Litigate 
 
6.5.1 Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s Findings 
Figure 6.1 
Table A: Litigation rates over time  
                          
Deals  
         Litigation  % with litigation  
2005  183  72  39.3%  
2006  232  99  42.7%  
2007  249  97  39.0%  
2008  104  50  48.1%  
2009  73  62  84.9%  
2010  150  131  87.3%  
2011  128  117  91.4%  
2012  121  111  91.7%  
2013  118  110  93.2%  
2014  79  75  94.9%  
Total  1,437  924  64.3%  
*Cain & Davidoff Solomon 2015 
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Out of the 79 transactions Cain and Davidoff Solomon recorded in 2014, 75 of these involved 
litigation. In percentage terms the findings record that almost 94.9 percent of takeovers in 
2014 involved litigation.
536
 The preliminary statistics they recorded in 2015 however show a 
slight decline in rates of takeover litigation from 94.9 percent in 2014 to 87.7 percent.
537
 
These rates however still remain high, and it is certain that if a target announces a takeover 
(with a value over $100 million) it should be assumed that it and its directors will be sued.
538
  
 
Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s study shows that takeover litigation has reached a “steady-
state” where almost every deal valued over $100 million experiences litigation. For the fifth 
year in a row around 90 percent of transactions experienced a lawsuit. The higher figure 
continues the increasing trend of their recorded takeover litigation which is now brought at a 
rate almost 2.5 times that of 2005.
539
 
 
In respect of settlement information, Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s data is only preliminary 
because, as they explain, many of the cases recorded are still currently making their way 
through the courts.
540
 They have however found that more than 70 percent have settled so 
far.
541
 Nearly 85 percent of these settlements were disclosure only, which typically resulted in 
an amendment to the company’s proxy statement to provide additional disclosure to target 
shareholders, who are not paid any amount in this type of settlement.
542
 
 
These findings show that there is a significant difference between the levels of takeover 
litigation brought in the US as compared to the UK. During the period of 2010 to 2014 in the 
UK less than one percent of takeover litigation was brought. In the same period Cain and 
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Davidoff Solomon recorded that around 90 percent of takeover transactions experienced 
litigation. There is however a limitation to Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s data which may 
lead to a biased result. The transactions that were of interest to them, as already noted, were 
those valued over $100 million. When analysing takeover litigation it is important to consider 
both smaller offers as well as larger offers. This is because higher valued transaction may 
experience more litigation because there is more at stake. The data collected for the UK did 
not have such a limitation and therefore it makes the figures difficult to accurately compare.  
 
Krishnan et al, who also carried out an empirical study on the levels of takeover litigation in 
the US looked at both high value and low value takeover transactions and the levels of 
litigation experienced by each. To do this they segregated offers into either large or small 
offers, defined as offers above and at or below the median offer size of $80 million, 
respectively.
543
 Their study found that less than 12 percent of all offers are subject to takeover 
litigation.
544
 Their data however also has a limitation because it was collected from the period 
1999 to 2000, which means that their findings are also not comparable to the litigation data 
collected for the UK. This is because the levels of litigation experienced in takeovers of all 
values have significantly increased after the 2008 post-financial crisis period.
545
  
 
Therefore it seems as if there is no data available to ascertain the actual levels of litigation in 
the US of takeovers of both low and high value transactions in recent years. If Krishnan et 
al’s findings are applied to Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s; however some rudimentary figures 
can be calculated which can be compared to the UK data. For instance, Krishnan et al found 
that 18.73 percent of the high value transactions they recorded experienced litigation, 
compared to low value transactions which experienced 5.09 percent. This is nearly a 14 
percent difference, and concludes that at this time, high value transactions experienced over 
three times more litigation than lower value transactions.  
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Table 6.3 
 % 
Litigation in high value deals (>$80mil) 18.73 
Litigation in small value deals (<$80mil) 5.09 
 
Using this data, it can therefore be assumed that takeover litigation is 3.68 times more likely 
to occur in larger transaction deals than in smaller deals. Consequently if Cain and Davidoff 
Solomon’s findings that 91.7 percent of high value transactions from the period of 2010 to 
2014 experienced litigation is divided by 3.68, it can be assumed that during the same period 
almost 25 percent of all transactions experienced litigation. This figure of 25 percent, 
although rudimentary, shows that there is still significantly more litigation in takeover 
transactions in the US than in the UK.
546
 Even comparing Krishnan et al’s findings that just 
less than 12 percent of all transactions experience litigation demonstrates that the propensity 
for takeover litigation is greater than in the US than the UK. 
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6.5.2 Daines and Koumrian’s Findings 
Figure 6.2 
 
 
Continuing a recent trend, Daines and Koumrian found that shareholders challenged the vast 
majority of takeover deals in 2012.
547
 Among deals valued over $100 million, 93 percent 
were challenged, with an average of 4.8 lawsuits filed per deal.
548
 The data in the report 
showed that lawsuits were filed an average of 14 days after the merger announcement, with 
plaintiff firms sometimes announcing investigations within hours of the merger 
announcement.
549
 For deals valued over $500 million, 96 percent of target firms reported 
deal-related litigation in their SEC filings, with an average of 5.4 lawsuits per deal.
550
 Most 
cases settled, and in more than 80 percent of settlements the only relief to shareholders was 
additional disclosures.
551
  
                                                          
547
 Daines, Koumrian (n526) 1 
548
 ibid  
549
 ibid 
550
 ibid 
551
 ibid 6 
164 
 
Figure 6.3
 
 
Daines and Koumrian were also able to determine the outcome of 182, or 58 percent, of the 
consolidated lawsuits related to 2012 deals.
552 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 59 lawsuits, 
and the court dismissed six cases. The majority (119) of the 2012 lawsuits settled. The 
settlements occurred before the deals closed and an average of 42 days after the lawsuits were 
filed. Most 2012 settlements resulted only in additional disclosures and fees awarded to 
plaintiff attorneys. The 119 settling lawsuits resulted in 67 unique settlements (several 
awarded lawsuits often settle together). Of the 67 settlements, shareholders received 
supplemental disclosures (and nothing else) in 54 settlements (81 percent), and the parties in 
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only one settlement acknowledged that litigation contributed to an increase in the merger 
price. Additionally, the deal termination fee was reduced in four cases and the parties reached 
agreements about appraisal rights in six cases.
553
 
 
Figure 6.4 
 
 
Most of the large settlements included allegations of significant conflicts of interest, such as: 
target companies’ managements negotiated premiums for share classes they held; the target 
companies’ chief executive officers negotiated side deals with acquirers to purchase some of 
the targets’ assets; the majority shareholders gained ownership of the remaining shares in the 
companies at allegedly unfair terms; the target companies’ financial advisors had conflicts of 
interest. Only two of the settlements recorded by Daines and Koumrian did not involve 
allegations of specific, significant conflicts of interest. 
 
6.6 Comparative Analysis 
Based on the data recorded in the empirical studies there is a greater propensity to litigate in 
the US than in the UK. The exact degree of difference is however difficult to ascertain. It 
ranges from a significant one when looking at Cain and Davidoff Solomon, and Daines and 
Koumrian’s’ studies, to a smaller but still higher propensity to litigate when considering 
Krishnan et al’s data. Using the data collected in Krishnan et al’s study however, it can be 
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assumed that takeover litigation is nearly four times more likely to occur in larger transaction 
deals than in smaller deals. Consequently if Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s findings that 91.7 
percent of high value transactions from the period of 2010 to 2014 experienced litigation is 
divided by 3.68, it can be assumed that during the same period 25 percent of all transactions 
experienced litigation. This figure of 25 percent, although rudimentary, shows that there is 
still significantly more litigation in takeover transactions in the US than in the UK.
554
 In the 
UK only 0.27 percent of the takeovers recorded in chapter four experienced litigation. That 
means the US experiences 92 times more litigation in takeovers, even when considering more 
conservative figures. 
 
US takeover litigation is almost always brought as a class action case on behalf of target 
shareholders who request additional disclosures to be made.
555
 In the UK both the target 
shareholder and the bidder commence an almost equal amount of litigation. Shareholders 
generally allege unfair prejudice or a breach of a director’s duty, and bidders usually bring 
claims against other third parties, such as advisors regarding conflicts of interest. Around 27 
percent of takeover litigation in the UK is successful, in that the claimants won their claim, 
even though they may not have always achieved the outcome of the litigation which they 
desired. Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s original data, collected from 2005 to 2011, shows that 
28.4 percent of cases are dismissed by the court, and that the other 71.6 percent of cases 
result in some type of settlement. It therefore seems that takeover litigation in the US is more 
likely to succeed.  
 
However, it depends on how success is defined because 55.1 percent of the settlements 
recorded were disclosure only settlements which brought no monetary benefit to the 
shareholders. 1.2 percent of the claims involved an amendment settlement and only 4.8 
percent provided an actual monetary benefit. Daines and Koumrian recorded similar figures 
in their study. They found that of the total cases they documented that settled 81 percent of 
these were disclosure only settlements (82.6 percent of settlements were disclosure only in 
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2014).
556
 Daines and Koumrian however noted that when there was a settlement involving a 
monetary benefit that the amount of money awarded has increased in size over a 10 year 
period between 2002 and 2012. The average settlement fund between 2010 and 2012 was $87 
million, compared with $36 million in 2003 through 2009.
557
 The large settlements generally 
included claims of allegations of significant conflicts of interest.
558
 Outcomes of litigation in 
UK are much more varied than those in the US, for example  injunctions were granted by the 
courts, requests for identity of shareholders were made, freezing orders were requested to be 
lifted, and parties (such as advisors) were asked to be removed from the takeover process. 
Damages for breaches of duty of care were also rewarded. The majority of US litigation 
however seems to be based on information-forcing. Once those cases are stripped away there 
are only a small number of cases involving litigation which results in an amendment to the 
takeover agreement or in a monetary benefit. These cases, looking at Cain and Davidoff 
Solomon’s data, only amount to six percent of the overall litigation recorded.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter and chapter four have mapped the litigation landscapes of the UK and US, and 
have established that there are low levels of litigation in the UK compared to high levels in 
the US. These chapters therefore confirm that there is a significant divergence in the levels of 
takeover litigation in these two jurisdictions. 
 
Cain and Davidoff Solomon find that 91.7 percent of high value transactions from the period 
of 2010 to 2014 experienced litigation. This figure is also reflected in the findings of Daines 
and Koumrian who found that 93 percent of the transactions they recorded involved litigation 
commenced by the target shareholders. Based on this data it is clear that there is a greater 
propensity to litigate in the US than in the UK. The degree of difference is however difficult 
to ascertain due to the differences in the transactions recorded in the UK (with the US studies 
targeting high valued transaction only compared with all values of transactions which were of 
interest in the UK study). Even when considering a more conservative figure, which was 
calculated using data from an older study which recorded lower value takeovers, US parties 
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to a takeover are still 92 times more likely to commence takeover litigation than their UK 
counterparts.  
 
This chapter showed that US takeover litigation is almost always brought as a class action 
case on behalf of target shareholders who request additional disclosures to be made.
559
 In the 
UK both the target shareholder and the bidder commence an almost equal amount of 
litigation. Shareholders generally allege unfair prejudice or a breach of a director’s duty, and 
bidders usually bring claims against other third parties, such as advisors regarding conflicts of 
interest. As such there is not only a difference in the levels of litigation brought in the US and 
UK but also a difference in the motivations for bringing the claims. US litigation seems to 
solely revolve around information forcing as very few cases settled for amendments to the 
takeover agreement or for a monetary benefit. 
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Chapter Seven 
Explaining the Litigation Landscapes of the UK and US 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters four and six sought to describe, or to “map,” the takeover litigation landscapes of 
the UK and the US. This chapter now turns from description to explanation: why is it that the 
US has so much more (of certain types of) takeover litigation than the UK does? The 
difference, however, is not the only thing of interest here; shared features are also worthy of 
some explanation.  As an analogy, an explanation of two geographical landscapes would be 
considered rather limited if it explained only the presence of a mountain in one landscape and 
its absence in the other, whilst making no attempt to explain the large flatlands that both 
landscapes also shared in common. The difference between the two landscapes is easily 
restated here: in the US, target shareholders almost always sue their own directors regarding 
their conduct during a takeover (mainly alleging that information has not been disclosed); in 
the UK, target shareholders very rarely do so. Since this is the essential difference between 
the two regimes, to avoid repetition this will be labelled the “TSvTD spike.”560 As noted, the 
explanation of this key difference is the primary focus of this chapter.  
 
This chapter offers four candidates for explaining the TSvTD spike.  They are considered in 
turn through sections 7.2-7.5. None of these candidates alone is sufficient to explain the 
TSvTD spike, but in fact all do contribute towards a full explanation. It is the combination of 
these four ‘explanatory candidates,’ and key differences between the UK and the US that 
each one captures that together fully and convincingly explains the TSvTD spike. My thesis 
thus rejects a simplistic uni-causal explanation. The explanation is, perhaps predictably, more 
complex, but better able to capture the full range of matters that together encourage takeover 
litigation in the US but suppress it in the UK.  This chapter does not attempt to model the 
impact of removing any one of the differences that constitute the explanatory candidates. 
Certainly, it is implicit in my account that changing any of them would indeed have an 
impact, and would likely reduce (but not eliminate) the magnitude of the difference between 
UK and US takeover litigation rates.  But calculating the precise extent of that impact is 
beyond this work.   
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The first explanatory candidate, in 7.2, considers the possibility that target shareholders in the 
US have more ‘causes of action’ available to them than do UK shareholders. As with the 
other three explanatory candidates, it is argued that this has some validity. However, it is 
important to identify precisely how US shareholders benefit from more extensive ‘causes of 
action’. They do so in two ways. First, the statutory obligations (such as the disclosure 
obligation) of US directors are more demanding than the obligations to which UK directors 
are subject during a takeover. Secondly and much more significantly however, is that the 
beneficiaries of these more demanding obligations also differ between the two jurisdictions. 
Crucially, the relevant US duties of disclosure are owed directly to the shareholder. This is in 
complete contrast to directors’ duties in the UK, which are owed only to the company and not 
directly to the shareholders. It is this difference in the identity of the beneficiaries of the 
disclosure obligations (and, therefore, of who is entitled to bring an action for a breach of 
them) that matters most here in understanding this first candidate for explaining the TSvTD 
spike.  
 
The second explanatory candidate, examined in 7.3, is the different ‘forms of action’ 
available in the UK and US.  By ‘forms of action’ it is meant, the procedural tools that target 
shareholders can use to enforce whatever causes of action may exist. Thus, forms of action 
would include representative actions, class actions, derivative claims, and so on. In the US, 
target shareholders prefer to use the class action as a means of enforcing disclosure 
obligations owed by target directors.
561
 It is this procedural device, especially when 
understood in the context of the rules governing attorneys’ fees, which provides the reservoir 
feeding the flow of US takeover litigation. This, however, does not necessarily entail that it is 
the absence of such a device in the UK which explains the absence of the litigation mountain 
in the UK.  Even if the UK were to permit class actions, it would not necessarily follow that 
this would result in a surge of UK litigation comparable to the TSvTD spike seen in the US. 
The reason this is so takes us to the third explanatory candidate.   
 
The third candidate, addressed in 7.4, concerns the role played by the existence of the Code, 
and its administration by the Panel. It is argued that these UK institutions do much to 
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suppress takeover litigation in general, including (crucially for the argument that is the focus 
of this work) litigation by target shareholders against target directors. The presence of the 
Panel and the Code in the UK both disincentivises, and sometimes even entirely precludes, 
takeover litigation, in a number of ways. Firstly, the Panel plays a significant role in solving 
disputes, and as such provides an efficient alternative to litigation and the Code manages the 
behaviour of the directors. Secondly, the reverence given to the Panel by the courts means 
that judges are extremely hesitant to play a role in the regulation of takeovers. Thirdly, the no 
frustration principle prohibits target company tactical litigation that has not been approved by 
the target shareholders.  The absence of such a body as the Panel in the US explains why 
parties to a takeover rely heavily on the courts for any resolution of disputes. Thus, even if 
the UK introduced both a direct statutory directors disclosure obligation owed to target 
shareholders, and a class action device similar to that in the US (and even if that operated 
with the same generous fee awards for lawyers as seen in the US), there still would not be 
comparable levels of litigation in the UK.    
 
The fourth candidate, discussed in 7.5, is the rather amorphous concept of “litigation culture.” 
The section begins by clarifying what is meant by this concept, as the term is sometimes used 
merely as a convenient label to describe (but not to explain) an abundance of litigation.  Such 
a usage is, clearly, inappropriate here, in what is an explanatory chapter.  Instead, the term is 
used here to capture other features of the economic or social environment, of the UK and of 
the US, which might offer explanations for the TSvTD spike. What these features might be 
are identified, and then considered as to whether any of them are likely to make a real 
difference to litigation rates in the two jurisdictions. Some features, such as the US being 
more prone to litigation due to an aggressive nature, or having more lawyers, do not seem to 
provide a plausible explanation. The existence of the Code in the UK, and its creation of both 
an alternative means of disciplining target directors and a climate in which allegations of 
misbehaviour by target directors are expected to be settled through the Code/Panel, are 
essential elements of the specifically-takeover related culture in the UK. Other elements such 
as the acceptability of litigation in the US takeover process may be a factor in explaining the 
disparity. These cultures have been determined by the structural components of the US and 
UK systems, and therefore it is these components that constitute the ultimate explanation for 
the litigation landscapes of the UK and US. 
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7.2 Differences in “Causes of Action” in the UK and US  
The degree to which shareholders in the UK and the US enjoy a cause of action in respect of 
alleged misbehaviour by their directors will depend on two different ingredients. The first is 
the ‘extent’ of the obligations or duties owed by the directors. The more extensive these 
obligations (for example, the more bits of information directors are required to disclose) the 
more likely, all other things being equal, that directors will be in breach, and therefore liable 
to litigation against them. The second ingredient is the identity of the party to whom such 
duties are owed.  If the duties are not owed to shareholders themselves, but instead are owed 
only to the company (or if the obligations are owed only to the state, and punishable only by 
criminal proceedings), then shareholders would enjoy no cause of action, regardless of 
however extensive the underlying obligations might be.  
 
The task, then, is to compare the causes of action enjoyed by shareholders in each 
jurisdiction.  In respect of the first ingredient, the obligations on directors (and especially the 
disclosure obligations) are indeed more extensive in the US than the UK. However, we shall 
also see that, in respect of the second ingredient (that is, the identity of the beneficiary of the 
obligations) there is a much more significant difference between the jurisdictions.  US 
disclosure obligations, in particular, are owed directly to, and enforceable by, shareholders.  
In the UK, the general rule is that they are owed only to the company itself.   
 
7.2.1. Are the Obligations of (Target) Directors More Extensive in the US than the UK? 
In this section, we consider whether the obligations on target directors are more extensive in 
the US than in the UK.   
 
7.2.1.1 A Red-Herring: Some Additional, but Irrelevant, US Regulatory Obligations 
This section begins by addressing what is, in truth, a “red herring.”  It concerns some ways in 
which the US takeover regime does indeed seem to impose additional obligations on parties 
to takeovers compared to those in the UK.  These particular additional obligations, however, 
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actually generate very little litigation, and therefore are in fact quite irrelevant to the specific 
TSvTD spike which we are seeking to explain.   
 
Table 7.1, below shows five complaints where there exist relevant legal obligations in the US 
but which are covered by no equivalent legally enforceable obligations in the UK.  
Table 7.1 
  Complaint Potential Cause of Action  
Complainant Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of 
Complaint 
UK US 
Target Directors Bidder 1Ciii. Failure to disclose 
or misrepresented 
information 
  s.13(d), s.14(a), s.14(e) SEA ; 
SEC Rule 14d-1  
1Civ. Breach of 
timetable 
  SEC Rule 14e-1 (minimum 
tender offer period) 
1Cviii. Breach of 
takeover regulations 
  s.13(d), s.13(e), s.14(a), 
s.14(d), s.14(e) SEA; SEC 
Rule 14d-1 
Bidding Company Target 
Company 
3Ai. Breach of 
timetable  
  SEC Rule 14d-9 
(recommendations or 
solicitations by the target 
company or others) 
3Avii. TD 
misrepresented or did 
not disclose 
information  
  s.14(a) SEA; SEC Rule 14D-9 
 
At first sight, it might easily (but in fact wrongly) be assumed that these various legal 
obligations must have led to an increase in the level of US litigation, and therefore explain 
the TSvTD spike. What is important in explaining the differing propensities to litigate 
however is to ascertain whether these five “extra rights” in the US actually generate the high 
levels of litigation?  
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The answer is no, and for two reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, these extra obligations 
do not generate the litigation which makes up the TSvTD spike. The obligations set out in 
Table 7.1 are required to be undertaken between the target company and the bidder. They do 
not include obligations owed by target directors to target shareholders. Secondly, the federal 
regulation as noted above does not generate high levels of litigation. The graph below, taken 
from the Corner Stone Research conducted by Daines and Koumrian, illustrates that only a 
small percentage of takeover litigation in the US is brought under federal causes of action.  
Figure 7.1 
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The graph reveals that over a four year period only eight to 12 percent of all takeover 
litigation in the US is brought to the federal courts using federal causes of action.
562
  
 
7.2.1.2 Relevant Ways in Which Target Directors’ Obligations are More Extensive in US 
As noted before, the complaints that do make up the TSvTD spike concern allegations against 
target directors (by target shareholders), i.e. that a target director has breached a duty. This 
could be a duty of disclosure, or some other duty. So, for example, target shareholders may:  
‘challenge the target director’s substantive and procedural fairness in the takeover, 
typically encompassing possible conflicts of interest, failure to shop the company adequately 
or otherwise maximise the sales price, or concerns about provisions in the merger agreement 
such as termination fees.’563  
 
It is true that directors in both the UK and the US owe obligations with regard to disclosure, 
conflicts of interest, and the like.  However, as we shall now see, those owed by directors in 
the US are rather more intense/demanding than their UK equivalents.  This difference in the 
intensity of the obligations is most pronounced in respect of the disclosure obligations 
imposed on US directors, and especially those imposed by state law, rather than by federal 
law.
564
 The TSvTD spike is, as we have seen, constituted primarily of actions alleging that 
target directors have breached their state law duty of disclosure to shareholders.
565
 Target 
shareholders however tend to allege a breach of disclosure rather than a breach of duty of 
loyalty or care, because it is easier to demonstrate that a director has not met their obligations 
under this duty.
566
 
 
                                                          
562
 What is not clear from the graph is whether the five extra rights highlighted in Table 7.1 form a significant 
part of this federal takeover litigation. Despite this, even taken together the total number of federal cases is not 
significant enough to conclude that these extra rights explain the substantial difference in takeover litigation 
levels between the UK and US. 
563
 Jill E Fisch, Sean J Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon, ‘Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger 
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform.’ (2015) 93 Texas Law Review 557, 599 
564
 ibid 613, see also Elliott J Weiss, Lawrence J White, ‘Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of 
Investors’ Reactions to “Changes” in Corporate Law’ (1987) 75 California Law Review 551, 572 
565
 ibid 598 
566
 See ibid 
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The Delaware fiduciary duty to disclose was created by the courts.
567
 The pivotal case in the 
development of this duty is Smith v Van Gorkom.
568
 In this case the court held that a board 
had breached its fiduciary duty, because it had failed to disclose all material facts, which it 
knew or should have known, before securing the shareholders’ approval of a merger.569 The 
board, during a takeover or merger, is therefore responsible for providing shareholders with 
sufficient information to approve or reject a transaction on an informed basis.
570
 The motive 
of the director in deciding not to disclose information is irrelevant; therefore there is no need 
for the claimants to prove that the director acted fraudulently or dishonestly.
571
  
 
Delaware judges interpret the term “material” in quite broad terms, noting that ‘the 
materiality of non-disclosure facts is a mixed question of law and fact.’572 In Weinberger v 
Rio Grande Industries the court confirmed Lynch v Vickers,
573
 stating that it is ‘now [a] well-
settled rule of Delaware law that corporate directors owe the corporation's stockholders a 
fiduciary duty to disclose all facts germane to a transaction involving stockholder action, in 
an atmosphere of complete candor.’574 The courts have defined “germane” in the tender offer 
context as all ‘information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in 
deciding whether to sell or retain stock.’575 The standard does not require that the non-
disclosure would have caused a reasonable investor to change their vote, but only that the 
statement be relevant to a reasonable shareholder.
576
 The test is objective as to whether the 
information would have been important from the perspective of the shareholders.
577
 
Therefore non-disclosure from a non-interested director acting in good faith could still be in 
breach of this duty for not disclosing information in their control, if it would have been 
                                                          
567
 This state fiduciary duty to disclose was only created in the last three decades; see Strine et al (n403); Jeffrey 
Gorris, Leo Strine, Lawrence Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti, ‘Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of 
Good Faith in Corporation Law’, vol 5349 (2009) 630. 
568
 (n375) 
569
 See chapter five section 4.3.2 
570
 Fisch et al (n563) 565; see also Smith v Van Gorkom (n375) (which held that a board had breached its 
fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the parameters of the negotiations leading to the company’s sale. at 890–92) 
571
 Smith v Van Gorkom (n375) 873-874 
572
 Glassman v Wometco Cable Tv inc Civ Act No 7307 1989 Delaware Chancery LEXIS 1 (Jan 6, 1989) 
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 383 A2d 278 (1977) 
574
 519 A2d 116 (1986) at 121 
575
 Weinberger (n430) [710]; see also Michelson v Duncan Delaware Supreme Court 407 A2d 211 (1979); 
Schreiber v Pennzoil Corp Delaware Chancery, 419 A2d 952 (1980) 
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 See Red Oak v Digirad 2013 WL 5740103 (Delaware Chancery Oct 23, 2013) 
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 See Smith Van Gorkom (n375) at 893 (‘by their failure to disclose all material information such as a 
reasonable stockholder would consider important’) 
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relevant to a reasonable shareholder in making a decision to vote, even if that information 
ultimately would not have affected the way in which they would have voted.  
 
Delaware judges consequently apply disclosure requirements ‘in the fact-specific context of 
individual transactions’578 giving greater flexibility to the courts to determine whether 
information is indeed required to be disclosed. This standard of disclosure is even far greater 
than that required under federal law which contain ‘prescriptive rules of general 
application.’579 Consequently it could be difficult for a claim of non-disclosure to be 
dismissed before it reaches trial.
580
 Under federal law, ‘the failure to disclose even material 
information is not actionable unless SEC rules specifically mandate disclosure of that 
information or unless the omission renders other disclosures misleading.’581 The ‘failure to 
include all material information in a proxy statement does not violate federal law.’582 For 
example, as Fisch et al note: 
‘[F]ederal law requires the disclosure of “material relationships” existing between 
the advisor and the other party in the transaction over the prior two years, but several 
Delaware decisions have compelled considerably more detailed disclosure about investment 
banker relationships and potential conflicts.’583  
In El Paso,
584
 Chancellor Strine remarked that a target company’s financial advisor’s 
failure to disclose a personal ownership of $340,000 in the bidder’s stock to the target 
shareholders was “very troubling;”585 even though it is ‘unclear that disclosure of this interest 
was required under federal law.’586  
 
                                                          
578
 Fisch et al (n563) 594; see also David Friedman,‘The Regulator in Robes: Examining the SEC and the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s Parallel Disclosure Regimes’ (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 1543 
579
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 In re El Paso Corp Shareholder Litigation 41 A3d 432 (Delaware Chancery 2012); see also Friedman (n578) 
1553 
585
 Friedman (n578) 442 
586
 Fisch et al (n563) 595; see also ibid 
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This section now turns to analyse and compare the equivalent obligations owed by UK 
directors. There is no specific fiduciary duty to disclose in the UK, and under s.956 of the CA 
it is noted that a contravention of any rule-based requirement under the Code, including a 
disclosure requirement, does not give rise to any right of action for breach of statutory duty. 
A target directors’ non-disclosure would therefore only become actionable if it amounted to a 
breach of a UK statutory obligation, such as a breach of a directors’ duty under the CA or a 
breach of s.90 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”). There are three possible 
duties which may be breached if a director does not disclose material information during a 
takeover, these duties are: s.172 to promote the success of the company; s.174 to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence; and s.175 to avoid conflicts of interest. A target 
shareholder will however find it difficult to demonstrate a breach of these duties in the UK.  
 
The duty to promote the success of the company requires a director to act in a way that they 
consider, in good faith, to be most likely to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard to other factors, such as long-
term strategies and the interests of stakeholders.
587
 It is said to be ‘probably the most wide-
ranging duty of the general duties in the Act, and clearly the most difficult to interpret.’588 
The understanding of the legislative development of this duty is that it is ‘meant to focus 
directors’ attention on the long-term interests of the company, and not just short-term profit 
maximisation.’589 The duty is also meant to have an impact on the way in which directors 
behave, including the way in which they make decisions.
590
 It is comparable to the US 
directors’ duty of loyalty;591 from which the current US disclosure obligations were 
conceived. It would therefore seem reasonable for a UK target shareholder to bring a 
complaint regarding non-disclosure under the grounds set out in s.172. The way in which the 
courts have deliberated over the application of this duty suggests that, even though it is wide 
ranging in scope, it is actually very difficult to establish that a director has in fact breached 
this duty.   
 
                                                          
587
 s.172 CA 
588
 Andrew Keay, ‘The Duty To Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit for Purpose?’ (2010) University 
of Leeds School of Law, Centre for Business Law and Practice Working Paper 1, 4 
589
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590
 Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic 
Framework (1999) London DTI para 5.1.17. 
591
 Discussed in chapter five section 4.3 
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The directors’ actions will be judged as ‘bona fide in what they consider, not what a court 
may consider is in the interest of the company.’592 As such the court will not impose their 
own views in considering what was reasonable in the particular situation before them, as long 
as the director honestly believed the action to be in the best interests of the company.
593
 
Consequently, the bar is set remarkably high for target shareholders to prove that a director 
deliberately did not disclose material that would be in the best interests of the company to 
have disclosed. It is ‘likely to be difficult to demonstrate, save in cases of really bad 
behaviour, that the directors have breached their duty of good faith.’594  
 
There are also difficulties for target shareholders to establish a breach of s.174, which 
requires directors to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence when making decisions.
595
 
This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent 
person with: the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of 
a person carrying out the functions of a director in relation to the company, and; the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.
596
 A target shareholder could 
potentially bring a claim for a breach of this duty if a director failed to disclose pertinent 
information regarding a bid. However, as with s.172, demonstrating a breach of this duty is 
difficult. This is because the courts are reluctant to find directors liable for breaching this 
duty,
597
 and are often cautious about judging directors harshly when making business 
decisions.
598
  
 
Finally, the duty under s.175 requires directors to declare any interests they may have in a 
proposed transaction or arrangement, whether that interest is direct or indirect. This provision 
ensures that directors are not in conflict with the company and do not exploit company 
opportunities for their own benefit. This fiduciary duty of disclosure is very limited in scope 
compared to that created by the US courts. For instance, a director need not declare an 
interest in the UK if it cannot be reasonably regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of 
                                                          
592
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593
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interest; or if the other directors were already aware of it (and for this purpose the other 
directors are treated as aware of anything of which they ought reasonably to be aware).
599
 
There are also ex-ante and ex-post shareholder approval mechanisms to approve a transaction 
even if a director is in conflict with a takeover.
600
 For example, under s.239 CA shareholders 
can vote to ratify a director’s action or omission that was in breach of their duties.  
 
7.2.2. The Key Difference: to whom are these Duties Owed? 
The underlying statutory obligations of directors during a takeover are therefore greater in the 
US than the UK. However, whilst disclosure claims constitute a majority of the TSvTD spike, 
the differences in the extent of the obligations do not seem to sufficiently explain away the 
size of the spike. It is not as if the obligations on UK directors are so much weaker than their 
US equivalents that an allegation of breach is never likely to be plausible, and yet actions are 
almost never likely to be brought in the UK.   
 
Much more significantly, however, is not the extent of the obligations, but the identity of the 
party to whom they are owed, and who can therefore enforce them?  Starting with the US, the 
directors’ disclosure obligations are based upon a director’s fiduciary duty in relation to both 
the corporation, and more crucially, its shareholders.
601
  The US statutory duty of disclosure 
is therefore owed directly to the shareholders, as laid down in Lynch v Vickers.
602
 As such 
US target shareholders are able to bring a personal claim for a breach of this duty.
603
  As 
noted above, the pivotal case in the development of this duty was Smith v Van Gorkom.
604
 
Discussion of which has already highlighted the content of the duty.  The point of importance 
now is that, in this case, the court restated the principle in Lynch v Vickers that the board had 
breached a duty it owed directly to its shareholders.
605
 Shareholders, therefore, could 
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themselves initiate proceedings against the directors for such breaches of duty owed to them 
personally; the action did not have to be brought by the company itself.  
 
By comparison, in the UK it is trite law that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the 
company itself, not directly to shareholders.  This has been long established in common 
law,
606
 and was repeated in the statutory codification of these duties.
607
  UK shareholders are 
also not owed a separate and direct fiduciary duty of loyalty by the directors under common 
law. This principle was reaffirmed by Sharp v Blank.
608
 In this case target shareholders 
alleged that their directors had breached a (non-directorial) common law fiduciary duty of 
loyalty that was owed to them directly, to provide sufficient information when approving a 
transaction. The court however ruled that the relationship between the director and 
shareholder did not give rise to a common law fiduciary duty of loyalty.
609
 The court instead 
directed the shareholders to use the directors’ duty route as laid down in the CA. The court 
held that the relationship between a director and their shareholders is only one of giving 
advice and information for a particular purpose:  
‘there is nothing here which as far as I can see comes close to a relationship where 
the directors have in any more extended sense undertaken to act for or on behalf of the 
shareholders in such a way as to give rise to a duty of loyalty, or have undertaken an 
obligation to put the interests of shareholders first, or are themselves entering into 
transactions with the shareholders, or where there are any of the other hallmarks of a 
fiduciary relationship.’610 
 
The director ‘does not have, by virtue of his appointment as director, any direct relationship 
with the shareholders.’611  Even though the interests of the shareholders and the company are 
generally aligned it does not mean that ‘a director has agreed to act for the individual 
shareholders or has a direct relationship with them – his relationship is with the company.’612 
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608
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609
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The courts have noted that the only time in which a director may owe a direct duty to a 
shareholder is if a “special relationship” can be established.613 That special relationship 
however has to be ‘something over and above the usual relationship that any director of a 
company had with its shareholders.’614  The court reiterated in Sharp v Blank the cases where 
a fiduciary duty has been held to exist: 
 ‘[These] mostly concerned companies which were small and closely held, where 
there was often a family or other personal relationship between the parties, and where, in 
almost all cases, there was a particular transaction involved in which directors were dealing 
with the shareholders, from which the directors often stood to benefit personally…[and 
where a director] might be tempted to exploit that relationship to take unfair advantage of 
the shareholders for their own benefit.
615’ 
This particular judgment concluded that not only do directors not owe statutory duties 
to the shareholders, as laid out in s.171 to 177, but that individual shareholders do not have a 
private right of action alleging a breach of a general fiduciary duty under tort, unless that 
special relationship could be shown.
616
  
 
That concludes the relevant general duties found in the CA, however, for completeness it 
should also be noted that in certain circumstances, UK target shareholders may allege that a 
director has breached s.90 of FSMA, if the directors have failed to disclose information on 
listing documents. If successful they can receive compensation for such a breach.
617
 Does 
s.90 give shareholders a personal right to bring proceedings against directors and is this 
sufficient to bridge the gap (in terms of shareholders’ ability to sue target directors) between 
the UK and the US?  It is argued that it does not.   
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Certainly, s.90 does close the gap a little. However, only a very small number of cases have 
been commenced alleging a breach of this legislation.
618
 As such, complaints of a breach of 
s.90 FSMA are largely new and untested before the courts.
619
 The lack of precedents in such 
actions therefore require “lawyers to grapple with novel and, often, complex issues in order to 
recover investors’ losses.”620 These issues include: 
‘prevailing industry practice, the knowledge of the issuer and relevant individuals at 
the time the listing particulars or prospectus was prepared and, perhaps most crucially in 
relation to claims arising out of the financial crisis, the foreseeability of future events or 
circumstances.’621  
The development of a successful case for the target shareholders is also severely limited by 
access to information; this is because limited public information may only be available for 
these companies.
622
 Consequently whilst there are a number of UK statutory disclosure 
obligations placed upon directors they are limited in scope when compared to the US state 
law obligations.
623
  
 
7.3 Differences in the  “Forms of Action” 
The second explanatory candidate for the TSvTD spike concerns differences in the “forms of 
action” available to US and UK shareholders.  As noted in section 4.3 a “form of action” is 
not the same as a “cause of action.” A form of action refers to the form of legal proceedings 
that must be used to advance some cause of action. It is the distinction between the substance 
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of a claim (the complaint) and the procedural form in which a claim is brought. For example, 
a target shareholder may complain that a director has breached their fiduciary duty to disclose 
under s.175, which is the cause of action. One form of action for pursuing such a claim might 
be a derivative claim brought by one or more shareholders. 
 
How might differences in the forms of action available in the UK and the US be relevant to 
this analysis?  The argument made in section 7.2 is that the substantive obligations owed by 
directors, in the UK, are owed ordinarily only to the company, not directly to shareholders. 
Aside from s.90 FSMA, shareholders generally cannot themselves bring a “personal” action 
for breach of such duties. In the US, they generally can do so. Still, this immediately seems to 
prompt three further questions: First, in respect of the UK, even if actions for breach of duty 
must be brought by the company itself, why do we not see just as many actions being brought 
by (or on behalf of) the company as we see being brought personally by shareholders in the 
US? Second, in respect of the US, just why are shareholders so ready and willing to bring 
personal proceedings? Third, (and back to the UK), even where personal actions are possible 
(under s.90 of FSMA) why do we still see so few UK actions being brought?  The answers to 
these questions lie at least partly in the differences in the forms of action available within the 
two jurisdictions. 
 
7.3.1 Derivative Claims  
Why are so few actions brought by target companies in the UK to enforce breaches of duty 
owed by target directors?  Why is there not a “UK” litigation spike, of actions brought by 
target companies against target directors (a TCvTD spike), comparable to the TSvTD spike in 
the US? To answer these questions, it must be highlighted again that proceedings by the 
company must, ordinarily, be authorised by that organ within the company enjoying the 
authority to decide that the company shall sue. It is a “constitutional question,” for each 
company, which organ has such authority; it depends on how the constitution of that 
company allocates decision-making power.
624
 For most companies, including those with 
‘Model Articles,’ their constitutions allocate such power to the board.625 Thus, an action by 
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the company against some of its own directors requires the board of that company to 
authorise such proceedings. For many obvious and often-discussed reasons, it is highly 
unlikely the board will do any such thing. The UK (like most jurisdictions) however does 
have a form of action, the “derivative claim” that is intended precisely to overcome this 
predictable reluctance of the board to authorise proceedings by the company. Why then do 
we not find as many derivative claims by UK target shareholders as we see personal actions 
by US shareholders?  What is lacking with derivative claims?    
 
A derivative claim is a claim brought by one or more shareholders, but “on behalf of the 
company.”  It is used to enforce breaches of directors’ duty owed to the company.  If the 
director is found liable, the remedy against them will be awarded to the company, not to the 
shareholder bringing the claim.  The rules governing this form of action in the UK were, until 
2006, common law rules.  However, the Companies Act 2006 chose, for almost all derivative 
claims,
626
 to replace these common law rules with a new “statutory derivative claim.” The 
intention, in introducing the statutory derivative claim in the UK, was two-fold.  First, it 
aimed to make the law itself clearer and more accessible. Second, it aimed to make it easier 
to bring, or at least, to commence derivative claims. This was achieved by clearly abandoning 
one, and probably abandoning another, common law requirements that a claimant previously 
had to satisfy.   
 
The first requirement, clearly abandoned in the new statutory rules, was that derivative 
actions
627
 at common law could only be brought in respect of “fraudulent” breaches of duty.  
As s.260(3)  makes clear, a derivative claim can be brought for any breach of duty, whether 
or not it satisfies the (very unclear) common law definition of fraud.  This relaxation of the 
new statutory derivative claim has some significance for this argument. The wrongdoing 
alleged against directors might well consist of allegations of negligence; for example, that the 
target directors failed to value accurately, either the target company itself, or the bidder’s 
offer. At common law, however, directorial negligence provided it did not benefit the 
negligent director, did not constitute fraud, and could not be sued for derivatively. Now, 
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under CA, such directorial negligence, like any other breach of duty, can be the basis of a 
derivative claim.   
 
The other common law requirement that has (probably
628
) been abandoned is that the 
claimant shareholder previously had to show that the “wrongdoers are in control” of the 
company. Again, if this requirement has indeed been abandoned, this also has some 
significance for this argument. The “wrongdoer control” requirement rendered derivative 
claims almost impossible in widely held companies (which most target companies would 
likely be). Directors of these companies typically have always been likely to own only a 
small fraction of the shares, and therefore do not enjoy control, at least insofar as “control” 
means “legal” control.629 Thus, the new statutory derivative claim sought to make it easier for 
claimants to at least to start derivative proceedings, and achieved this in ways which are 
directly relevant to, and helpful for, shareholders alleging directorial negligence in widely 
held companies, the very scenario that might face target shareholders in a takeover situation. 
However, in reforming the derivative claim, Parliament was also concerned to ensure that 
only meritorious claims would be allowed to continue and disrupt companies and their 
directors.  Alongside the relaxations already described, then, the CA also introduced a clearer 
procedure under which the courts now effectively act as a “gatekeeper,” by blocking those 
claims which ought not to be allowed to run to trial.  Here those legal obstacles begin to be 
confronted, in part actually strengthened by the 2006 Act, which greatly suppresses the 
number of derivative claims which are, or are ever likely to be, brought in the UK.   
 
In order to proceed with a derivative claim, the claimant shareholder(s) must, immediately 
upon commencing the claim, apply to the court for permission to continue it.
630
 This 
application process has two stages.
631
 Firstly, the shareholders will submit evidence to the 
court to be considered in a paper hearing.
632
 It is the responsibility of the shareholders to 
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establish that they have a prima facie case for permission to continue the claim.
633
 If they 
cannot establish this then the court will dismiss the application.
634
 If the court does not 
dismiss the application then, and secondly, a full permission hearing takes place.
635
 The 
factors that the court must consider when granting or refusing permission at this hearing are 
set out in ss.263(2) and (3) of CA. We might begin by noting that the total, combined, effect 
of these various factors is to weigh the court’s decision against granting permission.  This is 
especially evident in relation to those factors found in s.263(2), which operate as ‘mandatory 
bars’.  In other words, if any one of the three factors identified in s.263(2) exists, then the 
court has no discretion, and must refuse permission to continue the claim.  Those factors are   
‘. . . (a)that a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote the 
success of the company) would not seek to continue the claim, or (b)where the cause of action 
arises from an act or omission that is yet to occur, that the act or omission has been 
authorised by the company, or (c)where the cause of action arises from an act or omission 
that has already occurred, that the act or omission— (i)was authorised by the company 
before it occurred, or (ii)has been ratified by the company since it occurred.’636 
 
Moreover, even if the shareholder ‘survives’ these mandatory bars to the granting of 
permission, the court must then (but only then) apply the list of discretionary factors found in 
s263(3).  But again, this long list of factors tends to weigh heavily on claimant shareholders, 
giving the court a number of different avenues for refusing permission.  These discretionary 
factors are:  
‘(a)whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim; (b)the 
importance that a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote the success 
of the company) would attach to continuing it; (c)where the cause of action results from an 
act or omission that is yet to occur, whether the act or omission could be, and in the 
circumstances would be likely to be—(i)authorised by the company before it occurs, or 
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(ii)ratified by the company after it occurs; (d)where the cause of action arises from an act or 
omission that has already occurred, whether the act or omission could be, and in the 
circumstances would be likely to be, ratified by the company; (e)whether the company has 
decided not to pursue the claim; (f)whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim 
is brought gives rise to a cause of action that the member could pursue in his own right 
rather than on behalf of the company.’ 
The court must also have particular regard to any evidence before it as to the views of the 
members of the company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter.
637
 In 
addition to these provisions, the court in Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association
638
 noted 
that the list of factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant an application under 
s.263(3) were not “exhaustive,”639 and it was therefore open for the courts to take  other 
factors in to account, such as the applicant’s motive.640  
 
In summary, the court has vast judicial discretion when deciding whether to grant permission 
to continue a derivative claim.
641
 As a consequence, in a majority of cases brought since the 
introduction of the statutory claim procedure, permission to continue the claim has been 
refused. Dignam and Lowry note that these procedural requirements ‘represent significant 
hurdles to be overcome’ by any claimant, and that the case law in this area demonstrates that 
the courts have a “cautious approach” when deciding how to exercise their discretion.642 
There was a clear policy, during the introduction of s.260, that derivative claims should be 
‘exceptional,’643 and that they should be subject to ‘tight judicial control at all stages.’644 This 
is certainly the case, and Reisberg notes that this is illustrative of how procedurally and 
substantively English law has developed to provide disincentives to prospective claimants.
645
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As described by Reisberg, ‘imagine a bona fide shareholder who genuinely contemplates 
taking an action and reads through this (non-exhaustive, it should be stressed) list; faced with 
these complexities, the average shareholder will often give up in despair at this early 
stage.’646 
 
Moreover, and in addition to the many legal/procedural hurdles considered so far, there are 
also many other, perhaps more ‘practical’ or ‘commercial’, obstacles preventing or 
discouraging shareholders from bringing a derivative claim. In the first instance it will be 
difficult for shareholders even to detect any wrong done by a director. Shareholders, 
particularly in large public companies will have limited access to information. An additional 
deterrent against any speculative claims is the one of costs. Although the court can order the 
company to indemnify the shareholder,
647
 some recent cases suggest a growing reluctance to 
make such an order, even where permission to continue the claim is being given.
648
 The 
practicalities of financing shareholder litigation will therefore remain a major obstacle. 
Reisberg summarises the position as follows: ‘[t]here is nothing in the new procedure that 
will convince a rational shareholder they should be better off litigating the case on behalf of 
the company rather than selling their shares.’649 There is also a risk that the company will 
ratify the director’s decision and destroy the derivative claim (as long as the breach is one 
which is capable of being ratified and the ratification is not void under s.239).
650
 The target 
shareholder must therefore out manoeuvre significant obstacles in order to bring a derivative 
claim. 
 
This section began by asking why there is not a huge spike of UK litigation, albeit in the form 
of derivative claims, which might equate to the spike of personal actions brought by 
shareholders in the US. The answer to that is now clear. The continuing difficulty in 
commencing derivative claims in the UK severely limits the number of claims target 
shareholders can, or would ever be willing to, pursue.  
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7.3.2 Class Actions 
Having addressed the reluctance of UK shareholders to sue, this section now turns to the next 
question we asked ourselves in the introduction to 7.3: why are US shareholders so much 
more ready to litigate? The first point to make clear is that the reason does not lie in the 
superiority of US derivative proceedings, in comparison to the UK version. The process of 
bringing a derivative claim in the US is in many respects just as difficult as it is in the UK. 
For instance, US State legislatures and courts have also added additional hurdles for 
claimants to overcome, including requirements that they make a demand on the board of 
directors before filing suit, and permitting the use of special independent litigation 
committees of boards of directors to decide if derivative suits should be terminated.
651
 But, as 
we have established already, US target shareholders do not need to rely on, the almost 
equally flawed, US derivative claims because shareholders can bring personal actions in 
respect of the directors’ failure to meet their disclosure obligations. This is important to make 
clear, but it really just repeats the point already established in section 7.2 and still does not 
completely explain the question of the readiness of US target shareholders to bring personal 
actions.   
 
The answer lies in the very favourable US rules that constitute the next key “form of action” 
which this section addresses, namely the “class action.”  It is the class action which provides 
the reservoir feeding the flow of US takeover litigation. This is especially so when 
understood in the context of the rules governing attorneys’ fees, to which we shall return to in 
section 7.3.2.1. In a study completed by Krishnan et al it was found that 87 percent of the 
takeover litigation they recorded were shareholder class actions
652
 and only 3.5 percent were 
derivative suits.
653
 Shareholders in the US prefer to bring takeover litigation as a class action 
because they can avoid the additional procedural barriers that are raised in derivative 
claims.
654
 As noted above, recent empirical studies show that the majority of US takeover 
litigation is brought by the shareholders via class action lawsuits.
655
 A class action lawsuit is 
a procedural device that permits one or more plaintiffs to file and prosecute a lawsuit on 
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behalf of a larger group, or “class.” The subject matter of these lawsuits can vary widely. The 
“usual rule”656 however requires that the issue in dispute is common to all members of the 
class and that the persons affected are so numerous that it would be impractical to bring them 
all before the court.
657
 To understand the impact of this form of action, however, we must 
have regard not only to its availability, but also to the large fees that are paid to shareholders’ 
lawyers under this system. 
 
Under the US system, ‘a lawyer with an eye for an opportunity can easily mastermind a class-
action suit.’658 Ramseyer and Rasmusen state that this can be done by completing a few steps: 
firstly the lawyer must identify a legal wrong (in the case of a takeover, breach of the target 
directors fiduciary duty); and then locate several of the victims (target shareholders) 
suggesting that they can retain them to sue on their behalf, and all others similarly situated.
659
 
Agency problems also often arise, ‘as clients are usually too scattered to control the lawsuit 
directly, so they happily or unknowingly delegate authority to the lawyer, and as an incentive 
for this task they [the lawyers] will collect compensation.’660  
 
7.3.2.1 Attorney Fees in Shareholder Class Actions  
As was established in chapter six, the vast majority of shareholder litigation is settled 
between the parties before they reach trial. Attorneys that bring these lawsuits are usually 
compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee.
661
 Despite the claims only reaching 
settlement a US lawyer can be “handsomely rewarded” for encouraging target shareholders to 
bring a class action.
662
 Fisch et al argue that this practice only benefits the lawyers who bring 
the claims and not the shareholders they represent.
663
 Due to the representative nature of this 
type of litigation a settlement agreement requires court approval, and as such they approve 
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the agreed attorney costs.
664
 Consequently, even though the majority of these claims never 
reach trial, litigation is generated because the court is still required to play a role in the 
conclusion of the claims.  
 
The court’s role at a settlement hearing is threefold: the court must approve the certification 
of the class;
665
 the court must assess whether the settlement is fair and reasonable;
666
 and the 
court must decide on the amount of the fee to be awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel.667 Fisch et al 
note that: 
‘while these steps are independent in theory, as a practical matter, they often 
collapse; if the court determines that the benefits provided by a settlement are illusory, the 
plaintiff class will not have received any consideration for the releases that accompany a 
settlement, and the settlement will not be seen as fair.’668  
Only then, may the court properly refuse to approve the settlement.
669
 The decision of the 
court to rule that there is no benefit, however, may ‘raise questions about the adequacy with 
which the class has been represented, suggesting that the court should deny class 
certification.’670 Similarly, if the court approves the settlement, it has ‘implicitly concluded 
that the plaintiff class has received something of value, making it difficult to decline to award 
a fee to class counsel.’671  
 
Once the court has approved the settlement, it must independently consider the fee award.  
This is because ‘[a] litigant who confers a common . . . benefit upon an ascertainable 
stockholder class is entitled to an award of counsel fees and expenses for its efforts in 
creating the benefit.’672 The court’s determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee is 
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based on consideration of the Sugarland
673
 factors: (i) the amount of time and effort applied 
to the case by counsel for the plaintiffs; (ii) the relative complexities of the litigation; (iii) the 
standing and ability of petitioning counsel; (iv) the contingent nature of the litigation; (v) the 
stage at which the litigation ended; (vi) whether the plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit 
for the benefit conferred or only a portion thereof; and (vii) the size of the benefit 
conferred.
674
 ‘Among these factors, the last two receive the greatest weight.’675 
 
The average fee awards for the settlement of takeover litigation vary widely.
676
 In Del Monte, 
plaintiffs’ counsel received one of the largest fee awards, which was $22.3 million for a case 
that generated a recovery to the plaintiff of $89.4 million;
677
 at the “lower end” of the scale 
$100,000 was the award to the lawyers in Gen-Probe for a disclosure only settlement 
(whereby only additional disclosures are released by the target directors to their 
shareholders).
678
 Cain and Davidoff Solomon’s study shows that the average fee awarded in 
disclosure only settlements was approximately $500,000 in 2014 and $362,000 in 2015.
679
 
These figures are high considering it may take little effort for the attorneys to request 
additional disclosures and confer only a small benefit to shareholders, considering that these 
disclosures do not usually have an effect on the shareholder vote. 
 
The way in which the court must assess fees has however dragged state court judges into the 
‘task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in connection with the approval of fee 
awards.’680 If disclosure claims were dealt with only by federal courts, as proposed by Fisch 
et al, this could lead to a reduction in US takeover litigation overall. This is because the 
‘inability to win fees for disclosure settlements would reduce the profitability of takeover 
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litigation for plaintiffs’ firms on a portfolio basis, creating an incentive to curtail claims.’681 
The judges in the Delaware Chancery Court are very conscious of the incentives that these 
attorney fee award decisions can create.
682
 In Re Gen Probe, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster 
criticised the growth, and benefits, of this particular litigation.
683
 He stated that the court was 
now “giving out, left and right, five hundred grand for” weak claims which conferred “very 
weak” benefits to shareholders.684 He additionally noted that the court may now need to 
recalibrate the system of assessing attorney’s fees in light of the proclivity for disclosure only 
settlements.
685
 In Re Aruba Networks, in 2015, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster again stated 
that this dynamic represented a “systemic” problem that has resulted in a “misshapen legal 
system.”686 In this hearing he rejected the proposed disclosure-only settlement that had been 
filed objecting to Hewlett-Packard’s $2.7 billion acquisition of Aruba Networks.687  
 
These recent decisions make it clear that the Delaware courts are drawing a line in the sand. 
The historical practice of approving disclosure only settlements that provide little value to the 
shareholders in exchange for a release which is “overly broad” and payment of excessive 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees will be no longer be followed.688 In Re Trulia the court stated that 
‘litigants [who] continue to pursue disclosure settlements…can expect that the Court will be 
increasingly vigilant in scrutinizing the “give” and the “get” of such settlements to ensure that 
they are genuinely fair and reasonable to the absent class members.’689 This stricter approach 
taken by the Delaware courts, and crack down on the amount of fee awards given, may have 
already had an effect on the levels of litigation in the US. 
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Figure 7.2 
 
*Cain and Davidoff Solomon (2015) See Table A 
Cain and Davidoff Solomon recorded that there has been a sharp and significant decline in 
litigation.
690
 The figures in the table above, taken from their report, show that takeover 
litigation for completed transactions declined in 2015 with only 87.7 percent experiencing 
litigation. Whilst these figures still remain at a high rate, those transactions which experience 
litigation have fallen from the 94.9 percent rate that was recorded in the previous year.
 
Cain 
and Davidoff Solomon believe this may correlate with the Delaware courts challenge of 
“disclosure-only” settlements which began in the autumn of 2015.691 They found that in the 
wake of these decisions the rates of filings for completed and uncompleted transactions fell to 
21.4 percent and a number of settlements were withdrawn.
692
  
 
While disclosure only settlements have not been “eliminated by these recent decisions,” the 
landscape has been “materially changed.”693 It seems increasingly certain that any 
shareholder lawsuit (and resulting settlement with a universal release) will need to be 
predicated on true substance that solves a material deal deficiency.
694
 Conversely, it seems 
uncertain whether the ‘heightened standard for a settlement will simply deter plaintiff firms 
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from filing suits in the first place.’695 This litigation is not about disclosure,696 but what fee 
award the attorney may get for commencing the claim. The encouragement of legal advisers 
to commence litigation and the ease in which the class action can be brought significantly 
contribute to the TSvTD spike. 
 
7.3.3 UK Group Litigation Orders and Representative Actions 
This section now, finally, addresses the third question that was posed regarding the 
contribution of the ‘forms of action’ in explaining the different litigation landscapes. The 
shortcomings of UK derivative claims may help to explain the absence of a derivative claim 
spike in the UK. The ease of bringing class actions in the US (especially when fuelled by 
generous fee awards) may help to explain the prevalence of US litigation. But why is there no 
UK spike of class actions?   
 
This can partly be explained by repeating the explanation given in section 7.2, that the 
general duties of directors are not owed directly to shareholders. They, the shareholders, can 
therefore not bring personal actions in respect of such breaches, either individually or 
collectively as a class action. But now, it can be noted that there are some obligations by 
directors that do indeed give a personal right to shareholders to sue: s.90 FSMA creates such 
a right. Why, then, is there not a spike of litigation enforcing that right in the UK? Again, the 
answer is to be found in comparing forms of action in the two jurisdictions.  
 
The comparison goes beyond the rather obvious point that, technically, US style class actions 
are simply not available in the UK. For whilst it is true that the UK does not have a form of 
collective action labelled as a “class action,” designed with all the features of the US form 
which bears that name, the UK does have two forms of collective action. These are, first, the 
Group Litigation Order (“GLO”) and, second, the representative action, and both can, like the 
US class action, be used as a form of action to advance claims collectively.  
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GLO’s were officially introduced in to the English Civil Procedural Rules (“CPR”) in 
1999.
697
 A GLO is an order made under rule 19 of the CPR, to provide for the case 
management of claims which ‘give rise to common or related issues of fact or law.’698 A 
GLO must contain directions about the establishment of a register (the “group register”) on 
which the claims managed under the GLO will be entered; specify the GLO issues which will 
identify the claims to be managed as a group under the GLO; and specify the court (the 
“management court”) which will manage the claims on the group register.699 Shareholders 
wishing to join group litigation must “opt in” by applying to be entered onto a group register 
before a date that is specified by the court.
700
 A GLO will not be permitted if ‘the court 
considers it more appropriate that the claims are consolidated or for there to be a 
representative action.’701  
 
Representative actions, on the other hand, may be made by (or against) one or more persons 
who have the “same interest” in a claim.702 The “same interest” requirement is however quite 
restrictive. In the Court of Appeal judgment in Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc 
the court stated that the claimants must have ‘the same interest in the claim as the claimant at 
the time the claim was begun’ and cannot only be defined by a future end-result.703  This case 
has been cited by some commentators as an example of the shortcomings of the collective 
actions mechanisms currently available in England and Wales and they are not often used.
704
 
 
In the UK the ‘take-up of GLOs has been modest,’ this is in stark contrast to the frequent use 
of the class action system in the US.
705
 Many commentators attribute the failure of the GLO 
                                                          
697
 Ashurst ‘Collective Actions: UK Guide’ (2016) 1 
698
 CPR 19 
699
 ibid 
700
 CPR 19  
701
 ibid 19B 
702
 ibid 19.6 
703
 [2010] EWCA Civ 1284 at 346-347 
704
 See Ashurst (n697) 2; see also Rachael Mulheron, ‘Opting in, Opting out, and Closing the Class: Some 
Dilemmas for England's Class Action Lawmakers’ (2011) 50 Canadian Business Law Journal 376; Rachael 
Mulheron, ‘Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways plc: A Century Later, the Ghost of Market Lives On’ 
(2009) 8 Comparative Law Journal 159; A Owens, ‘A Collective Debate’ (2009) 159 New Law Journal 956; J 
Knibbe, ‘Case Comment: Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways Plc (2010) 31 European Comparative Law 
Review 139 
705
 Ashurst (n697) 1 
198 
 
to a lack of an “opt-out” system.706 The opt-out element is critical to the US operation of the 
class action; claimants may, ‘without taking any active steps in the proceedings, participate in 
the proceeds of any court judgment or court-sanctioned settlement, unless they specifically 
opt-out.’707 The difficulty in commencing collective actions in the UK provoked calls to the 
Civil Justice Council (“CJC”) to enact a more effective system of these types of actions.708  
 
In 2008, the CJC completed a report attempting to address the failure of collective actions in 
the UK.
709
 The report concluded that the current system was indeed insufficient to provide 
effective access to justice. The UK Government in 2009 responded however by stating that 
rather than adopting a US style class action, which they stated would be inappropriate, 
collective actions would best be taken forward on a sector by sector basis.
710
 They concluded 
that the adoption of an opt-out system would go against UK tradition and EU 
recommendations.
711
 Even where an opt-out collective action has been made available in 
certain sectors since 2009 they are very rarely used. For instance, in 2014 it was confirmed 
that an “opt-out” collective redress mechanism for victims of competition law infringements 
would be introduced by the Consumer Rights Bill.  Since the changes to the law were made 
in October 2015, only one collective action has been commenced.
712
 Whilst the changes have 
not opened any floodgates of litigation to date, only time will tell if this new system will 
become more popular.  
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Collective actions in the UK are, more importantly, unlikely to be a viable option due to a 
lack of incentives for those bringing the claims.
713
 This is largely due a need to rely on  third 
party funders, who play a pivotal role in paying for the costs of litigation, with lawyers 
working on conditional fee no-win, no (or low) fee arrangements who may therefore also 
have little motivation to encourage claims.
714
 Cary and Rickard state that ‘the availability of 
funding to facilitate litigation is the most important factor in determining the number of 
claims.’715 Securing funding however is difficult as third party funders will only commit to a 
claim if they are sure the claim has a good prospect of success. Shareholders may find this 
particularly problematic to show due to a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of any 
claims to reference (never mind successful claims); secondly, because of this the law is 
uncertain; and thirdly, shareholders will find it challenging to collect information against the 
directors’ breach due to issues of information asymmetry. ‘Action groups may therefore find 
themselves in an invidious position in which they do not have the funds to investigate a claim 
fully, but cannot easily raise those funds without that investigation.’716 UK target 
shareholders will therefore find it difficult to commence a collective action, in contrast to US 
shareholders who find it relatively easy. 
 
7.3.4 Class Actions: Evidence from Australia 
If the UK government did introduce US style class actions; or overhauled the current 
collective action system, it stands to reason that this could have the effect of increasing the 
levels of takeover litigation in the UK. Evidence of such a correlation has been seen in 
Australia.  
 
A US style class action regime was introduced to Australia in 1992, but it was not until the 
early 2000s that the class action became a mainstay of the legal landscape. Since this time 
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there has been a rapid growth in Australian class actions,
717
 which are now ‘a prominent 
feature of both the Australian legal landscape and the Australian psyche.’718 One of the main 
areas in which these class actions are brought is shareholder securities class action, similar to 
the US. Corporations have consequently faced an unprecedented level of class action 
litigation. Over the last five years, Herbert Smith Freehills has reported that they have acted 
for defendants in class actions with a total claim value of more than three billion Australian 
dollars.
719
 Jones Day also recorded that in the first half of 2014 there had been a spike in 
shareholder class actions, with a number of new entrants threatening or commencing 
proceedings, mainly around alleged continuous disclosure breaches.
720
 So an introduction of 
different forms of action such as a US style class action in the UK, or removing barriers to 
those forms that already exist, could have an impact on the levels of litigation. Any impact is 
however, unlikely to be significant due to the presence of the Panel and the Code, which is 
the next explanatory candidate to be considered. 
 
7.4 Presence of the Panel and the Code  
 
If the UK and the US had identical causes of action, and identical forms of action, it is likely 
that differences in takeover litigation rates in the two jurisdictions would be more modest.  It 
is however, also unlikely that those differences would disappear, or even substantially reduce. 
This is because, what is perhaps the most significant difference between the two jurisdictions 
would remain, namely the presence of the Panel and the Code in the UK (and their absence in 
the US).  This forms our third explanatory candidate. More particularly, we shall argue that 
the Panel and the Code generally disincentivises, and sometimes wholly precludes, takeover 
litigation, and that they do so in three principal ways. Firstly, the Panel plays a significant 
role in solving disputes, and as such provides an efficient alternative to litigation. The Code 
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additionally manages the behaviour of the directors, which might be the subject of a target 
shareholder claim in the US. Secondly, the courts refuse to ‘step on the toes’ of the Panel 
during the process of a takeover. Thirdly, the no frustration principle prohibits target 
company tactical litigation that has not been approved by the target shareholders. The US 
does not have such a system in which takeover disputes can be resolved, and therefore their 
system relies heavily on the courts to settle these disputes.   
 
7.4.1 The Panel as an Alternative to Litigation 
The Panel plays a significant role as an alternative to litigation, as it can offer advice and 
solve disputes via formal and informal procedures. The lack of such a body in the US means 
that courts are relied on for the resolution of such disputes. The rules of the Code, which are 
developed by the Panel, are also expansive and cover many issues which are not directly 
governed by UK regulation. These include rules that stipulate the disclosures required from 
target directors, which are not dealt with comprehensively or specifically for a takeover 
scenario by company law. Table 7.2 demonstrates the coverage of the Code rules as 
compared to UK and US regulation: 
Table 7.2 
Table 7.2a - Complainant: Target Directors 
Complaint Potential Cause of Action    
Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of 
Complaint 
UK US Takeover Code 
Provision 
1A. Target 
Shareholders 
1Ai. Identity of TS s.793, s.803 CA 2006 s.13(d) SEA  Rule 5.4, Rule 8 
1Aii. Concert party 
arrangements 
s.793, s.803 CA 2006 s.13(d) SEA Rule 9.1, Rule 8 
1B. Fellow 
Target 
Director 
1Bi. Failure to 
disclose information 
Duty of care; s.172, 
s.174 CA 2006 
s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 
12b-20 13a-11, 14d-9; Directors 
duty of candor 
Rule 20.1, Rule 23.1 
1Bii. Merits of the 
bid  
Duty of care; s.172, 
s.174 CA 2006 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty 
of care 
Rule 23.1, rule 20.1 
1Biii. Acting in 
concert with the 
Bidder  
Duty of care; s.172, 
s.173, s.174, s.175, 
s.177  CA 2006 
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of 
candor and duty of care 
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
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1Biv. Interest in bid Duty of care; s.172, 
s.173, s.174, s.175, 
s.176, s.177  CA 2006 
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of 
candor and duty of care 
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
 
Table 7.2b - Complainant: Target Directors (continued) 
Complaint Potential Cause of Action    
Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of 
Complaint 
UK US Takeover Code 
Provision 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of 
standstill clause 
Breach of contract 
(breach of 
conditions/repudiatory 
breach of 
contract/anticipatory 
breach) 
Breach of contract (specific 
to each governing State) 
  
1Cii. Breach of 
confidentiality 
agreement 
Breach of contract 
(breach of 
conditions/repudiatory 
breach of 
contract/anticipatory 
breach) 
Breach of contract (specific 
to each governing State) 
Rule 20 
1Ciii. Failure to 
disclose or 
misrepresented 
information 
  s.13(d), s.14(a), s.14(e) SEA ; 
SEC Rule 14d-1  
Rule 8, Rule 20.1, Rule 
23.1, Rule 24.2, Rule 
24.3, Rule 25.3 
1Ciii. Conflict of 
interest 
Fiduciary conflict of 
interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of 
loyalty & duty to act in 
best interests 
Directors duty of care  Rule 3.2 
1Civ. Breach of 
timetable 
  SEC Rule 14e-1 (minimum 
tender offer period) 
Rule 31 
1Cv. Bidder 
pressured TS to sell 
shares 
    Rule 16.1 
1Cvi. Extension of 
timetable 
    Rule 31 
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1Cvii. Takeover 
detrimental to long 
term plans of the 
target company 
    Rule 24.2 
1Cviii. Breach of 
takeover 
regulations 
  s.13(d), s.13(e), s.14(a), 
s.14(d), s.14(e) SEA; SEC 
Rule 14d-1 
Breach of any Code 
rule 
1Cix. 
Misrepresented 
information 
s.2(1) MA 67 s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA Rule 19.1, 19.3 
1Cx. Value of bid       
1Cxi. Failure to 
formalise bid 
    Rule 2.7 
Table 7.2c - Complainant: Target Directors (continued) 
Complaint Potential Cause of Action    
Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of 
Complaint 
UK US Takeover Code 
Provision 
1D. 
Bidder/Government 
1Di. Breach of 
competition laws 
s.75 FTA 73 s.7 The Clayton Antitrust 
Act 1914 
  
1Dii. TC is a 
‘national treasure’ 
or ‘jewel company’  
      
1Diii. Takeover will 
have detrimental 
effect to the 
economy  
      
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent 
advice  
Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
Duty of care   
1Eii. Conflict of 
interest 
Fiduciary conflict of 
interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of 
loyalty & duty to act in 
best interests 
Duty of care   
1F. Regulating Body 1Fi. Decision or 
ruling 
Judicial Review Judicial Review   
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Table 7.2d - Complainant: Target Shareholders 
Complaint Potential Cause of Action    
Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of Complaint UK US Takeover Code 
Provision 
2A. Target 
Director 
2Ai. TD misrepresented 
information  
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); 
Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA; SEC 
Rules 12b-20 13a-11, 14d-9; 
Directors duty of candor 
Rule 19.1, 19.3 
2Aii. Failure to disclose 
information 
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); 
Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA; SEC 
Rules 12b-20 13a-11, 14d-9; 
Directors duty of candor 
Rule 23.1, Rule 
20.1 
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not 
complying with takeover 
regulations 
     A number of Code 
rules could be 
breached 
2Aiv. TD valuation of the 
share price 
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.174 CA 2006)  
Directors duty of loyalty and 
duty of care 
 Rule 3.1 
2Av. TD advice on the merits 
of the bid  
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); 
s.994 CA 2006  
s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rule 14d-5, 
14d-6; Directors duty of 
candor and the duty of 
loyalty 
Rule 23.1, Rule 
20.1  
3Avi. TC used takeover 
defence  
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.171 CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty and 
duty of care 
Rule 21 
3Avii. TC used a 
disproportionate defence  
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.171 CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty and 
duty of care 
Rule 21 
2Aviii. TD interest in bid Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.173 s.174, s.175, 
s.176, s.177 CA 2006); 
Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
s.14(d) SEA; Directors duty 
of loyalty, duty of candor 
and duty of care 
Rule 16.2, Rule 
24.5 
2Aix. TD knew or ought to 
have known that the advice 
given to the shareholders by 
other professionals was 
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); 
s.994 CA 2006 
Directors duty of loyalty, 
duty of care and duty of 
candor 
Rule 19.1, 19.3 
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negligent or 
misrepresentative  
2Ax. TD issued new shares Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.171 CA 2006), s.33, 
s.549 CA 2006 
   Rule 21 
2Axi. TD knew or ought to 
have known that bidder 
would strip company of 
assets  
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
   Rule 23.1 
2Axii. TD knew or ought to 
have known that the 
takeover was detrimental  
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty, 
duty of care and duty of 
candor 
 Rule 23.1 
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Table 7.2e - Complainant: Target Shareholders (continued) 
Complaint Potential Cause of Action    
Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of Complaint UK US Takeover 
Code 
Provision 
2.B 
Bidder/New 
Directors 
2Bi. Long-term plans have been 
unnecessarily disregarded by 
the new directors/majority 
Derivative claim for 
breach of directors 
duties (s.172 CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty 
of care; Breach of controlling 
shareholders duty 
  
2Bii. New directors issues 
shares (after takeover), and as 
a result remaining target 
shareholders vote is diluted 
s.549 CA 2006     
2Biii. TS who are unable to take 
advantage of sell-out rule, but 
are affected by a new majority 
want their shares to be bought 
by the bidder  
      
2Biv. New directors/majority 
have stripped company of 
assets  
s.911B CA 2006      
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Table 7.2f - Complainant: Bidding Company 
Complaint Potential Cause of Action    
Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of Complaint UK US Takeover Code 
Provision 
3A. Target 
Company  
3Ai. Breach of timetable    SEC Rule 14d-9 
(recommendations or 
solicitations by the target 
company or others) 
Rule 31 
3Aii. TC used takeover 
defence  
    Rule 21 
3Aiii. TC used a 
disproportionate defence  
    Rule 21 
3Aiv. Failure to disclosure 
information  
Duty of care; s.90A FSMA  s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA; SEC 
Rules 12b-20 13a-11, 14d-9; 
Directors duty of candor 
Rule 8, Rule 20.1, 
Rule 25.3 
3Av. TD refused to negotiate        
3Avi. Value of bid       
3Avii. TD misrepresented or 
did not disclose information  
  s.14(a) SEA; SEC Rule 14D-9   
3Aviii. TD advice to 
shareholders 
      
3B. 
Advisors 
3Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
Duty of care   
3C. 
Regulating 
Body 
3Ci. Decision or ruling Judicial Review Judicial Review   
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Table 7.2f - Complainant: Bidding Company 
Complaint Potential Cause of Action    
Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of 
Complaint 
UK US Takeover Code 
Provision 
4A. Bidding 
Directors 
4Ai. Takeover is 
not in the best 
interests of the BC 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 
CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty and 
duty of care 
  
4Aii. BD did not 
obtain best price 
for shares 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 
CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty and 
duty of care 
  
4Aiii. BD 
misrepresented 
information 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 
CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of 
care and duty of candor 
  
4Aiv. BD advice on 
merits of bid 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 
CA 2006) 
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of 
care and duty of candor 
  
4Av. BD knew or 
ought to have 
known that the 
advice given to 
the BS by other 
professionals  was 
negligent or 
misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 
CA 2006); s.994 CA 2006 
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of 
care and duty of candor 
  
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent 
advice  
Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
Duty of care   
 
As can be seen form Table 7.2, the Code addresses, and significantly limits, directorial 
misbehaviour of the type that is sued for in the US. It imposes a prescriptive regime of 
disclosure rules, regulates target directors’ behaviour, and limits their involvement in the 
decision making process during a takeover. The power to accept the takeover offer is placed 
firmly with the target shareholders. Consequently, UK target boards are generally able only 
to give advice on the takeover offer. They do not have the power to accept or reject the bid, 
unlike target directors in the US who play a greater role in determining the outcome of a 
takeover bid. Target directors’ actions during a takeover in the US are therefore, quite rightly, 
subject to greater scrutiny by the courts. The need for target shareholders to complain in the 
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UK regime is also greatly reduced. In particular the no frustration principle and the 
mandatory bid rules protect shareholders, and provide the UK system with important checks 
and balances. The way in which the Code is developed, (i.e. it is not black letter law) 
additionally means that the Panel can pre-empt changes in market practices and adapt the 
Code quickly to such changes, and as such the rules are always up to date. 
 
The Panel’s Executive also precludes and disincentives the use of litigation as it regulates and 
supervises takeovers on a day-to-day basis. This includes, either on its own initiative or at the 
instigation of third parties: the conduct of investigations, the monitoring of relevant dealings 
in connection with the Code and the giving of rulings on the interpretation, application or 
effect of the Code. The Executive is additionally available both for consultation and also the 
giving of rulings on the interpretation, application or effect of the Code before, during and, 
where appropriate, after takeovers or other relevant transactions.
721
 This is something courts 
cannot reasonably be expected to do. As well as regulating firm offers, the Executive also 
‘undertakes a substantial volume of work in respect of possible offers, whitewashes, concert 
party queries, re-registrations and other general enquiries relating to the application of the 
Code, much of which does not become public.’722 The Panel relies upon the co-operation of 
parties to a takeover and Section 6(b) of the Code imposes ‘an obligation upon a relevant 
person or its advisers to consult the Panel if they are in “any doubt whatsoever” as to whether 
a relevant proposed “course of conduct” is in accordance with the Code.723 Once that ‘very 
low threshold of doubt is reached the Panel must be consulted.’724 The Executive may also be 
approached for general guidance on a “no names” basis, where the person seeking the 
guidance does not disclose to the Executive the names of the companies concerned.
725
 Again, 
this is a practice which the courts would not easily be able to adopt and is a significant 
advantage of the Panel as a regulator. 
 
                                                          
721
 Takeover Panel <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/executive>  accessed 11 January 2016 
722
 The Takeover Panel Report on the Year Ended 31 March 2015 <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/935766_TakeOver-AR_web-version1.pdf> accessed 20 December 2015 
723
 The Takeover Panel, Asia Resource Minerals plc (formerly BUMI plc): Statement of Public Criticism of 
Credit Suisse, Freshfields and Holman Fenwick, 2015/15 (2015) para 5.2 
724
 ibid 
725
 The Code para 6(a) 
210 
 
As such, in the UK, the Panel is the first port of call if there are any issues which arise during 
a takeover. This is reflected in the data collected in chapter four, which shows that the Panel 
has made 35 formal rulings in the last five years,
726
 compared to five cases which reached the 
courts.
727
 It is not clear how many decisions are made, or how many queries are brought 
before the Panel as these statistics were not available. As noted during the interviews with the 
UK Lawyers,
728
 the Panel is constantly providing informal advice to companies on a daily 
basis. Often this guidance is a phone call away, and complaints can also be lodged just as 
quickly. As the Panel provides guidance to parties, this may also preclude complaints from 
arising at all because they can be quickly resolved. The appeals system that exists within the 
structure of the Panel and the rules of the Code means that rulings of the Panel can be 
challenged. If there is a grievance between the parties then it should be resolved within the 
system of the Panel, and once this comprehensive appeal system has been exhausted it is 
unlikely that parties would still wish to go to court. Moreover, due to the Code’s soft law 
nature, a breach of the rules cannot be enforced by the courts. Under s.955(3) of the CA the 
only person who can seek an injunction for a breach of the Code is the Panel itself. This will 
also significantly impact upon the level of litigation in the UK. The US does not have a 
similar system in which complaints can be dealt with or advice given from a statutory body, 
without bringing litigation. Furthermore, academics have noted that the role of the courts in 
the US plays a role in encouraging litigation.
729
 This is not because the courts actively and 
directly encourage litigation, but do so due to the way in which they approve settlements and 
fee awards. 
730
  
 
7.4.2 The Courts’ Refusal to “Step on Toes” of the Panel  
It is not just the Panel which is cautious of litigation. Traditionally, the UK courts have also 
taken a non-interventionist stance when dealing with cases during a takeover bid, in contrast 
to the US courts.
731
 The non-interventionist policy was established in the UK in a number of 
cases, but most prominently in Datafin.
732
 In this case, it was made clear that the relationship 
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between the Panel and the court would be “historic rather than contemporaneous,” and 
therefore the court would allow the Panel’s decisions to take their course.733 Sir John 
Donaldson MR justified this response by stating that: 
 ‘when the takeover is in progress the time scales involved are so short and the need 
of the markets and those dealing in them to be able to rely on the rulings of the Panel is so 
great that contemporary intervention by the court will usually either be impossible or 
contrary to the public interest.’734  
 
The principle set in Datafin has been affirmed in two later judicial review cases brought 
against the Panel, in Guinness
735
 and Fayed.
736
 In Guinness, although the Court of Appeal 
condemned the Panel’s decision as “insensitive and unwise”, it still declined to intervene.737 
It stated that although the Panel’s executive investigations could have been pursued more 
thoroughly, there was public interest in the Panel acting to enforce the Code and, because no 
injustice had resulted from the Panel's actions, the case was dismissed.
738
 Similarly in Fayed, 
the Court of Appeal declined to intervene because it could not be shown that there had been 
bad faith on the part of the Panel or an injustice caused to the claimant.
739
  
 
In Datafin the courts held that they would allow the Panel’s contemporary decisions to take 
their course, and then would consider the complaint, and intervene ‘if at all, later and in 
retrospect by declaratory orders.’740 Whereas in Dunford and Elliot, a case not concerning 
judicial review but a conflict of interest, the court noted that the particular issue that arose 
was ‘perhaps a problem which may hereafter require consideration by the Panel to avoid any 
possible future conflict of interests, if indeed they are not already considering it.’741 The 
judgment in Dunford and Elliot suggests that the court will intervene in some cases when the 
takeover is ongoing, and direct the Panel to potential issues in which to make a ruling at a 
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later date.
742
 These two cases seem to draw a distinction between judicial review cases and 
non-judicial review cases.  
 
7.4.2.1 Courts Approach to Litigation in Schemes of Arrangements 
The court has a significant role to play in schemes because they require a sanction by the 
court, as set out in Part 26 of the CA. As such, in the case of a scheme there is a dual 
jurisdiction, of both the Panel and the court.
743
 There is, therefore, the possibility that the 
process could undermine the function of the Panel. This could then lead to an increase in the 
levels of litigation used in takeovers. This possibility was however removed by the courts in 
Re Expro International Group plc (‘Expro’).744 In this case the courts stated that ‘one of the 
purposes served by the Code is to bring a degree of certainty in the conduct of bids for the 
benefit of all shareholders.’745 Litigation would understandably affect this certainty and 
therefore the courts eliminated the opportunity for this to occur.  
 
The facts of this case will be outlined to highlight this issue. A recommended offer was made 
for Expro, by a company called Umbrellastream. The takeover was to be implemented by 
way of a scheme. A meeting of Expro's shareholders was convened to approve the scheme 
with Umbrellastream, however, another company, Halliburton, announced that it was 
conducting due diligence on Expro with a view to possibly making a competing offer. 
Expro’s board announced that it had received a private proposal from Halliburton but the 
proposal did not amount to a firm intention to make an offer and was subject to pre-
conditions. Under the circumstances the shareholder’s meeting to approve the original 
scheme was adjourned for a week and a circular was sent to the shareholders. The circular 
recorded terms reached between the company and Umbrellastream, whereby the company 
agreed not to seek to postpone or further adjourn either the shareholders' meeting or the court 
hearings for the sanction of the scheme and a confirmation of reduction of the capital 
involved in it. Expro shareholders, in the knowledge that Halliburton had put forward a non-
binding proposal to Expro’s board, later voted to approve the Umbrellastream scheme.  
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Halliburton then made a last minute increased offer on terms that the company would, 
without necessarily recommending the proposal, co-operate with the proposal being put to 
shareholders in a scheme of arrangement. The company's board concluded that the additional 
10p per share over Umbrellastream’s offer was insufficient for them to agree to Halliburton’s 
proposal. At the court hearing seeking the court's sanction of the scheme with 
Umbrellastream, certain shareholders of the company appeared and sought an adjournment of 
the company's application for the sanction of the scheme for 14 days. The purpose of the 
adjournment was to give Halliburton the opportunity to make a further bid for the company. 
The shareholders submitted that the board appeared not to have taken into account the 
acceptance of Halliburton’s proposal which would have triggered an orderly auction process 
overseen by the Panel under the provisions of Rule 32.5 of the Code, and that such an orderly 
auction process could have resulted in an increased price to the benefit of shareholders. 
 
The court held that the board, on the evidence at hand, had considered the possibility of an 
auction process, and whether it could lead to a higher price. The board had concerns that it 
could not, and the court found that no criticism could be made of the board's assessment of 
the relative benefits and risks associated with accepting or rejecting Halliburton’s final 
proposal. The certainty of Umberellastream’s offer which could become fully effective in a 
short time outweighed commercially either a firm offer from Halliburton or the uncertainty of 
a higher offer in due course. The uncertainty inherent in the potentially competitive situation 
created by Halliburton’s interest was well known and clearly addressed in the relevant 
circulars to the shareholders.
746
 
 
In regards to the shareholder’s application for adjournment the court stated that: 
‘I have approached this application by the shareholders…entirely on its own merits 
and in accordance with the established principles applicable to the consideration of schemes 
of arrangement. I none the less should say that I have concern that there should, if possible, 
be a common approach to the conduct of bids, whether they are structured as an offer or as a 
scheme. I would not think it desirable that the court procedure involved in a scheme should 
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allow in an undesirable level of uncertainty which the provisions of the Code have 
successfully reduced or eliminated in the case of ordinary offers.’747 
 
Whilst the courts made it clear in this case that although they must be involved in sanctioning 
schemes the Panel is still the main regulatory body and therefore it is the decision maker 
regarding the conduct of takeovers. Payne notes that this decision removed the uncertainty 
that there may be a two–track system where there was a possibility for litigation during a 
scheme of arrangement.
748
 
 
In reaction to this ruling the Panel stated in their end of year report: 
‘In the recent High Court judgment…it was noted that it was not considered desirable 
for Court procedure to introduce a level of uncertainty into offers which the provisions of the 
Code had successfully eliminated. On this evidence, it does not appear that there is any 
current likelihood of the Courts playing a more active role in determining the outcome of 
offers.’749 
The Panel were “unusually…perhaps uniquely”750 represented in these proceedings. Payne 
noted that having just introduced the new provisions to the Takeover Code in January 2008 to 
codify the Panel’s practice and to clarify the Code timetable in relation to schemes, ‘the Panel 
was concerned that a successful application for an adjournment by the dissentient 
shareholders in this case might create just the kind of uncertainty in the context that the Code 
changes were intended to reduce.’751 It is therefore clear that the judge was ‘keen for the 
courts involvement in schemes not to create this process.’752 
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7.4.3 The No Frustration Principle and Tactical Litigation 
So far this chapter has focused on explaining the “litigation mountain” that differentiated the 
US and UK landscapes, but as noted in the introduction, the similarities or “flatlands” of both 
landscapes are also worthy of discussion. The flatlands here represent the lack of tactical 
litigation instigated by the target company in both the UK and US. Tactical litigation can be 
defined as litigation which is undertaken during the course of the takeover process prior to 
the completion of the takeover in order to discourage or hinder the bidder.
753
 Potentially, 
tactical litigation can be commenced by any party to a takeover subject to each jurisdictions 
rules and regulations. For the UK, the lack of tactical litigation commenced by target 
directors is explained by the existence of Rule 21 of the Code, the “no frustration principle,” 
the hesitance of the Panel and the Court to allow tactical litigation, and other pieces of 
company law. For the US, the explanation for the lack of target company instigated litigation 
is that target directors do not need to use tactical litigation because they have other, non-
litigious, tactical moves which they can use to influence the outcome of a takeover.   
 
It is true that the Code, including specifically Rule 21, does explain part of the ‘flatlands’, in 
the sense of a general absence of tactical litigation brought by target directors (or by the target 
company on their decision) against the predator. The no frustration principle however is 
assumed to be the most obvious reason in explaining why there are differing levels of 
litigation between the UK and the US, in total. Rule 21 cannot, however, explain the absence, 
in the UK, of the TSvTD spike. This is because the no frustration principle states that the 
board of the target company cannot take any action which may frustrate an offer, which 
either has been formally made or which they have reason to believe will be made, without the 
consent of the shareholders.
754
  
 
The target company is therefore the only party who is prevented from bringing tactical 
litigation during a bid under this rule. It would therefore be possible for target shareholders, 
bidders and the bidder’s shareholders to commence litigation during a bid in the UK. 
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Additionally, due to the wording of this provision, tactical litigation can still be brought 
during a bid by the target directors on behalf of the target company when the target 
shareholders’ approval has been obtained. Rule 21 therefore only precludes a certain type of 
litigation, specifically tactical litigation commenced by the target company without the 
consent of the target shareholders. It cannot therefore explain completely the UK’s lack of 
takeover litigation.  
 
In contrast, the target directors in the US are able to commence litigation without first 
obtaining the target shareholders consent. Whether tactical litigation (or any other defence) is 
undertaken by the target company is in the control of the target directors. As long as the 
target directors abide by the standards set under the business judgment rule, and the enhanced 
scrutiny tests under the Revlon
755
 and Unocal,
756
 the target directors can decide whether 
litigation should be under taken. Shareholders will not usually have a say in whether a 
defence, such as tactical litigation is used.
757
 Nevertheless, the transplantation of the no 
frustration principle to the US system would not significantly reduce their levels of litigation 
either. This is because the main instigator of tactical litigation in the US is the target 
shareholder, who is not prevented from commencing litigation under this rule. It would only 
have an effect on the target directors’ ability to commence tactical litigation without the 
consent of the shareholders. As stated, directors in the US do not need to use tactical 
litigation if they wish to stall or prevent a takeover; this is because they can use takeover 
defences which would be more effective than commencing litigation.
758
  
 
It could be argued that if the no-frustration principle was removed from the regulation of 
takeovers in the UK, the levels of target company tactical litigation would increase. In the 
UK the target company commenced 14 percent of the cases recorded.
759
 Whilst this number 
of cases is half of those instigated by the target shareholders or bidders, the number is not 
insignificant. However, tactical target company litigation is not only restricted by Rule 21 
(even if they have shareholder consent). This is because the Panel has made it clear that they 
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should first be consulted before any proceedings are commenced. In Dunford and Elliott v 
Johnson and Firth-Brown
760
 in which there was a request to the court for an injunction, Lord 
Denning MR stated in his ruling that the very moving for an injunction would seem to be a 
breach of the General Principle of the Code; seeing that it is an action which is designed to 
frustrate the making of a bid.
761
 Shortly after, the Panel issued a statement affirming: 
“If the board of an offeree company contemplates legal proceedings in relation to an 
offer or prospective offer, problems may in certain circumstances arise under the Code. The 
board would therefore be well advised in such a case to consult the Panel before any action 
is taken.”762 
This statement addresses tactical litigation brought by target companies more specifically, 
and seems to advise that even when the consent of target shareholders has been obtained the 
Panel should still be consulted prior to the commencement of litigation. The Panel was able 
to offer further insight into their stance on tactical litigation in their own 1989 ruling 
regarding Minorco and Consolidated Gold Fields.
763
 In this case the Panel were 
unexpectedly, more favourable towards the idea of litigation, stating that they would be 
‘reluctant to interfere with the taking of legal action by parties to an offer, and would not 
lightly seek to preclude a party from pursuing proceedings which could legitimately be 
brought before a court whether in the UK or in an overseas jurisdiction.’764 The Panel, 
however, went on to clarify that legal proceedings might, depending upon their nature and 
timing, give rise to a potential conflict with the provisions of the Code.
765
  
 
Despite this, some tactical litigation has been commenced in the UK. Perhaps the most 
significant of these cases is Marks and Spencer Plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer.
766
 In 
this case the target firm, Marks & Spencer (M&S) made an application to request an 
injunction prohibiting Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Freshfields) from acting for, or 
advising, or otherwise assisting the potential bidder (who had instructed Freshfields to act on 
their behalf). M&S, who retained Freshfields as one of its legal advisers, contended that by 
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acting for the bidder in circumstances where Freshfields had an existing and on-going 
retainer, in relation to one of their main contractual arrangements and their restructuring, had 
placed themselves in a position of a conflict or a potential conflict of interest to which they 
had not consented. In addition, M&S maintained that as a result of the services performed by 
Freshfields over a number of years, they were in possession of confidential information 
belonging to them which was or might be relevant to the retainer which Freshfields had 
obtained with the bidder. The court held that a huge amount of confidential information 
relating to the affairs of M&S was held within Freshfields which was plainly, material to a 
potential bid. The court therefore granted the injunction. The outcome of these legal 
proceedings therefore significantly altered the tactical dynamics of the bid for M&S. 
 
The grounds for bringing the claim (which was the release of confidential information) were 
identical to that of Dunford and Elliott. Why then did the commencement of the M&S tactical 
litigation, which altered the outcome of a takeover bid, not breach the Code, but the granting 
of an injunction in the case of Dunford and Elliott could amount to a breach? One possible 
answer is that the court in Dunford and Elliott held that the information released, on the facts 
of the case, was actually not confidential.
767
 The Panel has not illustrated when a claim will 
not be in conflict with the Code, and therefore the situation in which the Panel may allow 
tactical litigation to proceed is unclear. The Panel itself has however implied that they are 
unable to clarify their position until a specific case of this nature comes before them.
768
 
 
The Panel has noted that target company tactical litigation could be potentially detrimental 
but whether a claim should be commenced is at the discretion of the target shareholders: 
‘[L]itigation could become a tactical weapon intended to prevent a bid from being 
considered on its merits. All this could take place regardless of the views of the shareholders 
who own the company. We think that, in principle, this would be highly undesirable and 
potentially gravely damaging to the orderly conduct of bids. In saying this, we are not 
suggesting that it may not be appropriate to take legal proceedings which frustrate a bid. All 
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we are saying is that the shareholders should be entitled to decide whether such actions 
should take place.’769 
This emphasises, again, the importance of the director not being able to take away the target 
shareholders’ ability to decide on the outcome of the takeover, and prioritises using the Panel 
as the first port of call.  
 
Company law also precludes the use of tactical litigation. This would be the case, even if 
Rule 21 were to be removed from the Code. The CA sets out specific regulations in regards to 
complaints, and renders it difficult for any tactical litigation to commence. For instance, 
sections 945, 951, 955, 956 and 961 CA are:  
‘intended to limit litigation by…channeling parties to seek decisions of the Panel 
(including the Panel’s Hearings Committee and the independent Takeover Appeal Board) 
before having recourse to the courts…’770  
This again, encourages parties to a takeover to first approach the Panel. This is designed to 
ensure clear and transparent takeovers, and to safeguard the length of time it takes to 
undertake takeovers (which should be kept to a minimum). If parties to a takeover do consult 
the Panel first, and a decision is made, then there should be no need to pursue complaints as 
litigation. Rule 21’s suppressing effect on litigation does not therefore explain much here; nor 
does the absence of such a rule in the US explain the propensity to litigate.  
 
7.4.4 The Australian Takeover Panel: a Point of Comparison 
It is difficult to quantify the precise impact of the Panel’s presence in the UK, and the lack of 
such a body in the US, on these jurisdictions’ different levels of litigation. We cannot, for 
example, carry out an ‘event study,’ where we measure litigation levels before, and after, the 
creation of the Panel and the Code, and deduce therefrom the impact this creation had.  What 
can be used in support of this explanation however is the impact of the adoption of a Panel 
like body in Australia.  
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The Panel in Australia was originally established in 1991 as a ‘means of enforcing the 
purposes underlying the takeover provisions.’771 In establishing a new system of takeover 
regulation, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (“CLERP”) reforms had four key 
aims. These were to: (i) inject legal and commercial specialist expertise into takeover dispute 
resolution; (ii) provide speed, informality and uniformity in decision-making; (iii) minimise 
tactical litigation; and (iv) free up court resources.
772
 Data does not exist to demonstrate the 
exact effect the Panel in Australia has had on the levels of takeover litigation. However, 
Armson notes that ‘statistics collected to assess the use of the new Panel, raised questions as 
to whether the CLERP reforms had merely resulted in ‘tactical litigation’ under the old 
regime being replaced by multiple applications to the Panel.’773 This therefore suggests there 
has been a reduction in takeover litigation reaching the courts in Australia due to the new 
presence of the Australian Panel, despite the increase in litigation after the introduction of US 
style class actions. 
 
 
7.5 Litigation Culture 
The final explanatory candidate is “litigation culture” which is a term that is sometimes used 
as a label merely to describe (rather than to explain) a high rate of litigation. This is not, 
however, the meaning that is employed for this term in this section. Instead litigation culture 
is defined as the features of a particular culture in the UK or US that might explain the high 
rates of litigation. For example, Kritzer described litigation culture as a set of norms and 
attitudes (including formal legal norms), and established expectations, practices, and informal 
rules of behaviour of judges and attorneys.
774
 One might assume that the explanation for the 
different levels of takeover litigation in the UK and US arises from these differences in 
litigation culture.   
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Whilst it is rather easy to compare the levels of litigation in different jurisdictions and 
conclude that one has a greater level than the other, it is not easy to pin-point what aspects or 
behaviours make up a particular litigation culture, and then demonstrate that those aspects 
actually do have an effect on levels of litigation. What this section will now go on to show is 
that some elements of culture are tied to factors that are plausible explanations, whilst others 
are not. The aspects of takeover litigation culture that are the focus here are the characteristics 
of each system that would seem to provide the most plausible explanation for the UK and 
US’s particular takeover litigation culture. These aspects are acceptability of litigation, 
positive attitude towards litigation and behaviour and litigation etiquette.  
 
7.5.1 Acceptability of Litigation 
Litigation culture can often refer to a public moral acceptability that litigation is a tool that 
can be used to settle problems or disputes. A report commissioned by Norwich Union 
indicates an increase in the UK’s acceptability to litigate. The report found that 96 percent of 
those asked believed that individuals in the UK were more likely to litigate than over a 
decade ago, and 47 percent stated that they themselves would be more likely to litigate today 
as compared to their previous attitude.
775
  
 
Many factors may contribute to an acceptability of litigation which could in turn create a 
litigious culture. For example, Mattei suggests that an increased awareness about the right to 
claim can contribute to a moral acceptability of litigation.
776
 The advertising of law firms 
may also contribute to this awareness and moral acceptability.
777
 Both the UK and US offer a 
fully advertised market for legal services which will certainly have an effect on the 
acceptance and general levels of litigation.
778
 There is also a lack of social stigma when 
commencing litigation in the UK and the US.
779
 This can be contrasted with other 
                                                          
775
 Norwich Union Report, ‘Public attitudes to ’blame and claim’ culture revealed’ (2004); see also Frank 
Furedi, Jennie Bristow, The Social Cost of Litigation, Centre for Policy Studies (2012) 
776
 Ugo Mattei, ‘Access to Justice. A Renewed Global Issue?’ (2007) 11 Electronic Journlal of Comparative law 
1. 10 
777
 Compensation Bill [HL] Bill 155 of 2005-06  Research Paper 06/28 (19 May 2006) 
<http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP06-28/RP06-28.pdf> accessed 13 May 2016 
778
 Mattei (n776) 10 
779
 ibid 8 
222 
 
jurisdictions such as China and Japan.
780
 Mattei found that there was social stigma 
surrounding litigation in these countries; noting that in China (mostly in the countryside) 
where someone suing or being sued is likely to be subject to “humiliation and dishonor” 
affecting the whole family, clan, and even in laws.
781
 Considering these particular factors the 
UK and US do display similar acceptability towards litigation. This acceptability of litigation 
is however perhaps rather vague, as what is acceptable may entirely depend upon the very 
specific litigation that is being undertaken. For example, it may be much more acceptable to 
sue a stranger for a personal injury suffered in a car crash than it is to sue an employer for a 
work related injury. The acceptance of takeover litigation may therefore be entirely different 
from the public’s overall attitude towards litigation. 
 
Whilst there has been an increase in acceptability of litigation in the UK, and correspondingly 
an increase in levels of litigation generally, there has not been a similar effect on the culture 
of takeover litigation in the UK. This can be demonstrated by the lack of a comparative 
increase in takeover litigation in the UK when compared to the public’s increase in 
acceptability of litigation in general.
782
 The data in chapter four shows that takeover litigation 
rarely occurs, and has remained at a steady rate for a number of decades. It is a little more 
difficult to decipher whether acceptability of litigation in the US has had any effect on their 
specific takeover litigation culture, and therefore the greater levels of takeover litigation. 
Mattei however, noted that these data recording of the US “explosion” in litigation 
demonstrates that there has only been a rough increase of 15 percent in the litigation rates 
from 1993 to 2001
783
. By contrast, Cain and Davidoff Solomon reported an increase in 
takeover litigation of 55.9 percent from 2005 to 2014.
784
 These data show that there has been 
a higher increase in the levels of takeover litigation than general litigation in the US.
785
 As 
such the increase in takeover litigation may not be attributable to the same factors that have 
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led to this general increase, and may be due to other more significant causes. However, there 
may be a greater acceptance of takeover litigation in the US because it occurs in 95 percent of 
transactions.
786
 Statistics gathered by Fisch et al also show that multiple teams of plaintiffs 
file lawsuits ‘challenging virtually every public company merger,’ and often in multiple 
jurisdictions.
787
  
 
In the US, litigation may be expected as part and parcel of the takeover process. This 
acceptance could, of course only be a side effect of the scale in which takeover litigation 
occurs in the US. Whether the acceptability to litigate added to the litigation culture before, 
during or after the high levels of litigation in takeovers were recorded in the US would be 
difficult to conclusively show. What may be implied is that litigation commenced during a 
takeover in the US is now an accepted practice and almost certainly part of the US takeover 
litigation culture. By contrast in the UK, takeover litigation does not seem to be an accepted 
part of the process because it rarely occurs. It is, however, extremely difficult to prove that 
the litigation does or does not occur because it is accepted, as attitudes of acceptability may 
have arisen due to other factors.  
 
7.5.2 Positive Attitude towards Litigation 
If a claim is relatively easy to bring and garners results then it could be assumed that the 
attitude towards bringing litigation would be positive. There are a number of factors which 
can make pursuing a claim easier. For example, the method in which a claim is brought can 
have a significant impact upon the ease of pursuing a claim. In the US, shareholders have 
class actions available to them, a form of action which is easier to commence than a 
derivative claim. If the form in which a claim can be brought is easier for shareholders to 
navigate in the US than in the UK, then litigation is more likely to be accessible to those 
shareholders. Another factor which increases the ease in which a claim is brought is access to 
lawyers and judges. In the study completed by Ramseyer and Rasmusen it was found that the 
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US has 10.81 judges and 391 lawyers to every 100,000, whilst the UK has only 2.22 judges 
and 251 lawyers per 100,000 people.
788
  
 
The US does have more judges per capita, and also more, but not many more, lawyers per 
capita than the UK.
789
 It is true that parties to a takeover in the UK will most likely have 
access to lawyers, however what they may not have access to is the courts. There are two 
reasons for this, firstly the courts in the UK are very reluctant to hear a case whilst a takeover 
is occurring, and secondly because the no frustration principle limits a target company’s 
ability to bring litigation during a takeover. Target shareholders and bidders in the UK are 
however only affected by the first limitation. Their access to the courts would not be limited 
by the no frustration principle.  
 
Takeover litigation also generally garners better results for those in the US than in the UK. 
Cain and Davidoff Solomon found that over 70 percent of the cases recorded in their US data 
settled. Whilst the vast majority of settlements result in additional disclosures,
790
 the act of 
litigating is arguably used more as a tactical manoeuvre and may therefore result in benefits 
not directly linked to the settlement of the claim, such as an increased offer or a change to the 
terms of the deal.  In contrast, 73 percent of takeover litigation is unsuccessful in the UK.
791
 
As such there may be more of a negative attitude towards bringing litigation in the UK. If 
there is a positive attitude towards bringing takeover litigation in the US, this may have been 
determined by the structural components of the US system, and therefore these components 
would be the likely explanation for the increased levels of litigation, rather than culture 
specifically.  
 
7.5.3 Behaviour and Takeover Etiquette  
The presence of the Panel in the UK has created a certain way of behaving during the course 
of a takeover, and as such has created a unique “takeover etiquette” in the UK. The historical 
                                                          
788
 Ramseyer, Rasmusen (n657) see Table 1 
789
 ibid 
790
 Daines, Koumrian (n526) (They found that over 50% of the settlements they recorded were disclosure only);  
791
 See chapter four section 5.1.4 
225 
 
development of the Code and the Panel explains the development of this culture.
792
 This is 
because UK institutional investors pre-empted public regulation by taking charge of the 
development and enforcement of the Code.
793
 Armour and Skeel note that the enforcement of 
soft law rules developed in the Code was feasible in the UK, because of the specific 
environment where parties interacted repeatedly within the square mile of London.
794
 ‘As 
repeat players, the institutions were able to agree on a mode of takeover regulation that was 
much cheaper than litigation, and to threaten reputational sanctions, like exclusion from the 
market, against those who refused to comply with the Code or Panel rulings.’795 This created 
an environment where those involved in takeovers generally behaved “well.” This was 
because the same people dealt with each other on a regular basis, and the fear of sanctions 
from those same peers reinforced the good behaviour. The Panel’s presence strengthens the 
traditional culture of compliance by providing an alternative to litigation, using their rulings 
based system, and by severely sanctioning those who do not follow the rules. Consequently a 
takeover litigation culture has not been able to develop in the UK. 
 
Such an environment is less evident in the US. In the absence of the Panel, and the 
(generally) good behaviour created by the square mile, the US has had to rely on the courts 
for a solution to complaints. Yates et al reason that ‘the differences in the elemental structure 
of the judicial system, or system in which complaints are handled, affect the degree to which 
the legal system is invoked for redress.’796 This is true of the different systems in the UK and 
US, as the different ways in which takeover complaints can be handled has ultimately 
impacted upon how often the courts are called upon to settle disputes. Furthermore Jacobi, 
claims that the more capable the judges are of providing forms of redress, the more effective 
threats of litigation become, which in turn increases the extent to which litigation can be used 
as a strategy, even when it is not ultimately pursued.
797
 Delaware courts are extremely 
experienced in corporate law and are well equipped to handle takeover cases and provide 
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forms of redress to parties. By contrast, the courts in the UK prefer to let the Panel handle 
such disputes due to their own particular expertise and power.  
 
The US is not, contrary to perception, inherently drawn to commencing litigation but guided 
towards it as a means by which to solve disputes because it is allowed, easily commenced and 
because it garners results. This could contribute to an explanation as to why the US has a 
propensity to litigate during takeovers. The presence of the Panel in the UK, and the special 
proximity in which it operates in London have entrenched a certain compliance culture that 
may also explain why there is a lack of a propensity to litigate in the UK. However as Siems 
notes: 
 ‘[O]ne has to be careful about making too confident an assumption about the 
relationship between litigation rates and legal cultures. It is also important to note that 
cultural and structural determinants for litigation are mutually interdependent: on the one 
hand, structures may be a reflection of cultural values, but, on the other hand, cultures can 
also change, which may, in part, be determined by structural decisions.’798 
 
Cultural factors that some assume affect the disparity in the levels of litigation between the 
UK and US, such as the US being more prone to litigation due to an aggressive nature, or 
having more lawyers, do not seem to provide a plausible explanation here. An explanation in 
terms of such attitudes must hold that target shareholders in the US have this attitude, but 
target shareholders in the UK do not. But given the globalisation of share ownership, the 
target shareholders in a US takeover will often include British institutions, and in a UK 
takeover will include US institutions.  If the US experiences more litigation because US 
shareholders are culturally disposed to sue, then those same US shareholders would display a 
similar cultural disposition to litigate in respect of their UK investments. UK investors in US 
companies would therefore be as likely as their fellow US investors to litigate in the US, 
when the US companies in which they have invested becomes a takeover target. What this 
suggests is that something other than a national stereotype about “attitudes” to suing explains 
what’s going on.   
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There is however some truth in the cultural explanation. The existence of the Code in the UK, 
and its creation of an alternative means of disciplining target directors, and of a climate in 
which allegations of misbehaviour by target directors are expected to be settled through the 
Code/Panel, are essential elements of the specifically-takeover related culture in the UK. 
Other elements such as the acceptability of takeover litigation in the US takeover process 
may be a factor in explaining the disparity, but it would be difficult to conclusively conclude 
that levels of litigation increased because commencing takeover litigation is an accepted 
practice, or that it became an accepted practice due to the increase in litigation. US parties to 
a takeover may also have a more positive attitude towards commencing takeover litigation 
because they have more access to the courts and are more likely to be successful.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered four candidates to explain the takeover litigation landscapes of 
the UK and the US, and especially to explain the key difference between those landscapes.  
That difference is the significant spike in US litigation, where target shareholders routinely 
sue target directors, a spike quite absent from the UK. It has been argued that none of the four 
candidates alone causes this difference; rather that each contributes to it.  If the ingredients 
which constitute any one of the four candidates ceased to exist, the differences between the 
UK and the US would likely be reduced, but would not wholly disappear. 
 
The first explanation focused on differences in the causes of action enjoyed by US and UK 
shareholders. We found some truth in this, partly because target directors are under more 
extensive obligations (and especially disclosure obligations) than UK directors are, but also, 
and much more significantly, because of differences in the identity of the party to whom 
these obligations are owed.  The US treats such obligations as owed both to the company, and 
directly to shareholders. The UK generally treats such obligations as owed only to the 
company.  In consequence, US shareholders enjoy extensive rights to bring personal claims 
against directors; UK shareholders only have such rights in much rarer, exceptional, cases.   
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These differences, in the underlying causes of action, are then compounded and reinforced by 
differences in the forms of action between the two jurisdictions, which is the second 
explanatory candidate.  As the UK causes of action are enjoyed by the company, not by 
shareholders personally, litigation in the UK must be brought by the company itself, or by 
shareholders suing derivatively, on its behalf.  If derivative proceedings in the UK were easy 
to bring and sure to succeed, and if they delivered tangible benefits into the pockets of 
shareholders taking on the burden of suing, then the significance of differences in the causes 
of action would be mitigated, and the flow of UK cases would likely be much greater. As we 
saw, however, none of that is true for derivative proceedings in the UK.  Similarly, if the 
forms of action in the US for enforcing personal claims were more hazardous, and offered 
less incentive to sue, then we would likely see far less US litigation, notwithstanding its 
readiness to create a personal cause of action in respect of directorial disclosure obligations.  
This is not how things are, thanks largely to the US class action, and especially to the fee 
orders which underpin that action.    
 
The availability of the class action encourages many more shareholders to bring personal 
actions; but that number would likely still be more modest than in fact it is, if it were not for 
the tendency of lawyers themselves to encourage personal claimants to launch and continue 
more claims. The personal action gives the kindling; the class action encourages more 
shareholders to strike the match; and the lawyers pour the petrol on the flames for reasons of 
self-interest.  Finally, the US class action is far more productive of litigation than either of the 
UK’s semi-equivalent collective action procedures. So, even where UK shareholders do, 
exceptionally, enjoy a personal cause of action, such as for breach of s.90 FSMA, they must 
pursue this by forms of (collective) action, the GLO or the representative action, that are 
significantly less attractive, either for shareholders or their lawyers.   
 
The presence of the Panel and Code additionally has an effect on the UK’s propensity to 
litigate. The presence of the Panel and the Code in the UK both disincentivises and precludes 
takeover litigation due to a number of reasons: the Panel plays a significant role in solving 
disputes, and as such provides an efficient alternative to litigation; the Code manages the 
behaviour of the directors and the respect given to the Panel by the courts means that judges 
are extremely hesitant to play a role in the regulation of takeovers. The absence of such a 
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body as the Panel in the US may also explain why parties to a takeover have to rely heavily 
on the courts for any resolution of complaints made.  
 
The existence of the Code in the UK, and its creation of an alternative means of disciplining 
target directors, and of a climate in which allegations of misbehaviour by target directors are 
expected to be settled through the Code/Panel, are essential elements of the specifically-
takeover related culture in the UK. Other elements such as the acceptability of takeover 
litigation in the US takeover process may be a factor in explaining the disparity. However 
these cultures have been determined by the structural components of the US and UK system, 
and therefore these components would be the likely explanation for the increased levels of 
litigation rather than culture specifically. 
 
Having completed our description, and our explanation, of the UK and US litigation 
landscapes, we can now address our final question: so what?  What consequences flow from 
these differences, and why should anyone be concerned about them?  It is to these matters, to 
the evaluation of the differences in the two landscapes, which our next chapter will turn.   
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Chapter Eight 
Impacts of the Propensity to Litigate 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In chapter seven, the differences in the takeover litigation landscapes of the UK and US were 
explained. This chapter will now turn from explanation to evaluation. In other words, this 
chapter seeks to evaluate the impacts of these differences on the takeover process in each 
jurisdiction. There are, of course, many impacts that litigation may have, and it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to evaluate them all. As such this chapter will limit the impacts discussed 
to those which significantly affect what generally is sought from the takeover process (i.e. to 
be quick, not unduly costly, and of benefit to shareholders and society in terms of an effective 
corporate governance mechanism via the market for corporate control (“MCC”)). These three 
areas of impact are the most significant and also the most easily identifiable. It is therefore 
more worthwhile to concentrate a more detailed evaluation of just these, rather than seeking 
to extend the assessment beyond what can realistically be achieved within a single chapter.  
 
Section 8.2 will thus evaluate the impact of the different propensities to litigate on the speed 
in which a takeover can be completed. The abundance of litigation that takes place during a 
takeover in the US does inevitably have an impact upon the average length of a takeover.  
Ideally the takeover process is completed quickly in order to prevent occurrences of the 
tactical use of time, and to avoid disruption to the market. This is the reasoning behind strict 
completion timetables for takeovers that have been imposed by regulators.  
 
Section 8.3 will evaluate the impact of different propensities to litigate on the costs of 
takeovers, focusing principally on the costs of the Panel and US attorney fees. Due to the 
average attorney fee costs that arise in almost all takeovers in the US, the cost of solving 
disputes via litigation is far more costly than the Panel system in the UK. In the US almost 
every takeover is subject to a claim, and every claim that is settled requires the payment of 
attorney fees.  
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Section 8.4 will evaluate whether litigation, (which will be established does have negative 
impacts to time and cost), provides any benefits for target shareholder in the US. Particularly 
when compared to the UK regime, which substitutes the Panel for litigation. Whilst the 
settlements that are achieved from litigation in the US are not economically beneficial to 
shareholders, they do provide additional disclosures. These disclosures, whilst not having 
much effect on the shareholder vote, do ensure that the shareholder is fully informed. 
Litigation is also argued to play a significant role in corporate governance, as it is a 
mechanism that is used to enforce and protect shareholders rights. Finally, section 8.5, will 
consider the impact the different propensities to litigate have on the MCC itself. If the MCC, 
is seen as beneficial then it should not be inhibited. The propensity to litigate in the US can 
however have constraining effects on the MCC, as will be shown.  
 
8.2 Impact on Takeover Speed 
Ensuring the speedy completion of takeovers is generally agreed to be highly desirable. This 
point will be returned to in section 8.2.3, to spell out the advantages of a speedy process.  
First, 8.2.1 shows both how, in the UK, the Code and the Panel together place great emphasis 
on adherence to an accelerated timetable for takeovers, and how litigation is not allowed to, 
and does not, disrupt this timetable. The process in the US will be examined in 8.2.2 and 
finds that litigation there does indeed introduce considerable delays into the takeover process.    
 
8.2.1 Speed of Takeovers in UK 
As discussed in chapter three, the Code establishes a ‘fairly rigid timetable for the entirety of 
the bid.’799 Without the consent of the Panel, an offer cannot remain open longer than 60 
days, if the offer is not unconditional as to acceptances.
800
 Completion of takeovers in the UK 
will be no shorter than 74 days, which is the earliest date at which an offer can close; and no 
longer than 81 days, when all conditions to the offer must be satisfied.
801
 Consequently, when 
an announcement of an offer is made “the clock starts ticking.”802 When approaching a target 
company, the Code makes it clear that a bidder must not be ‘hindered in the conduct of their 
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affairs for longer than is reasonable.’803 This includes the commencement of litigation, by the 
target company, which would have the effect of frustrating a bid.
804
 Moreover, the reluctance 
of the Panel to allow any litigation during a bid demonstrates the significance they place on 
the ability of takeovers to occur swiftly.
805
 This is also reflected in the court’s decision to take 
an “historical approach” to takeover litigation.806 There is however, very little takeover 
litigation in the UK, for these and other reasons as discussed in chapter seven. This means 
that the timetable set for takeover completion is not subject to delays caused by litigation. 
Any increase in the levels of litigation would therefore severely impact upon this short 
timetable.  
 
Although there is little litigation, there are still complaints made to the Panel during takeover 
bids. As such, decisions are frequently made by the Panel, a process which could have the 
potential to delay the timetable as much as litigation could. The essential characteristics of 
the Panel’s system of flexibility, certainty and speed, nonetheless means that parties to a 
takeover are ‘informed of where they stand under the Code by the Panel in a timely 
fashion.’807 The Panel therefore relies on its ability to make decisions informally in order to 
function efficiently.
808
 Armson, who undertook a study evaluating the workings of the Panel, 
noted that ‘as a general rule, [the Panel’s] decisions are relayed over the telephone, either 
immediately or within 24 hours’809 This is not something a court could reasonably be able to 
achieve for these types of matters. The informality of the Panel and their ability to respond 
immediately to complaints allows for bids to move quickly, despite the fact that disputes 
between parties require resolving. Litigation could not be concluded as quickly.  
 
More formal written rulings by the Panel’s Executive cannot be completed as quickly as the 
more informal decisions (i.e. via the telephone); however the occasions when they are needed 
are “very rare.”810 The Panel reduces the need for formal decision making by allowing 
                                                          
803
 Code General Principle 6  
804
 Code Rule 21  
805
 See chapter seven section 4.4; see also Mukwiri (n2)  
806
 Datafin (n268); See chapter seven section 4.2; see also Mukwiri (n2) 
807
 The Takeover Panel Report on the Year Ended 31 March 2002 <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/report2002.pdf> accessed 10 July 2016    
808
 See Emma Armson, ‘Models for Takeover Dispute Resolution : Australia and the UK’ (2005) 5 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 401. 
809
 ibid 421 (Advice from Noel Hinton, Deputy Director General, UK Panel Executive (27 April 2005)) 
810
 ibid 
233 
 
consultations with the Executive, which can ‘give rulings and interpretations before, during 
and, where appropriate, after takeovers.’811 Because the Panel recognises that the decisions it 
makes are time sensitive, and in order to adhere to the Code’s timetable, it also promptly 
answers enquires about the ‘possible effects of the Code’ on pending takeovers.812 As 
previously discussed in chapter seven, providing guidance is an important part of the 
Executive’s role, and as such, the Panel ‘encourages and in some cases requires early 
consultation so that problems can be avoided.’813 Again, this is not something that can be 
easily offered by the courts, and even if they were able to do so, they may feel that the Panel 
has greater expertise to deal with such guidance.
814
  
 
The Executive can also refer disciplinary matters to the Panel’s Hearing Committee, which 
can “be convened at short notice.”815 This is, however, comparatively rare and most of the 
matters considered by the Committee are appeals from Executive decisions.
816
 The Panel 
places great emphasis on its ability to make decisions quickly in order to avoid delays to the 
takeover process in the UK, and has ‘long been accustomed to delivering decisions 
quickly’817 and eliminating complaints which have no substance.818 Its function and speed is 
not something which could be easily emulated by the courts if appeals to decisions were to be 
made.  
 
 
8.2.2 Speed of Takeovers in US 
The Williams Act in the US does not provide for a time limit for takeover bids.
819
 The tables 
below illustrate the average timetable for both a single step-transaction and two-step takeover 
via a tender offer, which on average take 91 and 109 days to complete respectively. 
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Table 8.1 
Single-Step Transaction 
  
Day(s) Activity 
1 Announcement 
2 to 15 Prepare proxy statement (Target with the Bidder's input) 
16 File preliminary proxy materials with SEC 
26 to 50 Receive and resolve SEC comments 
55 Print and mail proxy materials 
90 Target shareholders' meeting to vote on merger 
91 Complete merger (provided requisite vote is obtained) 
  Bidder now controls and owns 100% of Target 
*Materials taken from ‘A Guide to Takeovers in the United States’, Clifford Chance Guide (2010) 
Table 8.2 
Two-Step Transaction 
Day(s) Activity 
1 Announcement 
2 to 15 Prepare Offer to Purchase and Schedule 14D-9 (Target) 
15 Commence tender offer; file definitive tender offer materials with 
SEC; mail materials to Target Shareholders 
15 to 43 Address any comments provided by SEC staff 
43 Close tender offer (if minimum tender offer and other conditions 
satisfied) 
  Bidder now controls Target 
47 If Bidder now owns at least 90% of Target's outstanding shares - file 
short-form merger certificate 
  Bidder now owns 100% of Target 
47 to 77 If Bidder owns less than 90% of Target's outstanding shares - prepare 
and file proxy materials with SEC relating to "squeeze-out" merger 
88 Mail proxy materials 
108 Target shareholder meeting to vote on 'squeeze out' merger 
109 Complete merger 
  Bidder now owns 100% of Target 
*Materials taken from ‘A Guide to Takeovers in the United States’, Clifford Chance Guide (2010) 
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Unlike the dispute regime constructed by the Panel in the UK which causes little delay to the 
takeover process, litigation in the US has been shown to cause significant disruptions to the 
time it takes for bids to complete. This disruption is found in almost all US takeovers.
820
 One 
of the main causes of these delays is the amount of time it takes the court to approve 
settlements.
821
 
 Days to completion 
Offers not litigated 93.74 
Offers litigated 148.95 
Large deals not litigated 114.01 
Large deals litigated 146.29 
*data taken from Krishnan et al 
 
Krishnan et al’s findings confirmed that litigation tends to delay the completion of deals that 
are eventually successful, compared to offers that are not litigated.
822
 The average time to 
reach completion, which they defined as the time between the announcement and deal 
completion dates, was 99.6 days. In all offers not litigated it was 93.74 days as compared to 
offers which were litigated that took 148.95 days to complete.
823
 In large deals not litigated it 
took 114.01 days for completion compared to 146.29 days in large deals litigated.
824
 That is a 
difference of 55.21 days to completion in all offers and 32.28 days in larger deals between 
litigated and non-litigated takeovers. They noted that offers that involve litigation ‘entail a 
significantly longer time to completion than offers that do not.’825  
 
To summarise: deals that are litigated in the US took on average 88.5 more days to complete 
than the maximum regulated time for a takeover in the UK, which is 60 days from the 
announcement to acceptance.
826
 Thus, it is clear that the process of takeovers is slower in the 
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US than in the UK, and it also seems plausible to conclude that the greater propensity to 
litigate in the US is a significant cause of this difference.     
 
8.2.3 The Significance of the Speed of Takeovers  
Why does the speed of takeovers matter?  Why choose to focus on this impact?  A faster 
takeover process is beneficial for target companies as it will shorten the period of disruption 
that the company will face. As Kershaw explains, if a ‘bid lingers on threatening a possible 
change of control…this [can] clearly distract management from running the company.’827 
Consequently, day-to-day management of the target company will be negatively impacted by 
a drawn out takeover attempt; and the more drawn out the takeover process the more impact 
this disruption will cause. Kershaw however, considers whether the minimum offer time 
period in the UK is too short for target boards to carry out market checks in order to assess an 
accurate pricing of the company’s shares.828 A shorter time period might also hinder a target 
boards’ ability to ‘identify alternative bidders and encourage them to place their own offer for 
the target company.’829 The extended timetable created by litigation in the US could be more 
beneficial to this practice; however an extension of the UK timetable can be obtained from 
the Panel. The bottom line however, is that the quicker the takeover, the faster the target 
company can return to focusing on day-to-day management of the company and progress its 
own commercial strategy.  
 
A faster takeover process is also beneficial for the bidding company as it is less likely to be 
deterred from pursuing the bid to completion. Bidders may be more inclined to give up on the 
bid if too much time has elapsed. Target companies may therefore take advantage of their 
ability to slow down a bid using litigation in order to defend against a bid. This point may 
however be moot in the UK as target companies are prohibited from taking this kind of action 
without the permission of their shareholders,
830
 and US target companies have more efficient 
                                                          
827
 Kershaw (n127) 265 
828
 ibid 262 
829
 ibid 
830
 See Code Rule 21 
237 
 
means of defending against a bid.
831
 However, US target shareholder litigation will still draw 
out the process and may affect the bidder’s ability to complete the bid. Furthermore, the same 
problems that afflict target boards from lengthy takeovers are also faced by bidding 
companies; takeovers are disruptive and distract from the day-to-day running of the company.  
 
Faster takeovers are also good for target shareholders, as a lengthy takeover process could 
affect their ability to assess the offer. This is due to the uncertainty that takeovers can create 
in the assessment of market prices. Nevertheless, the process of a takeover should not be so 
fast that it has an effect on the shareholders ability to make a decision. Although an 
unhindered takeover process is preferred shareholders will still need a reasonable time in 
which to assess the bid. Kershaw notes that ‘when shareholders are presented with an offer, 
any assessment of valuation is necessarily something of an art and not a precise science.’832 
Kershaw notes that there are some investors who do not have the expertise to properly 
conduct an assessment of an offer quickly and ‘may instead sell in to the market place using 
the market as a mechanism as a free provider for deal advice.’833 However, as Kershaw also 
notes, the average investor in the UK and US generally ‘tend[s] to be sophisticated and have 
easy access to expertise to make an informed decision.’834 He observes that ‘sophisticated 
institutions require little time and have no need for regulatory minimum provisions.’835 Even 
though takeovers in the UK are completed to a strict timetable there is enough time for the 
shareholders to make an “informed decision.”836 
 
Target shareholders however also need time to obtain the best deal, as target boards will 
require time ‘to engineer a competitive bid process for the company, or to persuade their 
shareholders to say no.’837 Again, the US system, in which takeovers take longer to complete, 
may allow for this process to happen. US target shareholder litigation does not often change 
the terms of the deal or result in greater premiums.  Provisions in the Code, however do allow 
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for competitive bids to occur and again an extension of the timetable can be sought from the 
Panel. US target shareholder litigation, however, does produce greater disclosures from the 
target company. If the slower US process generates more disclosures, shareholders have 
access to better information than that which can be disclosed in a slower process. The better 
informed shareholder is better than a less informed shareholder. The delays in speed caused 
by litigation might therefore be a price worth paying for a better informed shareholder.  
However the UK generates, through the Code, comparable information to that which is 
generated through disclosure focused litigation in the US, and does so (in the UK) much 
faster and with little disruption to the takeover process.
838
 
 
A faster takeover process is better for the market generally. This is because the market can 
become un-stabilised due to the uncertainty a takeover can create. The share price of the 
companies involved in a takeover can become warped by rumours of the transaction. The 
‘target company should not therefore be subject to an offer, or speculation regarding an offer, 
for an excessive period of time.’839 This also has an effect on the ability of the target 
company, target shareholders and bidding company to assess the bid correctly.  
 
The faster the takeover can progress the more the process promotes an efficient market price 
through the availability of prompt and accurate information. This is because investors will be 
provided with the information they need from the target board quickly, in order to assess the 
value of the shares of the target company; rather than the information not being available 
because the target company is focused on litigation. Timely disclosures will enable both the 
board and the shareholders to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase the 
offered securities or whether the target shareholder should sell. This contributes to an 
efficient capital market, which means that at any given time prices within a market fully 
reflect available information.
840
 Gullifer and Payne note that ‘accurate information is 
necessary to ensure that money moves to those who can use it most effectively and that 
investors make optimal choices about their investment decisions.’841 Both the bidding 
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company and target shareholders are investors and need to be well informed with up to date 
information. 
 
A takeover which is unnecessarily drawn out can obviously affect the certainty of 
information. Without ‘adequate information investors will not be able to distinguish bad 
investments from the good.’842 A false market could therefore be created. In the US, this is 
more likely to be a problem due to the delays litigation can cause to the takeover process. The 
Code however recognises this issue, and is the basis for the speedy timetable.
843
  
 
8.3 Impact on Costs of Takeovers 
As well as ensuring the speedy completion of takeovers, it is the (popular) consensus that 
takeovers should not be unduly costly.
844
 The propensity to litigate will inevitably affect the 
level of costs involved in completing a takeover. Why exactly costs matter will be discussed 
in 8.3.4. Prior to this, 8.3.1 demonstrates that the litigation costs of the UK system are 
relatively negligible and do not therefore increase the overall costs of UK takeovers. This is 
the case even when comparing operational costs of the Panel. Section 8.3.2 demonstrates that 
in comparison to the UK the cost of litigation in the US does impact upon the overall level of 
takeover costs. The aggregate distribution of costs will also be compared in 8.3.3 in order to 
show that, not only are the levels of costs different, but that they also impact different 
takeover participants.  
 
8.3.1 UK Costs 
As noted above, the costs of takeover litigation in the UK are almost negligible, given how 
little occurs. In light of the finding (in chapter seven), that the existence and operation of the 
Panel is one of the reasons for the absence of UK litigation, the costs which the Panel regime 
generates need to be compared to the litigation costs in the US. In assessing these (UK) costs, 
they will be broken down into two groups. The first concerns the fees which companies must 
pay to the Panel in order to enjoy the benefit of the Panel’s oversight of takeovers.  The Panel 
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derives its funding from three principal sources of income: document charges, a PTM Levy 
and Exempt/recognised intermediary status charges, and these are examined in 8.3.1.1- 
8.3.1.3 below.
845
 The second group of UK costs concerns the fees UK companies pay their 
own lawyers; companies will still need lawyers to advise them on, and deal with, Code 
complaints, even if they are not paying lawyers to litigate.  
 
8.3.1.1 Panel Document Charges 
Charges are payable on offer documents valued at £1 million or more.
846
 The amount of the 
charge will depend upon the value of the offer according to the scale set out below.
847
 
Figure 8.1 
Value of the offer 
£ million 
Charge 
£ 
Charge as a 
maximum % 
of the value of the 
offer 
1 to 5 2,000 0.20% 
Over 5 to 10 8,500 0.17% 
Over 10 to 25 14,000 0.14% 
Over 25 to 50 27,500 0.11% 
Over 50 to 100 50,000 0.10% 
Over 100 to 250 75,000 0.075% 
Over 250 to 500 100,000 0.04% 
Over 500 to 1,000 125,000 0.025% 
Over 1,000 to 2,500 175,000 0.0175% 
Over 2,500 to 5,000 250,000 0.01% 
Over 5,000 350,000 0.007% 
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8.3.1.2 Panel PTM Levy 
The Panel also derives a large part of its income from a charge on ‘certain trades in the 
securities of companies whose shareholders benefit from the protections afforded by the 
Code’ (this is called the “PTM Levy”).848 The current levy rate is one pound per contract 
‘where the total consideration of the relevant trade is greater than £10,000 (or the equivalent 
in any other currency).’849 The PTM Levy is payable on trades in, equity share capital, 
whether voting or non-voting.
850
 The PTM Levy is not however payable on trades in covered 
warrants; debentures and other debt securities; preference shares; Permanent Interest Bearing 
Securities; contracts for differences and total return swaps; spread bets; or option contracts.
851
 
The PTM Levy is also not payable on trades in securities of open-ended investment 
companies, including exchange traded funds.
852
 The Panel’s website clarifies that the PTM 
Levy is payable on both the purchase and sale of securities, and is payable by the purchaser 
or seller.
853
 An intermediary will collect the Levy, who is usually a member of a regulated 
market or a multilateral trading facility that requires its members to collect the PTM Levy.
854
  
 
8.3.1.3 Panel Exempt Status Charges 
Certain organisations are, however, exempt from paying these charges, but they are still 
required to pay an exemption charge. An exempt status can be obtained by fund managers 
and market makers if they can ‘demonstrate to the Panel’s satisfaction their independence 
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from corporate advisory and corporate broking operations.’855 The Panel explains that the 
purpose of granting exempt status is to: 
‘remove them from the presumption of concertedness which would otherwise apply 
and to enable the relevant group’s normal trading and fund management activities to 
continue without Code consequences for the group’s corporate finance clients, and 
without the Code being breached, when they are involved in offers.’856 
 
A payment of £6,000 per exempt entity is required to be paid to the Panel for taking 
advantage of an exempt status.
857
 This is because of the cost that is borne by the Panel in 
granting and maintaining exempt statuses.
858
  
 
8.3.1.4 Costs Relating to Panel Complaints and Breaches of the Code 
Lawyers’ fees for dealing with Panel complaints are small. This was confirmed by the 
lawyers who took part in the interviews for this research. One lawyer explained, ‘in general, 
for most deals the costs of dealing with the Panel would be very low. There are occasional 
cases, particularly in hostile or competitive bids where the time and cost can be more 
significant but these tend to be the exception.’859 As such, there does not seem to be large 
fees that companies in the UK must pay to lawyers’ for advice on how to navigate Panel 
complaints. The cost is therefore primarily made up of charges that are paid towards the 
running of the Panel.  
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8.3.2 Costs of US Litigation 
It is ordinarily the rule in the US that parties involved in litigation cover their own costs.
860
 In 
shareholder litigation, however, there is a long-recognised exception to this rule.
861
 The 
exception is based on the principle that if a “corporate benefit” can be shown then the 
claimant shareholders will have their litigation costs paid by the defendant company.
862
 A 
corporate benefit is determined by the courts by assessing whether the settlement that has 
been reached by the parties confers a benefit to the shareholders.
863
 How this is assessed was 
discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter.
864
 Courts do, however, generally conclude 
that settlements confer a benefit to shareholders, even if the settlement is ‘disclosure only.’ 
Consequently the cost of litigation in the US is generally borne by defendant target 
companies.  
 
Cain and Davidoff Solomon found that 71.6 percent of takeover litigation in the US resulted 
in some kind of settlement.
865
 Of these settlements they found that 55.1 percent settled for 
additional disclosures.
866
 They recorded that the average attorneys’ fees from these disclosure 
only settlements was $749,000 from the period of 2005 to 2011; and that they were 
‘considerably lower than other settlement types.’867 Fisch et al have however reported that the 
average requested fee award for these settlements has been declining over the past several 
years, from an average of $730,000 in 2009 to an average of $540,000 in 2012.
868
 New 
studies also show that the average fee awarded in disclosure only settlements was 
approximately $361,000 in 2015.
869
 Despite this in 55 percent of the litigation undertaken by 
target shareholders where only additional disclosures were released, the target company 
would have paid an average of nearly half a million dollars for the shareholders’ lawyers’ 
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fees over the past decade. In approximately 20 percent of the litigation, the fees would have 
been considerably higher in order to take into consideration the greater “corporate benefit” 
given to shareholders in more favourable settlements. The cost of takeover litigation in the 
US therefore has a significant impact upon target companies.  
 
8.3.3 Distribution of Litigation Costs in UK and US 
It is clear that the US system is far more costly when comparing the aggregate costs of the 
UK system (in which complaints are solved using the Panel) and that of the US system 
(which uses the courts to settle litigation). The charges which are required to be paid to the 
Panel for offer documents and lawyers advice on navigating the Panel’s complaints system, is 
considerably less than the average attorney fee for a disclosure award in the US. The average 
attorney fee award costs nearly four times more than the cost of complying with the Panel 
fees in the UK.
870
 For example, £75,000 is the document charge that is to be paid to the Panel 
when a formal offer has been made for a transaction valued at £100 million, which is 0.075 
percent of its value. In the US $361,000 was the average attorney fee award for a disclosure 
settlement in 2015.
871
 This equates to 0.36 percent of the value (when taken at the lower 
value limit of the takeovers collated by Cain and Davidoff Solomon at $100 million). The 
highest Panel charge in the UK is £350,000 for a transaction valued over £5,000 million, 
which equates to 0.007 percent of the value. Lawyers’ fees for dealing with Panel complaints 
are also low and not comparable to US attorney fees. Not only are the Panel charges less 
expensive than incurring litigation costs, they are also fixed, which brings certainty to the 
cost of each transaction.  
 
The distribution of the costs in the UK and US system are also different. The UK system is 
more of a generally shared burden, with fewer of the costs being borne specifically by those 
involved in takeovers, or even by those raising complaints (i.e. the equivalent of ‘litigating 
before the Panel’).  As such, in the UK, most of the costs of running the system are shared out 
amongst all companies, and little of them are borne specifically by litigating takeover 
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participants. In US they are borne initially by the target company, and perhaps eventually by 
the target shareholders. 
 
Cox and Thomas argue that the cost of litigation is not just borne by the target company, but 
also by target shareholders.
872
 Their argument is based on the circulatory theory, which states 
that when litigation costs are paid by the target company it will be at the expense of those 
shareholders who continue to hold shares in that company after the litigation has settled.
873
 
This also greatly affects shareholders who have diversified investment portfolios.
874
 The 
payment of both the target shareholders and target company’s litigation fees will lead to an 
overall net loss to the target shareholders.
875
 They observed, as such, there is a general 
negative perception of securities class actions in the US.
876
 Litigation consequently, ‘yield[s] 
small, if any, real gains to investors with the true economic benefits going to the class’ 
counsel.’877 
 
As the cost of shareholder litigation is shouldered by the target company, this type of 
litigation does not increase the total cost of the takeover for the bidder (in a small number of 
cases, however, the litigation may have the effect of increasing the premium offered). The 
bidder is therefore not at risk of being burdened with these costs, and won’t therefore be 
deterred from making an offer and completing the bid on this basis.
878
 As almost every 
takeover is subject to litigation in the US, and every claim that is settled requires the payment 
of attorney fees, Haims and Beha consider that the payment of these fees have ‘essentially 
become a tax on significant mergers and acquisitions.’879 Consequently, the distribution of 
costs may not have a significant effect on the takeover process if it is expected and budgeted 
for by the target company (and target shareholders) as something that they will have to pay. 
The distribution of costs in the UK however is preferable as lower costs are distributed 
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equally among all companies who benefit from the Panel’s successful regulation of the 
takeover process and expertise if, and when, it is needed.   
 
8.3.4 The Significance of the Cost of Takeovers 
The level of the overall cost of takeovers is important to the parties involved. Obviously, all 
parties would prefer that “dead weight loss” was reduced. This is because money could be 
better spent elsewhere; for example towards a premium for the shareholders or towards the 
costs of creating synergies between the two companies once the takeover has been completed. 
High levels of costs may also deter takeovers from taking place at all. This point will be 
returned to later in section 8.5. 
 
8.4 Impact of Litigation on US Target Shareholders 
The sections above established that the level of litigation in the US impacts upon both the 
time it takes for takeovers to complete, and the aggregate and distributional costs. These 
impacts are increasingly significant when compared with the same impacts of the UK regime. 
The benefits that US target shareholders gain from litigation may however offset the negative 
impacts of an extended timetable and increased costs. These benefits are monetary awards, 
amendments to the deal terms and additional disclosures. However, monetary awards and 
amendments that provide meaningful benefits to shareholders only occur in a small 
percentage of cases, and additional disclosures are argued to have little effect on how 
shareholders vote. The increased disclosures are contended to have created a well-informed 
shareholder, and the level of litigation that has been commenced has had a positive effect on 
the overall quality of disclosures received by shareholders from the target board. Yet, these 
benefits are not better than those obtained by target shareholders in the UK under the Code 
and the Panel. 
 
8.4.1 Do US Target Shareholders Achieve Better Settlements from Litigation?  
As previously established, US shareholder takeover litigation often results in a settlement 
deal. These settlements are beneficial to shareholders, and they do achieve results that they 
247 
 
would not necessarily have gotten had they not litigated, particularly if money or an 
amendment to the deal terms is awarded. Settlements however rarely provide any significant 
economic benefit. Nevertheless, settlements in the US do provide greater disclosures to target 
shareholders from their board of directors. These disclosures are not, however, any greater 
than those that target shareholders in the UK would obtain under the supervision of the Panel. 
This section will now examine these points in turn. 
 
In their study, Cain and Davidoff Solomon found that the most common type of amendment 
settlement in the US was a reduction to the termination fee. Other terms that were varied 
included, ‘post-sale closing limitations, extended appraisal periods and modification or 
elimination of voting arrangements.’880 These types of settlements can be quite advantageous 
for target shareholders as they ‘often provided more economic opportunity to shareholders, 
such as providing a longer period for them to exercise appraisal rights.’881 The higher value 
of such settlements is also illustrated by the increase in the average attorney fee awards. For 
example, $1.76 million was awarded on average for an amendment settlement as compared to 
$500,000 for a disclosure only settlement.
882
  
 
Cain and Davidoff Solomon however found that amendment settlements, that involve a 
change to the deal’s transaction terms, only occur in 0.2 percent of settlements: 10 percent of 
these settlements are both amendment settlements and disclosure settlements.
883
 In Daines 
and Koumrian’s study, of the 119 settling takeover lawsuits they recorded only 67 resulted in 
a “unique settlement.”884 Of the 67 settlements, they found that ‘shareholders received 
supplemental disclosures (and nothing else) in 54 settlements, or 81% of cases.’ In four of the 
cases settled the deal termination fee was reduced and the parties reached agreements about 
appraisal rights in six cases.
885
 There was only one settlement that was found to have 
increased the merger price.
886
 
 
                                                          
880
 Cain and Davidoff Solomon (n517) 17 
881
 ibid 
882
 ibid 
883
 ibid 
884
 Daines and Koumrian (n526) 6 
885
 ibid 
886
 ibid 
248 
 
Fisch et al found that although deal litigation is “pervasive,” shareholder litigation ‘rarely 
result[ed] in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff class.’887  Instead, they found that the vast 
majority ended in a disclosure settlement or dismissal.
888
 They noted that:  
‘compensation for the benefit produced by these settlements—often worth no more, in 
the words of a famous jurist, than a “peppercorn”—plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a fee award 
social desirability of affirming an important principle that underlies the right vindicated.’889 
 
Only 4.8 percent of transactions were recorded by Cain and Davidoff Solomon to provide a 
monetary benefit to shareholders that could be classified as a consideration increase.
890
 They 
noted that consideration increases have a wide distribution with an average increase of $70 
million in aggregate but a standard deviation of $152.8 million.
891
  The minimum 
consideration increase in their sample was one million dollars and the maximum was 
recorded as $669.8 million.
892
 They defined consideration increases as settlements which 
provide ‘quantifiable benefits to shareholders’ and as such ‘pay the most in attorneys’ fees,’ 
averaging $9.2 million.
893
  
 
In their study, however, Krishnan et al found that on balance, there was a significant 
economic effect of takeover litigation in the US. Their study established that there was a nine 
percent increase, in the takeover premiums they recorded after controlling for other offer 
features.
894
 They concluded that litigation causes, or helps to cause, increased bid premiums. 
This occurred, they explained, because bidders often responded to target shareholder claims 
that an initial offer was too low by generally raising their bids.
895
 If a bid was not increased 
then there was increased probability that the deal would fail.
896
 US target shareholder 
litigation may therefore deliver greater bid premiums than UK target shareholders could 
achieve without litigation. However the lower costs and faster speed of takeovers in the UK 
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may offset the loss of the greater bid premiums achieved by target shareholders in the US. 
That is, if indeed, there are greater premiums paid. 
 
8.4.2 Do US Target Shareholders Obtain Better Disclosures from Litigation? 
The main benefit achieved by US target shareholder litigation is increased disclosures. It is 
not quite clear however whether these additional disclosures, gained via litigation, are in fact 
beneficial to the target shareholders’ or whether they are of little value. If they are of value, 
are they better than the disclosures UK target shareholders obtain under the Code and 
supervision of the Panel? This section establishes, that whilst the majority of additional 
disclosures obtained via litigation are individually not valuable (as they do not affect the 
shareholder vote), as a whole, litigation has motivated directors to disclose better and more 
valuable information than had been previously disclosed in past decades. This has led to a 
more informed shareholder in the US, which is important considering the power directors 
have to influence the outcome of a takeover. However these additional disclosures are not 
greater than those acquired by UK target shareholders, and as such they are not missing out 
on benefits that could be achieved by litigating. 
 
Fisch et al considered whether litigation which ‘returns no monetary recovery to the plaintiff 
class must be without merit.’897 They observed that: 
‘The dynamic, in which every deal is challenged but only the lawyers get paid, has led 
to widespread scepticism concerning the value of public company merger litigation among 
both academic and professional commentators.’898 
However, they deliberated whether ‘equating merit and monetary recovery implicitly 
dismisses the value of nonpecuniary relief’ but noted that it is very difficult to place value on 
such relief.
899
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Fisch et al consequently proposed that the value of nonpecuniary relief in merger settlements 
should not be measured on settlements and monetary awards alone, but instead be measured 
by its effect on shareholder voting.
900
 Their core hypothesis was as follows:  
‘[B]ecause amendments should improve the terms of the merger or the quality of the 
procedures used in reaching a final agreement, amendment settlements should increase 
shareholder voting in favour of the merger. In contrast, because forced disclosures should 
produce negative information about the merger, we hypothesised that disclosure-only 
settlements should decrease shareholder voting in favour of the merger…Because the 
purpose of merger disclosure is to inform shareholder voting, it is reasonable to view 
supplemental disclosure as meaningful if it changes the way reasonable shareholders 
vote.’901  
The disclosure of negative information is particularly relevant when considering the type of 
disclosure that would be obtained from litigation. This, they explained, is because the 
defendant company, without “the prod” of shareholder litigation, already has an incentive to 
disclose positive information in order to ‘win approval of the transaction and minimise 
dissent.’902  By putting these two hypotheses together, Fisch et al concluded that for 
supplemental disclosures to be meaningful, they must have a negative impact on shareholder 
voting in favour of the merger.
903
  
 
Their empirical tests drew upon a hand-collected sample of 453 mergers involving publicly 
traded target companies announced from 2005 and completed through 2012, along with 
proxy-voting statistics provided to them by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) over the 
same period.
904
 At the end of their study they found “weak support” for their first hypothesis, 
that amendment settlements increase shareholder voting in favour of a transaction.
905
 More 
importantly, they found that disclosure only settlements did not ‘appear to affect shareholder 
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voting in any way.’906 They additionally found weak evidence that consideration-increase 
settlements increase shareholder voting in favour of a transaction.
907
  
 
The implications of their findings were clear: ‘If disclosure settlements do not affect 
shareholder voting, it is difficult to argue that they benefit shareholders.’908  Consequently, 
they argued that the ‘illusory benefit of supplemental disclosure must be weighed against the 
clear cost of merger litigation, including litigation expense as well as delay and 
uncertainty.’909 They reasoned that the lack of a significant relationship between disclosure 
only settlements and shareholder voting, suggested that shareholders may not actually value 
the additional information from these disclosures ‘at least in a way that affects their vote.’910 
They concluded that if additional disclosures gained from litigation do not affect the 
shareholder vote, it is ‘difficult to see how shareholders benefit from it.’911 Badawi et al’s 
findings also support this conclusion.
912
 Their study also examined litigation undertaken by 
shareholders during a takeover, and found that disclosures resulting from this type of 
litigation were ‘unlikely to provide new information to the market.’913  
 
The Delaware court has also recognised that the additional disclosures may not affect how 
shareholders decide to vote, and that this type of target shareholder litigation ‘nit-picks 
otherwise good disclosures.’914 In re Clarient Inc. the court stated that the claim was 
“paradoxical” because at the time of class certification, to proceed with the claim, 
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shareholders’ had ‘already decided to take the money in the deal they have already 
challenged.”915 In re Monogram Biosciences Inc. the court commented that ‘there appears to 
be a trend of litigation being brought more for the sake of litigation being brought than 
because any plaintiff genuinely believes that the terms of the transaction are actually 
unfair.’916 Despite this, the court decided that they would not “quibble with the fee” that had 
been agreed between the parties for the plaintiff’s lawyers.  
 
Under Delaware law, as under federal law, the test for whether additional disclosures should 
be granted is where there is  
‘a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of 
information made available.’917  
Judge Travis Laster argues that full disclosure is part of the procedural fairness the courts are 
trying to achieve, and the fact that shareholders have approved a transaction after receiving 
the additional disclosures is “powerful evidence of substantive fairness.”918 He contends that 
‘moving beyond statutory validity to questions of fiduciary fairness, the fully informed 
shareholder vote continues to play a central role.’919 He explains that the Delaware court uses 
a standard of review to measure whether directors have complied with the standards of 
conduct imposed by their obligations under their fiduciary duties.
920
 The Court of Chancery 
precedents indicate that ‘when a transaction otherwise would be subject to enhanced scrutiny, 
a fully informed, disinterested stockholder vote alone is sufficient to lower the standard of 
review to the business judgment rule.’921 As such, additional disclosures play a key role in 
assuring shareholders are fully informed and that mergers and acquisitions are not overly 
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scrutinised by the court. Judge Laster further argues that the doctrine of shareholder 
ratification in the US relies on a fully informed shareholder vote, and the adequacy of the 
defendants' disclosures is part of the analysis of substantive and procedural fairness.
922
 
 
In describing the two aspects of the unitary entire fairness test, the Delaware Supreme Court 
stated that the concept of fair dealing ‘embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, 
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals 
of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.’923  When analysing the aspect of fair 
dealing, the high court reiterated that “[p]art of fair dealing is the obvious duty of candor,”924 
Information may not always be valuable to shareholders, but perhaps it is better and fairer for 
shareholders to be over informed than not informed.  
 
Sumpter contends that shareholder litigation and disclosure only settlements do ultimately 
benefit all shareholders. He argues it has a sort of disciplinary affect in that ‘companies now 
provide much better disclosure to their shareholders in relation to mergers and 
acquisitions.’925 US litigation may therefore have played a corporate governance role in 
encouraging greater disclosures from target companies to the shareholders in an attempt to 
avoid litigation. This may also explain why the quality of additional disclosures has 
decreased. As target directors have provided better disclosures, claims with lesser merits have 
been commenced. Lawyers are therefore forced to “nit-pick” because directors are giving 
fewer reasons for claims to be brought. Chancellor Chandler remarked that companies are 
disclosing things ‘that would have never been in a proxy statement 20 years ago.’926 Vice 
Chancellor Strine additionally stated that ‘disclosure in this area has gotten increasingly more 
informative. And that's in part the result of changes at the Securities & Exchange 
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Commission and, frankly, decisions of this Court.’927 Vice Chancellor Laster commented that 
‘we have made tremendous progress in terms of quality of disclosure that goes out to 
stockholders. And there is no question that...the plaintiffs' bar...deserve[s] a lot of credit for 
that.’928 
 
Greater disclosures in a semi-strong efficient market are highly desirable, as the more 
information that is made available the better. This is because greater disclosures allow 
investors participating in the ideal market to choose among shares that represent the 
ownership of the company’s activities under the clear assumption that the process at any time 
fully reflects all available information.
929
 When prices always fully reflect available 
information the market becomes “efficient.” In an efficient market, production-investment 
decisions can be made easily and accurately.
930
   
 
Many claims in the US are however meritless and result in disclosures which have no impact 
upon the shareholders decision to vote. Shareholder litigation in the US has, however, led to 
greater and better quality disclosures for shareholders. All of which assist the shareholder to 
make an informed decision. In a small percentage of cases litigation has resulted in an 
increased offer or a change to the deal terms. Many, however, argue that these benefits do not 
offset the excessive litigation that is commenced in the US. The Delaware courts have 
acknowledged the high propensity for shareholders to litigate in takeovers, and the criticisms 
surrounding attorney fee awards, but have remained in favour of the availability of litigation 
for shareholders. The crackdown on the level of attorney fees awarded and the greater 
scrutiny placed on disclosure only settlements by the courts, has however had an impact on 
the levels of litigation in the US (see chapter seven). Although still at a high level, the falling 
takeover litigation rates may convince some critics that the litigation is on balance a benefit 
to shareholders rather than a nuisance. The litigation in the US however does not seem to 
produce better information or better terms than the use of the Panel produces in the UK. 
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The Code’s disclosure requirements seek to ensure a high degree of transparency between the 
target directors and target shareholders.
931
 As noted in chapter three, Rule 23.1 of the Code 
states that target shareholders must be given sufficient information and advice to enable them 
to reach a properly informed decision as to the merits or demerits of an offer.
932
 No relevant 
information should be withheld.
933
 The Code also states that the target board must prepare a 
circular that sets out the opinion of the board on the offer (including information from the 
target board as to any alternative offers) and the reasons for forming its opinion must also be 
given to the shareholders.
934
 The circular must additionally include the target boards’ views 
on: (i) the effects of implementation of the offer on all the company’s interests, including, 
specifically, employment; and (ii) the offeror’s strategic plans for the offeree company and 
their likely repercussions on employment and the locations of the offeree company’s places 
of business.
935
 Furthermore, the circular must include the substance of the advice given to the 
target board by the independent adviser appointed,
936
 and a description of any known 
significant change in the financial or trading position of the target company which has 
occurred since the end of the last financial period.
937
 In addition to this, the circular should 
also include interests and dealings of the target directors’, and give details of any service 
contracts the directors may have.
938
 
 
8.4.3 Agency Problems and Corporate Governance 
As touched upon above, shareholder takeover litigation plays an important role as a corporate 
governance mechanism in the US. Litigation’s role is essential due to the power directors 
have in controlling the outcome of the takeover.
939
 The Delaware courts allow the target's 
board of directors a ‘substantial gatekeeping role in unsolicited tender offers, which again is 
attributable to the courts' recognition of the importance of preserving the board's authority.’940 
Shareholders are given more limited powers, ‘essentially the right to sell their shares, to vote 
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with their shares and to sue to enforce their legal rights under state law.’941 As highlighted by 
Thompson and Thomas, whilst shareholder voting has proved to be a relatively weak check 
on managerial actions, shareholder litigation in state courts has historically played a key role 
in checking potential, or remedying actual, managerial abuses.
942
 The role that litigation plays 
as a corporate governance tool in the US is not necessary for UK target shareholders. This is 
because the Code places great emphasis on the protection of shareholders rights and as such 
promotes shareholder primacy.  
 
As Thompson and Thomas explain management entrenchment is a serious risk posed by 
hostile takeovers in the US.
943
 In friendly takeovers, however, there is the ‘constant fear that 
management may sell the firm too cheaply in order to obtain lucrative severance packages or 
employment contracts with the bidder.’944 If the bidder is a controlling shareholder, there will 
be a conflict of interest between the directors’ duty to ‘get the best deal for the shareholders 
and their own self-interest (or that of the controlling shareholder) to implement terms that 
minimise what the insiders will have to pay to gain control of the remaining interests in the 
company.’945 This greater risk of such agency problems, which are unique to takeovers, was 
the motivation behind the enhanced scrutiny of directors’ decisions and the additional duties 
imposed in the US under Unocal and Revlon.
946
 Shareholder takeover litigation is 
consequently an important tool that can be used to make management accountable and 
enhance transparency during a takeover. Shareholder takeover litigation ‘polices those 
management self-dealing transactions with the highest potential for self-dealing,’947 and as 
such ‘has a positive management agency cost reducing effect that may offset the litigation 
agency costs that accompany them.’948  
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Cox and Thomas note that ‘private suits, to the extent they generally stimulate greater 
compliance, are themselves producing a social benefit.’949 Corporate governance structures 
are encouraged to be strengthened in order to avoid wrongdoing that could lead to 
litigation.
950
 As such in a situation in which there is the greatest potential for self-dealing, i.e. 
a takeover, there is also a real threat of litigation which motivates directors to act in the best 
interests of the shareholders; at a time when they have all the power to prevent the change in 
control, so long as they conduct a reasonable investigation in to the share price before 
defending against the offer.
951
 Hence, there is certainly an argument that shareholder 
litigation is “accorded an important stopgap role” in takeover corporate law in the US.952  
 
A critique of this position is that shareholder litigation which is brought during a takeover is 
not of much benefit, other than supplying further disclosures. As considered above, however, 
the requirement for greater disclosures (whether produced via actual litigation or the threat 
thereof) gives greater transparency behind the directors decisions to either approve or dismiss 
a takeover. Even what is considered to be a “rare”953 outcome such as an increase in premium 
or changes to the terms of the deal of the takeover is extremely beneficial to shareholders; 
outcomes, which would not have been achieved without the shareholders ability to 
commence takeover litigation. This achieves a corporate governance benefit; to ensure that 
the takeover process is completed fairly and the best results are realised for the shareholders.  
  
A further critique is that the barrage of shareholder litigation, and payment of attorney fees, is 
too costly to justify the corporate governance benefits that are achieved. Thompson and 
Thomas nevertheless argue that ‘the small settlements for shareholders, the large attorneys’ 
fees and the frequent nuisance settlements do not paint a true picture of shareholder takeover 
litigation.’954 In their data set, they noted that they found settlements that are larger than in 
the other forms of representative litigation and attorneys' fees that are a smaller percentage of 
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the amount recovered.
955
 Shareholder litigation, they noted, ‘has often been cast in the role of 
the evil step sister of modern corporate governance: worthless and expensive to keep 
around.’956 However, based on the empirical evidence they concluded that ‘the acquisition-
oriented shareholder class actions filed in Delaware add value, even if they also have 
costs.’957 They further stated that, ‘the merits of litigation do make a difference, and that 
shareholder litigation deserves a seat at the table of corporate governance.’958 However they 
argue that ‘none of these findings disturb the basic reality that the net value of shareholder 
litigation will always depend on the balance between the benefits that come for its 
constraining management agency problems and the offsetting possibility that the 
representative litigation will spawn its own litigation agency costs.’959   
 
McConvill draws on work in behavioural economics, psychology, and sociology to argue that 
managers have substantial incentives to behave in ways consistent with shareholder interests 
despite the principal-agent conflict inherent in corporate governance.
960
 Castanias and Helfat 
have also argued that even in takeovers, ‘the incentives for superior senior managers to act 
efficiently prevent the presumed conflict between shareholder and managerial interests.’961 
Romano notes one such potential social benefit from shareholder litigation: 
‘all firms benefit from a judicial decision clarifying the scope of permissible conduct. 
The benefit of clarification is not simply deterrence of future managerial misconduct, but 
rather, given the contractual setting of the corporation, identification of a rule around which 
the parties (managers and shareholders) can transact. As few suits produce a legal rule this 
explanation of lawsuit efficacy turns on the need for a large number of lawsuits in order to 
obtain a ruling.’962 
The Delaware courts have developed such specific expertise that can be accredited to the 
volume of takeover cases which they have deliberated over. Consequently, policy regarding 
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the level of disclosure required in a takeover has been developed and clarified by the courts. 
This is reflected in the increased quality of disclosures received by shareholders.  
 
Shareholder takeover litigation may be an important tool in protecting the rights of 
shareholders in the US, and thereby playing an important role in corporate governance. The 
impact of low levels of litigation in the UK is not, however, a sign that there are failings in 
the UK system. This is, as said before, because the Code protects the shareholders rights to 
information regarding the bid and also prioritises the need for shareholders to be the sole 
decision makers in the outcome of a takeover. If the Code has been breached, the rules will 
be enforced for them by the Panel. This is in complete contrast to the US, in which the 
directors are the gatekeepers, and ultimately the success of the takeover will depend on their 
actions. Any breach of their duties as directors is left to the target shareholders to enforce 
themselves. Shareholder litigation in the US reduces managerial discretion, which is not 
present in the UK where only shareholders decide on the merits of the takeover offer. The 
lack of the propensity to litigate does not have a negative impact on corporate governance 
because the Code and the Panel effectively regulate the potential for managerial self-dealing.  
 
The need for litigation in the US to enforce shareholders rights also arises from the way in 
which takeovers occur. The methods in which takeovers are completed in the UK provide 
further protection to the rights of shareholders. For example, in the UK if an offer is made, 
shareholders will decide to sell or not; if a scheme of arrangement is proposed, the 
shareholders vote and that vote is then scrutinised by the courts to ensure that shareholders 
rights are protected.
963
 In the US most takeovers are structured as mergers, using the single-
step system. This is often proposed by the target directors and requires their approval. The 
success of the merger is dependent on a shareholder vote, however to become binding the 
merger does not need court approval and therefore this vote is not examined by the court.
964
 
If a hostile takeover offer is made, the target directors may easily defend against it. 
Accordingly, in the US system shareholders become reliant on the good behaviour of 
directors, which is subject to the increased risk of the agency problems that arise in the 
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specific circumstances of takeovers. The ability for shareholder to commence shareholder 
litigation is therefore essential to reduce these agency problems.  
 
8.5 Impact on the Market for Corporate Control 
The high levels of litigation in the US may affect the ease in which takeovers can occur, and 
in turn have an effect upon the number of takeovers that are attempted. This may impact upon 
the MCC. Whether there should be an open MCC will be discussed in the sections below, 
however ultimately the MCC is an important tool for corporate governance. Takeover 
litigation regulation should therefore be designed to support and foster, not undermine 
takeover activity.  
 
8.5.1 Does the Presence of Litigation Suppress the Market for Corporate Control? 
It cannot be reliably concluded as to whether the different levels of litigation actually have 
any impact on the number of completed takeovers. To find a causal link would require a 
further and more complex empirical study to be completed. There are also other factors 
which will have an effect on the number of completed takeovers in the US. For example, anti-
takeover legislation in the US and the relatively unfettered powers target directors have to 
ward off unwanted takeovers will have a substantial impact on takeover activity. A further 
difficulty arises due to the type of takeover litigation that is commenced; target shareholder 
litigation is not commenced to prevent the takeover from succeeding, but instead used as a 
tactic to increase premiums or change the deal terms.
965
 Nonetheless, Krishnan, et al. found 
that the presence of takeover litigation does have the ‘effect of decreasing deal completion 
probability by 5.8%.’966 This figure may not seem significant considering around 90 percent 
of takeovers
967
 in the US experience litigation. So whilst the US’s propensity to litigate does 
not significantly impact upon the MCC there is still some effect. This impact is also not 
entirely modest when compared with the UK, where the almost non-existent level of 
litigation would have an extremely minimal effect on the MCC.  
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It is not, however, just the absence of litigation in the UK that contributes to the operation of 
the MCC. UK takeover and company law regulation enables a MCC, for example, the 
structure of the Panel and the content of the Code creates an environment where litigation is 
not needed. So it may therefore be concluded that the propensity to litigate in the US does 
have an impact on the MCC but that this impact is not significant. Nevertheless, in 
comparison to the UK, the US’s propensity to litigate does have a greater suppressive effect 
on the MCC. Whether the suppression of takeover activity matters will depend upon attitudes 
towards the MCC and whether it should be embraced or rejected. .  
 
Having discussed the benefits of the MCC in chapter two, it can be concluded that any 
hindrance to its effectiveness would be undesirable. A well-functioning MCC creates 
‘economic efficiency by allowing outside parties to takeover poorly performing 
companies.’968 This is said to occur because of the change in control to a more effective 
management team, who can then improve the value of the company’s existing resources and 
create allocational efficiency through the reallocation of resources to their most productive 
and efficient use.  
 
Ineffective managers may therefore be able to entrench themselves within a company using 
litigation as a frustrating technique. Yet, the propensity to litigate in the US originates not 
from target directors but from the target shareholders. This litigation is consequently not the 
type of litigation that would frustrate a bid enabling target directors to continue their 
employment at the target company. Nonetheless, there is an impact on the MCC (if only 
marginal) that was established above, which will mean that managers in companies targeted 
for takeovers will remain, whether the litigation is meant to frustrate the bid or not. This 
therefore effects the functioning of the MCC and impacts upon the effectiveness of takeovers 
to act as a tool for creating greater economic efficiency.
969
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The propensity to use litigation in the US affects the ability of the MCC to function properly 
and therefore the merits which emerge from the MCC cannot be fully realised. The UK has a 
market in which takeovers can occur easily, and it appears that it is an aim of takeover 
regulation to allow for this.
970
 If US regulators wanted to ensure that the MCC could operate 
fully they could do more to prevent litigation which has the effect of frustrating bids.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
The propensity to litigate has a number of impacts on the takeover process that can affect the 
speed, cost, shareholder welfare and the MCC. On average, takeovers in the US take 
approximately 89 days longer to complete than those in the UK. The delays caused by 
litigation can impact upon a target company’s ability to focus on the day to day management 
of the company, a target shareholders’ capacity to properly assess the deal, and the bidders’ 
prospects of successfully completing the takeover. Delays in takeovers can also have much 
more wide reaching effects on market stability and certainty. A drawn out takeover can create 
false markets in which investors can no longer properly assess the value of a company’s 
shares.   
 
The propensity to litigate in the US also impacts upon the cost of takeovers. The cost of 
litigation significantly increases the cost of a takeover due to the level of fees that are 
frequently awarded to target shareholder attorneys. Although UK companies must still pay 
fees to the Panel, and to their own lawyers, these costs are significantly less than those paid 
by US companies in lawyers’ fees. The distribution of these costs is also impacted by 
litigation. In the UK costs are distributed evenly, as all companies (even those who are not 
parties to a complaint) must pay towards the funding of the Panel. In the US target companies 
are burdened with the costs of litigation. What burden these costs create will depend on the 
merits of the target shareholders’ claim.   
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There is also evidence to suggest that litigation in the US suppresses some takeover activity 
due to the frustrating effects litigation can have. By contrast, takeover activity goes 
unhindered by takeover litigation in the UK. As such there is an open MCC. This openness 
however derives from a number of different causes, not just the UK’s lack of takeover 
litigation. If the MCC is considered as an important corporate governance tool then the 
suppressive effect litigation has in the US may be problematic. What impact takeover 
litigation has on the MCC is however heavily outweighed by other factors that suppress 
takeover activity in the US, such as anti-takeover legislation and directors’ powers to defend 
against a bid. If US regulators wanted to encourage a more open MCC then they should first 
seek to remove those barriers.  
 
Takeover litigation is however, beneficial for US target shareholders. It plays an important 
function in assuring the transparency of the target board during a takeover. This contributes 
to an informed shareholder and information asymmetry. Whilst there is certainly scope to 
reduce meritless claims in the US; and in turn prevent litigation that results in immaterial 
disclosures, to completely remove shareholders access to litigation would have an impact on 
their ability to enforce their rights. Consequently, due to the characteristics of the US 
takeover system, takeover litigation plays an important role in US corporate governance. This 
is not a role that needs to be played by litigation in the UK as there is a culture of compliance 
which is created by the Panel and the Code. When a dispute does arise it is more efficient for 
parties to a takeover to consult the Panel than commence costly and time delaying litigation.  
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has described and mapped the landscapes of takeover regulation and litigation in 
the UK and US, explained why there are such diverging levels of litigation in these 
jurisdictions and evaluated the impact of the presence or absence of takeover litigation on 
time, cost and the impact on target shareholders.  
 
The second chapter, following the introductory chapter, described the merits of the MCC. 
The existing literature indicates that MCC provides for a broader, more effective and more 
efficient form of monitoring than any other corporate governance mechanism can currently 
offer. This is because hostile takeovers create economic efficiency which generates an overall 
efficient economy, in which management is submitted to continual checks by the market. 
Minority shareholders are also protected by the MCC as it allows them to easily exit 
companies when they are underperforming. These benefits are aided by a practically efficient 
market, in which relevant available information is rationally assessed by the market providing 
accurate share price signals. The accuracy of the share price consequently helps to identify 
both rightful bidders and targets. Whilst there are some valid issues regarding overshoots in 
the market, the literature indicates that the market is efficient enough to allow the MCC to 
function on a day to day basis. The only real concern, and an on-going issue for academia in 
this area, is to understand why these overshoots occur, whether they happen rationally or due 
to fads and euphoria. This question cannot be fully answered by this research, but whatever 
the answer, it is still clear that the MCC is a necessary tool for corporate governance in the 
Anglo-American market system.  
 
The third and fourth chapters described the UK takeover regime and identified the level of 
takeover litigation in this jurisdiction. The third chapter described the process and regulation 
of takeovers in the UK, where there are two processes in which a takeover can be completed, 
specifically via a takeover offer or a scheme of arrangement. Both are regulated by the Code, 
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and by certain provisions of company law. The Panel plays a key role in the regulation of 
takeovers in the UK by ensuring that the Code is adhered to, giving guidance, and dealing 
with any breaches of the Code and regularly updating and changing its rules. The behaviour 
of the target director, which includes whether any defensive mechanisms are used to defeat 
takeovers, is regulated by the Code, but for the main part is enforced by directors’ duties 
within the Companies Act 2006. Directors will therefore find it extremely difficult to defend 
against an unwanted takeover, including commencing litigation. This is because the UK 
system of regulation is primarily aimed at allowing the target shareholders to decide on the 
merits of the bid, and whether a company is taken over (either by a takeover offer or scheme 
of arrangement). Target shareholders, and bidders, are therefore still able to commence 
litigation under the UK system.  
 
However, the findings of the empirical search undertaken in chapter four, demonstrated that 
less than one percent of takeover litigation is brought in the UK during the process of a 
takeover. This level of litigation does not seem to have increased or decreased in the last 
three decades, and therefore remains at a steady state. The main instigators of this litigation 
are the target shareholders and the bidder, and claims are usually against the target company. 
The most popular causes of action in which to pursue takeover litigation are breaches of 
director’s duties, unfair prejudice under s.994 of Companies Act 2006, negligent 
misstatements and a breach of common law non-directors fiduciary duties. The litigation that 
is brought is, however, rarely successful, as 71.4 percent of claims fail to give the claimant 
their desired outcome. There are however alternatives to pursuing complaints parties may 
have during a takeover by seeking a decision of the Panel. The Panel nevertheless delivers 
formal rulings in less than two percent of takeovers. This figure is slightly more than the 
amount of takeover litigation brought but is still not a significant amount. It can therefore be 
concluded that there is not a propensity to litigate, or to commence formal complaint 
proceedings with the Panel, during or after a takeover in the UK by the main parties to a 
takeover. 
The fifth and sixth chapters described the takeover regime in the US and the level of litigation 
that is present in this jurisdiction. There are two main ways in which a takeover can be 
completed in the US, which are distinct from the UK approaches; these are either via a 
single-step or two-step merger. The method that will be used will generally depend upon 
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whether the bid is hostile or friendly. For example, if the bid is a one which is hostile then the 
two-step method will be more appropriate. Both of the different methods are regulated by 
federal and state regulations. Federal laws, for the most part, regulate the process of the 
takeover, ensuring that a proper process is followed and that parties to the bid meet the 
disclosure requirements. The SEC both overseas and enforces federal regulation. By contrast, 
state law plays a greater role in regulating the behaviour of the parties to the bid, namely the 
behaviour of the target directors. These laws do this by requiring target directors to not only 
meet the standard fiduciary duties placed on any director making any commercial decision, 
but also to meet enhanced duties. These enhanced duties allow judges to scrutinise decisions 
made during a takeover in order to be certain that directors are acting in the best interests of 
the company, and not for any other self-serving reasons. Directors are also obligated to 
disclose material information to shareholders during a takeover under the state law fiduciary 
duty of disclosure. This is in contrast to the UK, where directors are not subject to a specific 
fiduciary duty of disclosure.  
 
The heightened examination by judges of directors’ commercial decisions in the US are 
however justified by the courts on the grounds that takeovers put directors in an odd situation, 
in which it is more likely for there to be a conflict of interest between what is best for the 
company and what is best for the individual director (to avoid directors self-dealing). 
Generally in the US, as with the UK, directors are permitted a great deal of discretion when 
making commercial decisions and therefore judges will not decide on the merits of those 
decisions. The enhanced fiduciary duties placed on target directors during takeovers, 
however, allow the courts to disregard this norm and decide whether the behaviour of the 
director was reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Despite these enhanced duties 
directors in the US still retain a great deal of discretion when deciding on how to deal with a 
takeover bid (unlike in the UK). This is evidenced by the recent “just say no” cases, in which 
target directors have been able to defend against an unwanted takeover bid, despite whether 
the shareholders wish to sell or not, on the grounds that the takeover would be detrimental to 
the long-term business plans of the company. This is a divergence from the position in the 
UK, where directors cannot generally defend against an unwanted bid whether the takeover 
has merits or not.  
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Chapter six, established, using the recent study of Cain and Davidoff Solomon, that 87.7 
percent of high value transactions experienced litigation in 2015. This figure is also reflected 
in the findings of Daines and Koumrian who found that 93 percent of the transactions they 
recorded involved litigation commenced by the target shareholders. Based on this data it is 
clear that there is a greater propensity to litigate in the US than in the UK. The degree of 
difference is however difficult to ascertain due to the differences in the transactions recorded 
in the UK (with the US studies targeting high valued transaction only compared with all 
values of transactions which were of interest in the UK study). However, even taking this into 
account it is clear that US parties to a takeover are still more likely to commence takeover 
litigation than their UK counterparts.  
 
US takeover litigation is almost always brought as a class action case on behalf of target 
shareholders who request additional disclosures to be made.
971
 In the UK both the target 
shareholder and the bidder commence an almost equal amount of litigation. UK shareholders 
generally allege unfair prejudice or a breach of a director’s duty, and bidders usually bring 
claims against other third parties, such as advisors regarding conflicts of interest. As such, 
there is not only a difference in the levels of litigation brought in the US and UK but also a 
difference in the motivations for bringing the claims. US litigation seems to solely revolve 
around information forcing, as very few cases settled for amendments to the takeover 
agreement or for a monetary benefit. 
 
The seventh chapter explained why the UK and US have such diverging levels of litigation. 
Four candidates were offered to do this. Firstly the US has imposed greater statutory 
obligations for disclosure upon their directors and made this available for shareholders to 
pursue. Secondly, the class action and the encouragement of lawyers mean that shareholders 
in the US are more likely, and are more easily able to litigate as compared to UK 
shareholders. Thirdly, the presence of the Panel provides a good alternative to litigation and 
the comprehensive Code precludes the kind of behaviour US directors are sued for in the US. 
Fourthly, and finally, the different litigation cultures in each jurisdiction add to the 
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explanation due to the different behaviours the various parties to a takeover have adopted in 
both jurisdictions.   
 
Chapter seven therefore established that the US statutory fiduciary disclosure obligations are 
more extensive than their UK equivalent. More crucially however, the form of action that 
must be adopted to enforce these provisions is significantly different. In the US, the 
disclosure obligations of directors are owed not only to the company, but also constitute 
obligations owed personally to shareholders, in respect of which shareholders can bring a 
personal action. So, in the US, allegedly inadequate directorial disclosures in takeovers can 
generate both derivative claims, and personal actions by shareholders. There are very few 
derivative claims commenced in the US, because even in the US, derivative claims are 
limited in scope and are difficult to launch.  By far, the most popular form of action is the 
personal action.  
 
These factors, however, still do not give a complete explanation for the abundance of 
litigation in the US. The fact that such actions can be brought as personal actions is 
important, but it only provides a starting point for a fuller explanation. It would count for 
little if there were not an efficient method of bringing such personal claims.  In the US, 
shareholders may use the class action lawsuit without which, there would be few personal 
claims. The availability of target shareholders to use the class action in the US to commence 
claims for a breach of a fiduciary duty increases the number of personal actions significantly.   
 
However, even this may not fully explain the prevalence of US target shareholder litigation. 
Yes, the availability of the class action encourages many more shareholders to bring personal 
actions; but that number would likely still be more modest than it currently is, were it not for 
the tendency of lawyers themselves to encourage personal claimants to launch and continue 
more claims. The personal action gives the kindling; the class action encourages more 
shareholders to strike the match; and the lawyers pour the petrol on the flames for reasons of 
self-interest.   
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Turning to the UK most of these elements are lacking. First, in the UK, the less extensive 
disclosure obligations are owed only to the company itself (bar the s.90 FSMA claim). They 
do not constitute duties owed to and enforceable by shareholders personally. Shareholders 
cannot bring any personal action in respect of a failure by target directors to make the 
required disclosures. If disclosure obligations of target directors are breached, the action must 
be taken by the company itself or, if it will not, by a derivative claim commenced by 
shareholders, but only for the benefit of the company. The derivative claim procedure in the 
UK is however beset with many problems and weaknesses which mean that it is infrequently 
used. Consequently, even where there are inadequate disclosures which breach a directors 
duty, there are no personal actions (because they cannot be brought), no corporate actions 
(because the board won’t sue) and very few derivative actions (for the reasons given above).  
 
Nonetheless, there are a small number of personal actions brought by target shareholders, 
alleging that directors have breached disclosure obligations required under s.90 FSMA. These 
claims are generally brought using collective actions such as GLO’s or representative actions, 
which also have significant failings and as such generate very little litigation. These reasons 
create the primary bars to shareholder actions in the UK, and therefore explain the lack of 
shareholder litigation. However, even if US style class actions were adopted in the UK, 
litigation would still rarely be commenced due to the presence of the Panel and the Code. 
Shareholders in the UK therefore have very little to encourage them to strike the match.  
 
Chapter eight evaluated the impact of the different propensities to litigate, and identified a 
number of its effects on the takeover process. These relate to time, cost, benefits to 
shareholders and the impact on the MCC. On average, takeovers in the US take 
approximately 89 days longer to complete than those in the UK. The delays caused by 
litigation can impact upon a target company’s ability to focus on the day to day management 
of the company, a target shareholders’ capacity to properly assess the deal, and the bidders’ 
prospects of successfully completing the takeover. Delays in takeovers can also have much 
more wide reaching effects on market stability and certainty. A drawn out takeover can create 
false markets in which investors can no longer properly assess the value of a company’s 
shares.   
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The propensity to litigate in the US also impacts upon the cost of takeovers. The cost of 
litigation significantly increases the cost of a takeover due to the level of fees that are 
frequently awarded to target shareholder attorneys. Although UK companies must still pay 
fees to the Panel, and to their own lawyers, these costs are significantly less than those paid 
by US companies in lawyers’ fees. The distribution of these costs is also impacted by 
litigation. In the UK costs are distributed evenly, as all companies (even those who are not 
parties to a complaint) must pay towards the funding of the Panel. In the US, target 
companies are burdened with the costs of litigation.  
 
There is also evidence to suggest that litigation in the US suppresses some takeover activity 
due to the frustrating effects litigation can have. By contrast, takeover activity goes 
unhindered by takeover litigation in the UK. As such there is an open MCC. This openness 
however derives from a number of different causes, not just the UK’s lack of takeover 
litigation. If the MCC is considered as an important corporate governance tool then the 
suppressive effect litigation has in the US may be problematic. What impact takeover 
litigation has on the MCC in the US is however heavily outweighed by other factors that 
suppress takeover activity, such as anti-takeover legislation and directors powers to defend 
against a bid. If US regulators wanted to encourage a more open MCC then they should first 
seek to remove those barriers.  
 
Takeover litigation is, however, beneficial for US target shareholders. It plays an important 
function in assuring the transparency of the target board during a takeover. This contributes 
to an informed shareholder and information asymmetry. Whilst there is certainly scope to 
reduce meritless claims in the US, and in turn prevent litigation that results in immaterial 
disclosures, to completely remove a shareholders’ access to litigation would have an impact 
on their ability to enforce their rights. Consequently, due to the characteristics of the US 
takeover system, takeover litigation plays an important role in US corporate governance. This 
is not a role that needs to be played by litigation in the UK as there is a culture of compliance 
which is created by the Panel and the Code. When a dispute does arise it is more efficient for 
parties to a takeover to consult the Panel than commence costly and time delaying litigation.  
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This work has provided an original contribution to the understanding of the levels of takeover 
litigation in the UK, and in explaining the different propensities to litigate during takeovers in 
the UK and US. It has also provided an original contribution to the achievement of the correct 
regulation of takeovers in the UK. This is a contemporary legal issue that is frequently 
debated, both by academics and governmental agencies; and laws which function in and 
affect society today. The findings of this research will substantially add to the knowledge and 
understanding of the regulation of takeovers by critically examining the diverging levels of 
litigation, and the effect of both the absence and presence of litigation. This will enable a 
unique and clear insight into how the propensity for litigation should be managed through the 
regulatory and institutional framework in the UK, and what economic and social benefits will 
follow those frameworks if they are correctly managed; an objective which this project aims 
to clarify and thereby adding an original contribution to this field of study. By addressing 
different issues and continually adding to this topic we can ensure a viable takeover system. 
A sustainable and working system of takeover regulation will greatly assist in the growth and 
governance of companies in the UK.  
 
Finally, the thesis presented here suggests a number of avenues for future research.  Perhaps 
the most ambitious of these, and the one I shall mention here, concerns the future 
development of both the UK and the US regulatory regimes for takeovers. Although this 
work has sought to evaluate the consequences of the different propensities to litigate in the 
UK and the US, it has not described in any detail how either country might respond to the 
different litigation landscapes the thesis has portrayed.   Future research might, then, focus on 
developing policy responses, for both subject jurisdictions, to the evaluatory arguments 
presented here.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH M&A LAWYERS 
 
Whilst the case study conducted for this paper gave data as to the ‘population’ of UK 
takeover-related cases leading to recorded judgments (and Panel rulings), what was lacking 
was the practitioner’s insight and commercial awareness of the strategic role which litigation 
does, or does not, play within the takeover process. What also was crucial was establishing 
whether underneath the recorded court cases of takeover litigation (which were the subject of 
this case study) there weren’t cases that had begun but had settled before they reached the 
court. If this was the case then the UK may have had a greater propensity to litigate than what 
could be identified by collecting court recorded takeover cases. 
 
Four top lawyers, one of whom had been a member of the Panel, from leading M&A firms in 
the UK agreed to speak with me. I also spoke with the Deputy Director of the Panel. The 
subject headings for discussion included the practitioners’ general perceptions of the UK 
takeover environment; general experience of the level of takeover litigation in UK; and 
complaints and the causes of action used to pursue takeover litigation. The below summarises 
what was discussed in the interview in response to the discussion points. 
 
When asked about the level of takeover litigation in the UK, the interviewees agreed that the 
levels were indeed very low. The interviewees however differed as to whether they would 
ever use litigation during a takeover bid. One noted that litigation was not even threatened by 
their firm because “everyone knows it an empty threat.” The other however suggested that 
whilst there is “almost no litigation, there were somethings that could be done.” For example, 
you can litigate over the breach of confidentiality or conflict of interest, which he stated were 
the main reasons for brining takeover litigation. He cited the cases of M&S, Minorca and 
Hoylake which can possibly be used to bring regulatory litigation, but noted there is a fine 
line because of the quasi-judicial process regarding takeover regulations.
972
  
 
When asked about how their client’s takeover complaints were dealt with by their firm the 
interviewees both said that they would approach the Panel. They would bring any complaints 
                                                          
972
 This refers to the court’s reluctance to get involved in the takeover process because it is the domain of the 
Panel 
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to the attention of the Panel, or if there was an issue with a breach of confidentiality or 
conflict of interest they would ask the Panel to have the party involved removed from the 
deal. One interviewee who acts principally on behalf of bidders stated that the most 
complained about issue is that the target board is frustrating the bid, or if there is any 
possibility that the target board is frustrating the bid. He noted that target boards can usually 
frustrate bids by changing the nature of the company and diluting interests of shares. After 
approaching the Panel about this specific complaint, the Panel would require the target board 
to get a shareholder vote on their actions if the shareholders agreed then they can carry on 
with their frustrating action and there would be nothing the bidder could further do to prevent 
this.  
 
When asked about the Panel’s involvement with resolving complaints the interviewees noted 
that they do not always have to consult the Panel but there are definitely things which need 
clarifying and can often trigger consultation. For example on noted that they “will usually 
only have to consult the Panel regarding the general principles as these are more vague.” But, 
“the Panel makes decisions on bids every day, literally on a daily basis.” The interviewees 
also explained, from their perspective how the Panel resolves the complaints. One 
interviewee said there is an internal process in the Panel, where you can get a formal ruling 
and hearing, and can also appeal. When making decisions the Executive is very careful before 
it gives a ruling. This is because the Panel “lives and dies by its decisions” and it knows it. 
The Code however avoids any problems in the first place. So there should be little for parties 
to complain about. Complaints are however made but there is a process to be followed. There 
are frivolous complaints, but they usually don’t have grounds to proceed. They are however 
still listened to by the Panel. Complaints during the takeover process are resolved by the 
Panel through dialogue. There are always some people who are unhappy, but if their 
complaint is real then it is dealt with by the Executive. 
 
If brining litigation, one interviewee noted that generally the cause of action would be via a 
contractual or fiduciary duty. It will be a contractual cause of action because of an 
engagement between advisors and the client, or tortious where there has been a breach of a 
fiduciary duty such as a conflict of interest. The cause of action will generally always be 
grounded in common law. One interviewee noted that it wasn’t tremendously difficult to 
bring these types of claims, but that it would be easier if they had the ability to bring class 
actions. There is, however, he explained a disincentive of costs which is a major factor in the 
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UK, this must be considered if they were to lose. Therefore he concluded that there is 
definitely more risk in the UK to bringing these types of claims. 
 
When asked what role they play as a lawyer in the takeover process the interviewees noted 
that their role requires a lot of expertise in takeovers and a detailed knowledge of the Code. 
‘Tactics are interlinked with the rules of the code – the rules are very complicated. Lawyers 
need to know the Code backwards, which used to be the job of the bankers now it is the 
lawyers’ job because the rules became too complicated. I will advise clients through these 
rules and advise on how to achieve their tactical goals without breaching the code.’ 
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APPENDIX TWO 
CASE LIST 
 
Eclairs Group Ltd and another v JKX Oil and Gas plc and others
973
  
A special resolution to prevent a takeover bid was passed by the defendant in order to weaken 
the power of the claimants who were suspected of ‘raiding’ the company in order to devalue 
it with an ultimate aim of acquiring the company at less than its proper value. The resolution 
had the effect of serving restriction notices on the claimants which prevented them from 
voting or transferring shares. The claimants sought interim relief to challenge the validity of 
the restrictions. On the evidence it was held that the directors did have reason to believe that 
they had not been given proper information by the claimants, and accordingly their power of 
restriction had been capable of exercise. However the power to impose restrictions had been 
exercised for a purpose which had not been a proper one for the purposes of that power. 
Therefore, its exercise would be set aside. The claim was commenced prior to a formal bid 
being made.  
 
Re Ricardo Group plc (No 3)
974
  
Ricardo Group plc was the subject of a takeover bid. A reply by shareholders of the Ricardo 
Group to a notice under the Companies Act 1985 s.212 did not name the true owners of 
certain target shares. The shares were therefore made subject to restrictions. An application 
was made to have the restriction lifted. It was held that although a company had a prima facie 
right to know who owned its shares, it was a matter for the discretion of the court whether a 
freezing order should be imposed or continued. Restrictions were often sought by directors 
not to determine a matter which actually affected the company but to defend their own 
position. On the facts, a failure to lift the restriction might prevent the takeover bid going 
ahead and this could prejudice those shareholders who wanted to accept it. The restriction 
would was discharged.  
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Re T R Technology Investment Trust plc
975
  
A company began an investigation into acquisitions and disposals of its shares in order to 
ascertain the beneficial ownership. The company was dissatisfied with the replies it had 
obtained to its s.212 notices. The responses failed to provide a plausible commercial 
explanation of what was happening and therefore the company sought and obtained an order 
under s.216, on an ex parte application, against a number of the respondents, freezing the 
shares. Since the information supplied in response to the s 212 notices did not enable the 
company to identify the real owner of the shares, the judge was entitled to make the order 
freezing the shares. It was no objection to the granting of an order freezing its shares that the 
board of the company was seeking the information to ward off a take-over bid. However, the 
consequences of continuing the restriction had to be taken into account and since the 
shareholders were willing to give a satisfactory undertaking not to dispose of the shares 
pending trial, the order made with respect to the shares would be discharged.  
 
Re Geers Gross plc
976
  
A company began an investigation into acquisitions and disposals of its shares in order to 
ascertain the beneficial ownership. The company applied for and obtained an order under the 
Companies Act 1985 s 216, imposing restrictions of share transfer. An application was made 
to the court to have the restrictions removed, contending that the restrictions could be lifted, 
even though the relevant information had not been disclosed, where an undertaking was given 
that the shares would be sold in the open market. The application was dismissed. 
 
In re Ashbourne Investments Ltd
977
 
An investigation by the board of trade was conducted which discovered that shares had been 
bought by a Swiss bank as an agent. The bank refused to disclose the names of their 
customers who owned the shares. A restriction was then placed on the transfer of the shares. 
Meanwhile another company made a successful takeover for the company that was subject to 
the investigation. The bidder became bound to purchase the restricted shares, however as 
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long as the restrictions remained in force the shares could not be transferred. This had the 
effect that the bid became frustrated. The bidder and the target therefore applied to the court 
to have the restrictions lifted. A partial release of shares from the restrictions was permitted. 
 
Re Expro International Group plc
978
 
A scheme of arrangement was due to be sanctioned by the court when the target shareholders 
made an application for an adjournment of the sanction for 14 days; the purpose of which was 
to give a potential rival bidder the opportunity to make a further bid for the company. The 
shareholders submitted that the target board appeared not to have taken into account that the 
acceptance of the rival bidder’s proposal which would have triggered an orderly auction 
process overseen by the Panel under the provisions of the Code that could have resulted in an 
increased price to the benefit of the shareholders. The application was dismissed by the court.  
 
In re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd
979
 
Minority shareholder opposed a scheme of arrangement due to a belief that the company had 
been undervalued and therefore refused to sell their shares. An application was made for the 
compulsory acquisition of the shares of a dissenting minority. The court granted the order. 
 
In re Bugle Press
980
 
An application by the minority shareholder was made to oppose the compulsory sale of his 
shares on the grounds that the shares had been undervalued. The court granted the order the 
shareholder sought. 
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Heron International Ltd and others v Lord Grade, Associated Communications Corp plc and 
others
981
  
The target directors owned a majority of the shares in the target company. There was a 
contested takeover bid for the target, but the directors had an interest in one particular bidder 
as they had agreed to sell their majority holding to them. The claimants, who sued as 
representatives of the shareholders in the defendant company, sought an interlocutory 
injunction to prevent the transfer of the directors’ shares to their preferred bidder. It was held 
that the transfer of the shares was void. 
 
Re Astec (BSR) plc
982
 
A bidder obtained 45% of the issued shares in a target company. The bidder later increased 
its shareholding to 51%. Having failed to obtain support for its offer to purchase the 
remaining shares in the company from the majority of the board of directors, the bidder 
issued a press release to recommend its offer to the shareholders. Soon after, the bidder 
requisitioned an extraordinary general meeting of the company pursuant to s 368 of the 
Companies Act 1985 to remove three directors from the board and replace them with its own 
nominees. The resolutions removing the directors were passed, leaving the directors 
nominated by the bidder in a majority of six to four. However, a petition was presented under 
s 459 which alleged unfairly prejudicial conduct of the company's affairs. The petitioners, by 
way of relief, sought an order that the bidder be ordered to purchase the remaining shares of 
the company at a fair value. The bidder then terminated discussions as to its proposed bid for 
the remaining shares in the company and issued a notice of motion seeking to strike out the 
petition. The court found on the evidence that the substance of the s 459 claim was without 
purpose. Since the petition was being used for the purpose of exerting pressure on the bidder 
in order to achieve the making of a takeover bid, it was an abuse of process and would be 
struck out. 
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R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission and another, ex parte Argyll Group plc
983
 
In the course of a contested takeover bid, one of the rival bidders was referred to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The effect of the referral was to cause the rival 
bidders offer to lapse and prevent it from making any new offers while the commission 
investigated the bid. Since the reference would therefore be a severe handicap to the rival 
bidder in its attempt to out-bid the other bidder, it communicated that it intended to make a 
new offer on different terms from the previous offer, which it hoped would be acceptable. It 
also requested that the chairman of the commission exercise their power to 'lay … aside' and 
not proceed with the reference if it appeared that ‘the proposal to make arrangements such as 
are mentioned in the reference [had] been abandoned.’ The chairman agreed to not proceed 
and the other bidder then sought a judicial review of this decision. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd and others
984
  
In a contested bid the target directors issued shares in order to dilute the influence of the 
majority shareholders which would allow a successful takeover to be completed by the 
bidder. The shareholders alleged that the directors had issued the shares for an improper 
purpose and were therefore acting outside of their powers. It was held that the directors had 
indeed exercised their powers for an improper purpose, and that the issue of the shares should 
be set aside.  
 
Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC and others
985
   
Joint venture partners entered into a supplementary agreement containing a poison pill buy-
out clause in order to protect the claimant company from a takeover. The agreement entitled 
the defendant company to buy out its interest on favourable terms in the event of another 
party gaining control of the claimant company or on removal of its chairman or managing 
director. The arrangement achieved its purpose of deterring takeover negotiations with a 
potential bidder. The claimant alleged that the agreement was void because it was entered 
                                                          
983 [1986] 2 All ER 257 
 
984
 [1974] 1 All ER 1126 
985
 [2003] 2 BCLC 129 
280 
 
into improperly by the board of directors and that the defendant had actual notice of this 
breach of duty. The claimant applied to have the agreement set aside. It was held that the 
agreement entered into by the directors was outside of their powers and that the agreement 
would be set aside. 
 
Bamford and Another v Bamford and Others
986
  
An allotment of ordinary shares was issued by the directors, who were empowered by the 
articles, in order to counter a takeover bid. The directors' actions were then ratified by the 
company in a general meeting. Some shareholders however alleged that the directors' actions 
were not in best interests of company and were in excess of their powers. It was held that the 
allotment could be ratified by the company in general meeting and therefore the issued shares 
would not be set aside. 
 
Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd and Others
987
 
An offer was made to the chairman and managing director of the target company for the 
bidder to buy the whole of the issued preference shares. The proposed takeover however 
would lead to a change in the nature of the companies trading which the directors considered 
would not be in the best interests of the company. The directors therefore issued and allotted 
preference shares to trustees for the benefit of the employees. The claimant, who was a target 
shareholder suing on behalf of the target company, alleged that the issue of shares was an 
improper exercise of the directors’ powers and applied to have the allotment set aside. It was 
held that the allotment was invalid unless it could be ratified by the shareholders.  
 
Gething v Kilner
988
  
A bidder made an offer for a target company, and a joint announcement was made. The target 
company hired a firm of stockbrokers to advise on the merits of the offer. Initially it was 
decided that the offer was fair and reasonable, later however they were advised by the 
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stockbrokers that the offer was inadequate and that the target board should not recommend 
the takeover. The claimants, who were shareholders of the target company, dissented from 
the offer, and sought interlocutory injunctions to restrain the target board from taking further 
steps to recommend the offer and the bidder from declaring or purporting to declare that the 
offer was unconditional. It was held that the interlocutory injunctions should not be granted. 
 
Marks and Spencer plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
989
 
The claimant, a target of a takeover, applied for an injunction to a takeover bid on the 
grounds that the defendants, who were the solicitors advising the bidder, were also the 
solicitors of the target company. The claimant alleged that there would be a significant 
conflict of interest and that the defendants would have access to confidential information 
which would be beneficial to the bidder in succeeding in the takeover bid. The application for 
the injunction was granted.   
 
Young and others v Robson Rhodes (a firm) and another
990
 
The claimant made an application for an injunction to restrain a merger in order to protect 
confidential information. The claimant had alleged that the defendant accountants acting, 
who acted on behalf of the claimants, were putting themselves in a conflict of interest in 
deciding to merge with another firm. The claim was dismissed and the merger could proceed. 
 
Interbrew SA v Financial Times and others
991
  
The claimant was considering a takeover of another company. It therefore requested a 
presentation from its financial advisors containing confidential information, which also 
disclosed the fact that the claimant was considering making a takeover bid. Such information 
was market sensitive, being calculated to affect the market price of the shares of both 
companies. Shortly thereafter, a person whose identity was unknown obtained a copy of the 
presentation and prepared 'doctored' copies. The copies of the presentation were sent to the 
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five defendants, who published certain documents of the doctored copies. The claimant 
alleged that there was a breach of an equitable obligation of confidence owed by the 
defendants to the claimant. The claim was successful and the defendants were ordered to 
deliver up the documents along with the name of the source. 
 
Dunford and Elliott Ltd v Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd
992
  
The claimant company decided to make a rights issue to their shareholders. The majority 
shareholders however invited the defendant to underwrite a significant amount. The 
Defendant was given confidential information regarding the financial prospects of the 
claimant, but decided against the offer. They later made a press announcement that they were 
making an offer to the claimant’s shareholders. The claimant therefore applied for an 
injunction to forbid the use of the confidential information in order to restrain the takeover 
bid. The claim was dismissed. 
 
Re Coroin Ltd (No 2); McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd and others
993
  
Claimant alleged that a share transfer was contrary to the pre-emption rights as outlined in the 
shareholder agreement. The appropriate offer had not been made to the claimant when it 
should have been, with the consequence that 35.4% of shares came under the control of 
another. The relief sought was an order entitling the claimant to purchase the shareholding or 
exercise of his pre-emption rights. The court held that there had been no breach of the pre-
emption rights. Claim brought after there had been a change in control.  
 
Re Sedgefield Steeplechase Co (1927) Ltd, Scotto v Petch and others
994
 
An offer was made to buy all the shares of a company. The majority shareholder agreed to 
sell their shares, but the shareholder who owned the remaining shares refused to do so. The 
majority shareholder entered into agreements with the bidder, agreements which they 
believed did not trigger the pre-emption rights. The minority shareholder however claimed 
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that they did. It was argued that the company’s articles of association conferred on its 
members’ rights of pre-emption over the shares of fellow members which were not 
transferred to other members of the company, their families or other persons as agreed. The 
rights were triggered when a member ‘intends to transfer shares’, in which event they are 
required to give notice in writing of their intention to the board. It was held that the transfer 
of shares in this instance was not in contravention of the company’s particular pre-emption 
provisions. 
 
Kleanthous v Paphitis and others
995
  
A director personally bought a company following a decision by other directors not to acquire 
that same company. Minority shareholders commenced a derivative claim alleging breach of 
fiduciary duties in acquisition of the company. Permission was not granted to continue the 
derivative claim. The claim was brought after the director’s takeover of the company was 
completed. 
 
Arbuthnott v Bonnyman and others
996
  
The claimant held an 8.9% of shares in the defendant company. The bidder, which was a 
vehicle for the other shareholders in the defendant company, made an offer to acquire all 
shares in the same company. The acquisition was approved, with only the claimant voting 
against the resolution. The transfer of all shares (other than those held by Arbuthnott) took 
place under the terms of the bidder’s offer. The validity of a transfer of shares was challenged 
by the claimant who brought proceedings contending unfair prejudice. The claim was 
dismissed. The claim was brought after there was a change in control. 
                                                          
995
 [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch) 
996
 [2015] All ER (D) 218 (May) 
284 
 
Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel and others
997
 
The defendant company was wholly owned by the claimant company between 2001 and 
2005. Thereafter, the claimant sold 75% of the shares in the defendant company to a third 
party company. At the same time, the claimant and the third party company entered into a 
shareholder's agreement. The claimant made a number of complaints relating to the manner 
in which the business of the defendant company had been conducted. The claim was 
unsuccessful.   
 
Rock Nominees Ltd v RCO (Holdings) plc (in liquidation) and others
998
  
A petition was made by the minority shareholders alleging that the sale of the company had 
been made at an undervalue and therefore the target directors had breached their fiduciary 
duties. The claim was dismissed. 
 
Re BSB Holdings Ltd (No 2)
999
  
During the process of a merger, minority shareholders alleged that they had been oppressed 
due to funding arrangements which divided groups of shareholders in to classes with different 
interests. The result of the different groupings meant that their interests became diluted and 
their influence diminished. It was claimed that the directors should treat all groups fairly and 
that it was a breach of their duties not to do so. The claim was dismissed on the evidence 
provided. 
 
IFE Fund SA v Goldman Sachs International
1000
  
The defendant was a bank facilitating financing to a French company to takeover a British 
company. The claimant provided the finances. After the takeover was complete however the 
company failed after deceit of the auditors involved in the takeover had been revealed. It was 
alleged by the claimant that the bank had been in breach of its duty because of 
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misrepresentations made concerning the target company to the claimant. The claim was 
dismissed. 
 
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and Others
1001
  
Following their takeover of a company, the claimant brought an action against the target 
company’s auditors, alleging that the company’s accounts were inaccurate and misleading. 
The claimant’s contended that the auditors had been negligent in auditing the accounts, and 
that the takeover bid had been made on the basis of the audited accounts. Therefore the 
auditors owed them a duty of care either as potential bidders or as existing shareholders. It 
was held that the auditors owed the respondents a duty of care as shareholders although not as 
potential investors. 
 
James McNaughton Papers Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co (a firm)
1002
  
The claimant entered into negotiations with a rival company for an agreed takeover at a time 
when they were in financial trouble. The chairman of the target asked the defendants, who 
were their accountants, to prepare draft accounts as quickly as possible for use in the 
negotiations. The accounts when prepared were shown to the claimants. After the takeover 
was completed the claimant discovered certain discrepancies in the accounts. They brought 
an action against the defendants alleging that the draft accounts had been negligently 
prepared and that in going through with the takeover they had relied on the draft accounts and 
the statements. On the evidence the defendants owed no duty of care to the claimant in 
respect of the accounts. 
 
JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co (a firm)
1003
  
The claimant entered into negotiations to takeover a company. During the negotiations the 
defendants, who were the target company’s accountants and who knew that the claimant was 
negotiating to takeover the company, produced audited accounts for the company’s first 
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trading year. Having certified them as being accurate the defendants made the accounts 
available to the claimant. In light of the information the claimants decided to takeover the 
target company, however the claimants suffered considerable loss as a result. The claimants 
therefore brought an action against the defendants claiming damages for breach of duty of 
care as prospective buyers of the company. The claim was dismissed. 
 
Sharp and others v Blank and others
1004
 
The claimant shareholders of Lloyds brought claims against its directors, alleging breach of 
fiduciary and tortious duties in respect of Lloyd's acquisition of another HBOS. The 
shareholders alleged that the directors of Lloyds had the benefit of detailed disclosure by 
HBOS and vastly superior knowledge to that of the shareholders and that, in giving advice, 
making recommendations and providing information, the defendants had voluntarily 
undertaken responsibility for the correctness of advice and recommendations given. The court 
found that although a director of a company could owe fiduciary duties to the company's 
shareholders, he did not do so by the mere fact of being a director, but only where there was, 
on the facts of the particular case, a 'special relationship' between the director and the 
shareholders. That special relationship had to be something over and above the usual 
relationship that any director of a company had with its shareholders. It was not enough that 
the director had more knowledge of the company's affairs than the shareholders. The duty of 
sufficient information that was allegedly breached by the target directors was held not to be 
likened to a fiduciary duty.  
 
MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG and others v Freightliner Ltd and others
1005
  
The claimant alleged that there had been fraudulent misrepresentations made by the 
defendant’s accounts officer. The claimant had acquired another company from the defendant 
by way of a share purchase agreement. It subsequently transpired that the accounts of the 
company had been persistently manipulated. The claimants issued proceedings seeking to 
recover damages for the false accounting because it had not given a true and fair value of the 
target company’s financial position, and that there had accordingly been breaches of 
                                                          
1004
 [2015] EWHC 3220 (Ch) 
1005 [2007] All ER (D) 65 (Sep) 
287 
 
representations and warranties in the share purchase agreement. The court found that the 
defendant was liable to the claimant in deceit and for breaches of the share purchase 
agreement. 
 
Ferguson and others v Spicer & Pegler (a firm) and another
1006
  
The claimant’s primary case claimed that during the relevant period the defendant, acting for 
a company they wished to takeover, negligently made material misstatements to the claimant 
which he relied upon when taking over the company. The claimant argued that had it not 
been for the misstatements he would not have done so.  The claimant was successful in his 
application and was awarded damages. 
 
Yorkshire Enterprise Limited and another v Robson Rhodes
1007
  
The claimant alleged that an investment to takeover a company was made in reliance on 
misstatements negligently made by the defendants in the target companies audited accounts. 
The court held that on the facts there had been a breach of duty due to the negligent 
misstatement and damages were awarded.  
 
Amalgamated Industrials Ltd and others v Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd
1008
  
An agent of the claimant placed himself in a situation where his own interest conflicted with 
his duty to his principal as the result of an arrangement with the bidder (to what could amount 
to as a bribe), the person with whom he was, on behalf of the claimant, negotiating with the 
regarding a takeover of the claimant. It was alleged that there was a conflict of interest and 
that confidential information would not be protected.  
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Lonrho plc v Fayed and others (No 4)
1009
  
The claimant company alleged that the defendants had deprived it of the opportunity to 
acquire the shareholding of a certain public company by misrepresenting to the public 
authorities their financial background and, in particular, the sources available for their own 
acquisition of the shareholding. After initial discovery failed to disclose sufficient 
information the claimant obtained an order for production of those defendants' financial 
documents, including documents prepared for taxation purposes and held by them and their 
advisers. The defendants claimed that the documents attracted public interest immunity and 
declined to produce them. The defendants therefore appealed against the order. The appeal 
was dismissed. 
 
Dawson International plc v Coats Paton plc and Others
1010
  
A contract was agreed between the bidder and the target that stated that the target board 
would recommend the bidder’s takeover offer and not co-operate with any rival bidders. 
Later a rival bidder made an offer for the target company which was accepted. The initial 
bidder raised an action against the target company alleging that the agreement had been 
breached and sought reimbursement for the expenses they had incurred in taking steps to 
implement the takeover, which had been wasted when their bid lapsed because of the rival 
bid. It was held that the agreement could not be invalidated, but that the claim for 
reimbursement would be dismissed.  
 
Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel Bank Ltd and others
1011
  
The claimant announced a takeover bid of a target company. After the bid became 
unconditional it was alleged that the target negligently prepared financial statements and a 
profit forecast which the bidder relied on. The bidder made a claim that there was a duty of 
care owed to a bidder or potential bidder. The question at hand was whether there was 
sufficient proximity between the bidder, the target board and the advisers of target company 
to found an action in negligence. It was held on the assumed facts the target intended the 
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bidder to rely on the pre-bid financial statements and profit forecast for the purpose of 
deciding whether to make an increased bid, and the bidder did so rely on those statements and 
the profit forecast, it was plainly arguable that there was a relationship of proximity between 
each of the target and the bidder in this instance sufficient to give rise to a duty of care. 
 
British and Commonwealth Holdings plc v Quadrex Holdings Inc
1012
  
The claimant made a bid for another company with the intention of selling off the wholesale 
broking division it had, which consisted of two moneybroking companies, if the bid was 
successful. The defendant, also engaged in the moneybroking field, and made a rival bid for 
the target with the aim of acquiring its wholesale broking division. By an agreement the 
claimant and the defendant agreed that the defendant would withdraw its bid for the target 
and the claimant, if its bid was successful, would sell the target’s wholesale broking division 
to the defendant. The claimant’s bid was successful, and the agreement between the claimant 
and the defendant became operative. The defendant however could not complete the 
purchase. The Claimant gave notice to the defendant that the failure to complete was being 
treated as a repudiation of the agreement and issued a writ against the defendant claiming for 
breach of contract. The claimant also applied for summary judgment contending that time 
was of the essence of completion. The defendant was ordered to make a reduced interim 
payment. 
 
R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin plc and another
1013
  
Judicial Review of a decision of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers: the claim alleged that 
the Panel had dismissed a complaint of an alleged breach of the code. The court declined to 
intervene. 
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R v Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers ex parte Guinness plc
1014
 
Judicial Review of a decision of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers regarding a procedural 
impropriety. The Panel had refused to adjourn a hearing of an alleged breach of the code. The 
court declined to intervene.  
 
R v The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Mohamed Al Fayed
1015
 
Judicial Review of a decision of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers regarding disciplinary 
proceedings against the applicants: the Panel and appellate committee of the Panel refused to 
adjourn the disciplinary proceedings when the applicants had a legitimate expectation that the 
proceedings would be adjourned. The court declined to intervene.  
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APPENDIX THREE 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Each table number corresponds to the chapter in which it was originally presented and the 
order in the chapter that it came. For example Table 4.1 is from chapter four and is the first 
table to appear in that chapter. Each table heading gives a brief explanation of what is 
contained in the table, but for further details see the specified chapter.  
 
Table 4.1 
List of the typologies of complaints that parties to a takeover may have. 
  Complaint 
Complainant Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint 
1. Target Directors 1A. Target Shareholders 1Ai. Identity of TS* 
1Aii. Concert party arrangements 
1B. Fellow Target Director 1Bi. Failure to disclose information 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  
1Biii. Acting in concert with the Bidder  
1Biv. Interest in bid 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill clause 
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality agreement 
1Ciii. Failure to disclose information 
1Civ. Conflict of interest 
1Cv. Breach of timetable 
1Cvi. Bidder pressured TS to sell shares 
1Cvii. Extension of timetable 
1Cviii. Takeover detrimental to long term 
plans of the TC** 
1Cix. Breach of Code 
1Cx. Misrepresented information 
1Cxi. Value of bid 
1Cxii. Failure to formalise bid 
1Cxiii. Loss of employment 
1Cxiv. Change to contract of employment  
1D. Bidder/Government 1Di. Breach of competition laws 
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1Dii. TC is a ‘national treasure’ or ‘jewel 
company’  
1Diii. Takeover will have detrimental effect 
to UK economy  
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  
1F. Takeover Panel 1Fi. Decision or ruling 
 
  Complaint 
Complainant Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint 
2. Target Shareholders 2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD*** misrepresented information  
2Aii. Failure to disclose information 
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not complying with the 
Code 
2Aiv. TD valuation of the share price 
2Av. TD advice on the merits of the bid  
2Avi. TD interest in bid 
2Avii. TD knew or ought to have known that 
the advice given to the shareholders by other 
professionals was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
2Aviii. TD issued new shares 
2Aix. TD knew or ought to have known that 
bidder would strip company of assets  
2Ax. TD knew or ought to have known that 
the takeover was detrimental  
2.B Bidder/New Directors 2Bi. Long-term plans have been unnecessarily 
disregarded by the new directors/majority 
2Bii. New directors issues shares (after 
takeover), and as a result remaining target 
shareholders vote is diluted 
2Biii. TS who are unable to take advantage of 
sell-out rule, but are affected by a new 
majority want their shares to be bought by 
the bidder  
2Biv. New directors/majority have stripped 
company of assets  
2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  
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  Complaint 
Complainant Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint 
3. Bidding Company 3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable  
3Aii. TC used takeover defence  
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate defence  
3Aiv. Failure to disclose information  
3Av. TD refused to negotiate  
3Avi. Value of bid 
3Avii. TD misrepresent information  
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders 
3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  
3C. Takeover Panel 3Ci. Decision or ruling 
4. Bidding Shareholders 4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover in not in the best interests of 
the BC**** 
4Aii. BD did not obtain best price for shares 
4Aiii. BD misrepresented information 
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of bid 
4Av. BD knew or ought to have known that 
the advice given to the BS by other 
professionals  was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  
 
Table 4.2 
Complaint type and corresponding UK cause of action. 
Complaint: Complainant: Target Directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
1A. Target Shareholders 1Ai. Identity of TS s.793, s.803 CA 2006 
1Aii. Concert party arrangements s.793, s.803 CA 2006 
1B. Fellow Target Director 1Bi. Failure to disclose information Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 
1Biii. Acting in concert with the Bidder  Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, s.175, 
s.177  CA 2006 
1Biv. Interest in bid Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, s.175, 
s.176, s.177  CA 2006 
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1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill clause Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality agreement Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
1Ciii. Failure to disclose information   
1Ciii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to act 
in best interests 
1Civ. Breach of timetable   
1Cv. Bidder pressured TS to sell shares   
1Cvi. Extension of timetable   
1Cvii. Takeover detrimental to long term plans 
of the TC 
  
1Cviii. Breach of Code   
1Cix. Misrepresented information s.2(1) MA 
1Cx. Value of bid   
1Cxi. Failure to formalise bid   
1D. Bidder/Government 1Di. Breach of competition laws s.75 FTA 
1Dii. TC is a ‘national treasure’ or ‘jewel 
company’  
  
1Diii. Takeover will have detrimental effect to 
UK economy  
  
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
1Eii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to act 
in best interests 
1F. Takeover Panel 1Fi. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
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Complaint: Complainant: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD misrepresented information  Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 
2006  
2Aii. Failure to disclose information Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 
2006  
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not complying with the 
Code 
  
2Aiv. TD valuation of the share price   
2Av. TD advice on the merits of the bid  Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); s.994 CA 2006  
2Avi. TD interest in bid Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.173 s.174, s.175, s.176, s.177 CA 
2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
2Avii. TD knew or ought to have known that 
the advice given to the shareholders by other 
professionals was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006); s.994 CA 2006 
2Aviii. TD issued new shares Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.171 CA 2006), s.33, s.549 CA 2006 
2Aix. TD knew or ought to have known that 
bidder would strip company of assets  
Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
2Ax. TD knew or ought to have known that the 
takeover was detrimental  
Derivative claim for breach of directors duties 
(s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
2.B Bidder/New Directors 2Bi. Long-term plans have been unnecessarily 
disregarded by the new directors/majority 
  
2Bii. New directors issues shares (after 
takeover), and as a result remaining target 
shareholders vote is diluted 
s.549 CA 2006 
2Biii. TS who are unable to take advantage of 
sell-out rule, but are affected by a new 
majority want their shares to be bought by the 
bidder  
  
2Biv. New directors/majority have stripped 
company of assets  
s.911B CA 2006  
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2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent misrepresentation 
2Cii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to act in 
best interests 
 
Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Company 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable    
3Aii. TC used takeover defence   
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate defence    
3Aiv. Failure to disclose information  Duty of care; s.90A FSMA 
3Av. TD refused to negotiate    
3Avi. Value of bid   
3Avii. TD misrepresent information    
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders   
3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent misrepresentation 
3C. Takeover Panel 3Ci. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
 
Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover in not in the best interests of the 
BC 
Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Aii. BD did not obtain best price for shares Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Aiii. BD misrepresented information Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of bid Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006) 
4Av. BD knew or ought to have known that the 
advice given to the BS by other professionals  
was negligent or misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of directors 
duties (s.172, s.174 CA 2006); s.994 CA 
2006 
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent misrepresentation 
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Table 4.3 
UK causes of action and corresponding takeover litigation rates over a 50 year period. 
  Cause of Action No of Cases Litigated 
Companies Act 2006 s.33 0 
s.171 0 
s.172 1 
s.173 0 
s.174 0 
s.175 0 
s.176 0 
s.177 0 
s.549 0 
s.793 1 
s.803 0 
Part 26 1 
s.911B 0 
s.994 3 
Companies Act 1985 s.216 3 
s.459 (s.994 CA06) 4 
Companies Act 1948 s.164/172 1 
s.209 2 
Fair Trading Act 1973 s.75 1 
Misrepresentation Act 
1967 
s.2(1) 1 
Financial Services and 
Markets Act 
s.90 0 
Contract Law (common 
law) 
Breach of contract 1 
Negligent misstatement 4 
Directors Duties 
(common law position 
pre Companies Act 
2006) 
Improper purpose 4 
Duty to act in good faith 3 
Duty of Care 0 
Conflict of interest 0 
Fiduciary Duties 
(common law) 
Duty of care 5 
Duty to act in best interests 0 
Duty of confidence 2 
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Conflict of interest 3 
Judicial Review   3 
Total (inc. common law 
directors duties) 
  43 
 
Table 4.4 
Most common UK causes of action for takeover litigation. 
Cause of Action 
Number of 
Takeover Litigation 
Percentage of total cases 
recorded % 
Common Law Fiduciary Duties 10 23 
Directors Duties  8 19 
Unfair Prejudice (s.994 CA06 & s.459 CA85) 7 16 
Negligent Misstatement 4 9 
 
Table 4.5 
UK takeover litigation rates compared to number of takeovers. 
Year Number of Takeover Litigation Number of Takeovers Percentage % 
2015 0 49 0 
2014 2 211 0.95 
2013 1 326 0.31 
2012 0 373 0 
2011 1 564 0.18 
2010 1 537 0.19 
Total 5 2060 0.24 
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Table 4.6 
Number of UK takeover litigation per decade. 
Decade Number of Takeover Litigation 
60's 4 
70's 4 
80's 10 
90's 11 
00's 8 
10's 6 
Total 43 
 
Table 4.7 
Instigators of UK takeover litigation. 
Instigator of Litigation Number Percentage % 
Target Shareholder 17 39.6 
Target Company 6 14 
Target Director 0 0 
Bidder 15 34.8 
Other 5 11.6 
 
Table 4.8 
Targets of UK takeover litigation. 
Target of Litigation Number Percentage % 
Target Shareholder 0 0 
Target Company 17 39.6 
Target Director 5 11.6 
Bidder 10 23.2 
Other 11 25.6 
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Table 4.9 
Outcomes of UK takeover litigation 
  Number Percentage % 
Litigation Successful 12 28 
Litigation Unsuccessful 31 72 
   
 
Table 4.10 
UK causes of action compared to Code provisions. 
Complaint: Target Directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
1A. Target Shareholder 1Ai. Identity of TS s.793, s.803 CA 2006 Rule 5.4, Rule 8 
1Aii. Concert party 
arrangements 
s.793, s.803 CA 2006 Rule 9.1, Rule 8 
1B. Fellow Target Director 1Bi. Failure to disclose 
information 
Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 Rule 20.1, Rule 23.1 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  Duty of care; s.172, s.174 CA 2006 Rule 23.1, rule 20.1 
1Biii. Acting in concert with 
the Bidder  
Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, 
s.175, s.177  CA 2006 
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
1Biv. Interest in bid Duty of care; s.172, s.173, s.174, 
s.175, s.176, s.177  CA 2006 
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
 
Complaint: Target Directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill 
clause 
Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
  
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality 
agreement 
Breach of contract (breach of 
conditions/repudiatory breach of 
contract/anticipatory breach) 
Rule 20 
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1Ciii. Failure to disclose 
information 
  Rule 8, Rule 20.1, 
Rule 23.1, Rule 24.2, 
Rule 24.3, Rule 25.3 
1Ciii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to 
act in best interests 
 Rule 3.2 
1Civ. Breach of timetable   Rule 31 
1Cv. Bidder pressured TS to 
sell shares 
  Rule 16.1 
1Cvi. Extension of timetable   Rule 31 
1Cvii. Takeover detrimental 
to long term plans of the 
target company 
  Rule 24.2 
1Cviii. Breach of Takeover 
Regulations 
  Breach of any Code 
rule 
1Cix. Misrepresented 
information 
s.2(1) MA 67 Rule 19.1, 19.3 
1Cx. Value of bid     
1Cxi. Failure to formalise bid   Rule 2.7 
1D. Bidder/Government 1Di. Breach of competition 
laws 
s.75 FTA 73   
1Dii. TC is a ‘national 
treasure’ or ‘jewel company’  
    
1Diii. Takeover will have 
detrimental effect to UK 
economy  
    
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
  
1Eii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to 
act in best interests 
  
1F. Takeover Panel 1Fi. Decision or ruling Judicial Review   
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Complaint: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD misrepresented 
information  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 19.1, 19.3 
2Aii. Failure to disclose 
information 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); Part 26; s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 23.1, Rule 20.1 
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not 
complying with the Code 
   A number of Code 
rules could be 
breached 
2Aiv. TD valuation of the 
share price 
    Rule 3.1 
2Av. TD advice on the merits 
of the bid  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 23.1, Rule 20.1  
2Avi. TD interest in bid Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.173 s.174, 
s.175, s.176, s.177 CA 2006); Part 26; 
s.994 CA 2006  
Rule 16.2, Rule 24.5 
2Avii. TD knew or ought to 
have known that the advice 
given to the shareholders by 
other professionals was 
negligent or 
misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); s.994 CA 2006 
Rule 19.1, 19.3 
2Aviii. TD issued new shares Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.171 CA 2006), 
s.33, s.549 CA 2006 
 Rule 21 
2Aix. TD knew or ought to 
have known that bidder 
would strip company of 
assets  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
 Rule 23.1 
2Ax. TD knew or ought to 
have known that the 
takeover was detrimental  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
 Rule 23.1 
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Complaint: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
2.B Bidder/New Directors 2Bi. Long-term plans have 
been unnecessarily 
disregarded by the new 
directors/majority 
    
2Bii. New directors issues 
shares (after takeover), and 
as a result remaining target 
shareholders vote is diluted 
s.549 CA 2006   
2Biii. TS who are unable to 
take advantage of sell-out 
rule, but are affected by a 
new majority want their 
shares to be bought by the 
bidder  
    
2Biv. New directors/majority 
have stripped company of 
assets  
s.911B CA 2006    
2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
  
2Cii. Conflict of interest Fiduciary conflict of interest, duty of 
confidence, duty of loyalty & duty to 
act in best interests 
  
 
Complaint: Bidding Company 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable    Rule 31 
3Aii. TC used takeover defence    Rule 21 
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate defence    Rule 21 
3Aiv. Failure to disclosure of information  Duty of care; s.90A FSMA 2000  Rule 8, Rule 20.1, 
Rule 25.3 
3Av. TD refused to negotiate      
3Avi. Value of bid     
3Avii. TD misrepresent information      
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders     
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3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
  
3C. Takeover Panel 3Ci. Decision or ruling Judicial Review   
 
 
   
Complaint: Bidding Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action Code Provision 
4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover in not in the 
best interests of the BC 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Aii. BD did not obtain best 
price for shares 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Aiii. BD misrepresented 
information 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of 
bid 
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006) 
  
4Av. BD knew or ought to 
have known that the advice 
given to the BS by other 
professionals  was negligent 
or misrepresentative  
Derivative claim for breach of 
directors duties (s.172, s.174 CA 
2006); s.994 CA 2006 
  
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care; negligent 
misrepresentation 
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Table 4.11 
Number of formal rulings made by the Panel and the corresponding rule breach. 
Code Rule Rulings* 
2.7 22 
5.4 0 
8 1 
9.1 3 
16.1 0 
16.2 0 
19.1 0 
19.3 1 
20 0 
20.1 0 
21 0 
23.1 0 
24.5 0 
25.3 0 
31 0 
Total 27 
 
Table 4.12 
The number of formal rulings the Panel has made per decade. 
Year  No of Rulings 
2015 0 
2014 2 
2013 3 
2012 5 
2011 14 
2010 11 
Total 35 
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Table 4.13 
The number of Panel rulings compared to the total number of completed takeovers. 
Year No of Rulings No of Takeovers Percentage % 
2015 0 49 0 
2014 2 211 0.95 
2013 3 326 0.92 
2012 5 373 1.34 
2011 14 564 2.48 
2010 11 537 2.05 
Total 35 2060 1.75 
 
Table 5.1 
List of US rules that may be breached by parties to a takeover. 
Regulation Section/Rule Description 
SEA* s.13(a) Requires that issuers whose securities are 
registered with the Commission pursuant 
to s.12 SEA file with the Commission 
accurate annual reports 
SEA s.13(d) Persons owning >5% of stock must file 
holdings on Schedule 13D report with the 
SEC within 10 days of purchase 
SEA s.13(d)(3) Requires that when two or more persons 
act as a group for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding or disposing of shares 
they will be deemed a “person” (acting in 
concert), such a group must file a 
Schedule 13D report if exceed 5% 
threshold 
SEA s.13(e) Regulates self-tender offers 
SEA s.13(f) All institutional Investors must disclose 
ownership regardless of number of stock 
owned 
SEA s.14(a) Rules on proxy solicitation 
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SEA s.14(d) Regulates tender offers generally (rules 
on disclosure and procedure) 
SEA s.14(e) Regulates unlawful tender offer practices 
(prohibits fraud) 
SEC 12b-20 Requires that reports required under 
s.13(a) contain any additional information 
necessary to ensure that the required 
statements in the reports are not, under 
the circumstances, materially misleading 
SEC 13a-11 Every registrant subject to s.13(a) shall 
file a current report on Form 8-K within 
the period specified in that form 
SEC 14a-3, 14a-8, 14a-12 Rules on exempt communications from 
definition of solicitation regarding proxy 
rules 
SEC 14d-1 Regulates the scope and definitions of 
s.14(d) and s.14(e), including required 
mandatory disclosures under these 
provisions 
SEC 14d-2 Governs the commencement of an offer 
SEC 14d-5 Dissemination of certain tender offers by 
the use of stockholder lists and security 
position listings. 
SEC 14d-6 Disclosure requirements with respect to 
tender offers 
SEC 14d-7 Withdrawal rights: any person who has 
deposited securities pursuant to a tender 
offer has the right to withdraw any such 
securities during the period such offer 
request or invitation remains open 
SEC 14d-9 Regulates target directors' disclosure 
statement, on the 14D-9 form, to target 
shareholders 
SEC 14d-9(f) Target board must file 14D-9 Form with 
SEC disclosing reasons for boards position 
on an offer 
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SEC 14d-10 If the bidder increases offer, target 
shareholders who have already accepted 
the previous offer are also entitled to the 
increased offer 
SEC 14e-1 Bidder must keep offer open for at least 
20 business days 
SEC 14e-2 Target Directors must disclosure their 
position on an offer to shareholders 
within 10 business days of 
commencement of the offer 
 
Table 6.1 
US corresponding cause of action for common complaints. 
Complaint Cause of Action 
Non-disclosure of acquisition above 5% s.13(d) SEA 
Material misrepresentations and omissions in 
proxy statements 
s.14(a) SEA 
Breach of the federal procedural and disclosure 
requirements for a tender offer 
s.14(d) SEA 
Misrepresentations and omissions in connection 
with the offer 
s.14(e) SEA 
Mandatory SEC filings have not been made 
SEC Rule 14d-1  
Target has not responded to the offer by filing 
the information required by SEC within 10 
business days 
SEC Rule 14d-9  
The offer has not been kept open for the 
minimum of 20 business days 
SEC Rule 14e-1  
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Table 6.2 
US cause of action to pursue the typology of complaints as identified in chapter four.  
Complaint: Complainant: Target directors 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
1A. Target 
Shareholders 
1Ai. Identity of TS s.13(d) SEA  
1Aii. Concert party arrangements s.13(d) SEA 
1B. Fellow Target 
Director 
1Bi. Failure to disclose 
information 
s.13(a), s.13(d) s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 
12b-20 13a-11, 14d-9; Directors duty of 
candor 
1Bii. Merits of the bid  Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
1Biii. Acting in concert with the 
Bidder  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of candor 
and duty of care 
1Biv. Interest in bid Directors duty of loyalty, duty of candor 
and duty of care 
Complaint: Complainant: Target directors (continued) 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
1C. Bidder 1Ci. Breach of standstill clause Breach of contract (specific to each 
governing State) 
1Cii. Breach of confidentiality 
agreement 
Breach of contract (specific to each 
governing State) 
1Ciii. Failure to disclose or 
misrepresented information 
s.13(d), s.14(a), s.14(e) SEA ; SEC Rule 
14d-1  
1Ciii. Conflict of interest Directors duty of care 
1Civ. Breach of timetable SEC Rule 14e-1  
1Cv. Bidder pressured TS to sell 
shares 
  
1Cvi. Extension of timetable   
1Cvii. Takeover detrimental to long 
term plans of the target company 
  
1Cviii. Breach of Regulations s.13(d), s.13(e), s.14(a), s.14(d), s.14(e) 
SEA; SEC Rule 14d-1 
1Cix. Misrepresented information s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA 
1Cx. Value of bid   
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1Cxi. Failure to formalise bid   
1D. 
Bidder/Government 
1Di. Breach of competition laws s.7 The Clayton Antitrust Act 1914 
1Dii. TC is a ‘national treasure’ or 
‘jewel company’  
  
1Diii. Takeover will have 
detrimental effect to the economy  
  
1E. Advisors 1Ei. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
1Eii. Conflict of interest Duty of care 
1F. Regulating Body 1Fi. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
 
Complaint: Complainant: Target Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
2A. Target Director 2Ai. TD misrepresented 
information  
s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 12b-20 13a-11, 
14d-9; Directors duty of candor 
2Aii. Failure to disclose 
information 
s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 12b-20 13a-11, 
14d-9; Directors duty of candor 
2Aiii. TD in conflict or not 
complying with takeover 
regulations 
  
2Aiv. TD valuation of the share 
price 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
2Av. TD advice on the merits of the 
bid  
s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rule 14d-5, 14d-6; 
Directors duty of candor and the duty 
of loyalty 
2Avi. TD interest in bid s.14(d) SEA; Directors duty of loyalty, 
duty of candor and duty of care 
2Avii. TD knew or ought to have 
known that the advice given to the 
shareholders by other 
professionals was negligent or 
misrepresentative  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
2Aviii. TD issued new shares   
2Aix. TD knew or ought to have 
known that bidder would strip 
company of assets  
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2Ax. TD knew or ought to have 
known that the takeover was 
detrimental  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
2.B Bidder/New 
Directors 
2Bi. Long-term plans have been 
unnecessarily disregarded by the 
new directors/majority 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care; Breach of controlling shareholders 
duty 
2Bii. New directors issues shares 
(after takeover), and as a result 
remaining target shareholders 
vote is diluted 
  
2Biii. TS who are unable to take 
advantage of sell-out rule, but are 
affected by a new majority want 
their shares to be bought by the 
bidder  
  
2Biv. New directors/majority have 
stripped company of assets  
  
2C. Advisors 2Ci. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
2Cii. Conflict of interest Duty of care 
Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Company 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
3A. Target Company  3Ai. Breach of timetable  SEC Rule 14d-9 (recommendations or 
solicitations by the target company or 
others) 
3Aii. TC used takeover defence  Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
3Aiii. TC used a disproportionate 
defence  
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
3Aiv. Failure to disclosure 
information  
s.13(a), s.14(d) SEA; SEC Rules 12b-20 
13a-11, 14d-9; Directors duty of candor 
3Av. TD refused to negotiate  Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
3Avi. Value of bid s.14(a), s.14(d) SEA 
3Avii. TD misrepresented or did 
not disclose information  
s.14(a) SEA; SEC Rule 14D-9 
3Aviii. TD advice to shareholders   
3B. Advisors 3Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
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3C. Regulating Body 3Ci. Decision or ruling Judicial Review 
 
Complaint: Complainant: Bidding Shareholders 
Target of Complaint Substance of Complaint Potential Cause of Action 
4A. Bidding Directors 4Ai. Takeover in not in the best 
interests of the BC 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
4Aii. BD did not obtain best price 
for shares 
Directors duty of loyalty and duty of 
care 
4Aiii. BD misrepresented 
information 
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
4Aiv. BD advice on merits of bid Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
4Av. BD knew or ought to have 
known that the advice given to the 
BS by other professionals  was 
negligent or misrepresentative  
Directors duty of loyalty, duty of care 
and duty of candor 
4B. Advisors 4Bi. Negligent advice  Duty of care 
 
Table 6.2 
US takeover litigation rates taken from Krishnan et al’s study 
 % 
Litigation in high value deals (>$80mil) 18.73 
Litigation in small value deals (<$80mil) 5.09 
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Table 7.1 
Typology of complaints: comparing UK and US available causes of action. Highlighting only 
those which do not have a corresponding right of action in the UK (table is a condensation of 
previous table 4.2 and 6.2. 
  Complaint Potential Cause of Action  
Complainant Target of 
Complaint 
Substance of 
Complaint 
UK US 
Target Directors Bidder 1Ciii. Failure to 
disclose or 
misrepresented 
information 
  s.13(d), s.14(a), 
s.14(e) SEA ; SEC 
Rule 14d-1  
1Civ. Breach of 
timetable 
  SEC Rule 14e-1 
(minimum tender 
offer period) 
1Cviii. Breach of 
takeover 
regulations 
  s.13(d), s.13(e), 
s.14(a), s.14(d), 
s.14(e) SEA; SEC Rule 
14d-1 
Bidding Company Target Company 3Ai. Breach of 
timetable  
  SEC Rule 14d-9 
(recommendations 
or solicitations by 
the target company 
or others) 
3Avii. TD 
misrepresented 
or did not 
disclose 
information  
  s.14(a) SEA; SEC Rule 
14D-9 
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Table 8.1 
Process of the single-step merger. 
 
Single-Step Transaction 
  
Day(s) Activity 
1 Announcement 
2 to 15 Prepare proxy statement (Target with the Bidder's input) 
16 File preliminary proxy materials with SEC 
26 to 50 Receive and resolve SEC comments 
55 Print and mail proxy materials 
90 Target shareholders' meeting to vote on merger 
91 Complete merger (provided requisite vote is obtained) 
  Bidder now controls and owns 100% of Target 
*Materials taken from ‘A Guide to Takeovers in the United States’, Clifford Chance Guide (2010) 
Table 8.2 
Process of the two-step merger. 
 
Two-Step Transaction 
Day(s) Activity 
1 Announcement 
2 to 15 Prepare Offer to Purchase and Schedule 14D-9 (Target) 
15 Commence tender offer; file definitive tender offer materials with 
SEC; mail materials to Target Shareholders 
15 to 43 Address any comments provided by SEC staff 
43 Close tender offer (if minimum tender offer and other conditions 
satisfied) 
  Bidder now controls Target 
47 If Bidder now owns at least 90% of Target's outstanding shares - file 
short-form merger certificate 
  Bidder now owns 100% of Target 
47 to 77 If Bidder owns less than 90% of Target's outstanding shares - prepare 
and file proxy materials with SEC relating to "squeeze-out" merger 
88 Mail proxy materials 
108 Target shareholder meeting to vote on 'squeeze out' merger 
109 Complete merger 
  Bidder now owns 100% of Target 
*Materials taken from ‘A Guide to Takeovers in the United States’, Clifford Chance Guide (2010) 
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